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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One hundred and sixty-eight years ago, the first President of the United
States presented his farewell address to the country which he had served so
well and which he, as much as any other person, had changed from a divided
group of self-oriented states Into a cohesive nation. George Washington's
principal advice to this young nation was to stay clear of permanent alliances
with foreign nations. With a vast and growing territory to the west to settle}
with an ocean protecting her eastern shore, and another ocean protecting her
western shorej with a peaceful neighbor to the north except for one short
interlude of a few years, culminating in the War of 1812 j with a much weaker
neighbor to the south who would be forced to cede by conquest additional land
for settlement to the west} with a foreign policy relying on the most power-
ful navy In the world, that of Great Britain, with a favorable balance of
power in Europe—the United States for over a century found it to her best
interest to follow her first President's sage advice. A small group of
nostalgic citizens believe It still to be the best policy.
The Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans no longer offer adequate protection.
Geographic distance between potential enemies has lost its protective importance.
Salvos of intercontinental supersonic missiles with thermonuclear warheads
can
destroy the largest cities in a matter of minutes. The British Navy no longer
protects the United States} rather the nuclear missiles of the United States
now protect Great Britain. Two superpowers have transformed the political
world. Each of them is seeking to convince the neutral and uncommitted nations
that Its way of life, economically and politically, offers the best hope for
each individual nation, as well as the entire world. The United States, as
one of these two leaders, now Instead of avoiding alliances. Is 1n competition
with the U.S.S.R., the other leader, spending billions of dollars annually to
obtain additional allies and to bind her existing allies by new means and
methods into stronger and more permanent alliances—economic, political and
military.
The United States continues to support the United Nations, in which all
nations are potential members, hoping that this world organization would
eventually produce, as was hopefully predicted by its most ardent founders,
a world of peace governed by law with justice. The failure of the United
Nations to produce effective aggrements or to fulfill its expected role made
It necessary for the United States to shift its foreign policy from primary
reliance on the United Nations to an interlocking system of alliances and
multilateral treaties encircling the "Iron and Bamboo Curtains".
1 United
States maintains a preeminent position In all these alliances.
With planes traveling at 2000 miles per hour connecting world capitals
in hours instead of days} with Instantaneous telephone and telegraph communica-
tions between all countries} with basic diplomacy changed to special meetings
including special emissaries and even heads of state) with a world-wide inter-
locking economic structure) and, above all, with soma nations shifting their
emphasis between the two poles for political or economic advantage; with other
'united States is a member of OAS (Organization of American States) which
includes all Central and South American states except Cuba) NATO (North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization) consisting of United States, United Kingdom, West
Germany, France, Canada, Italy, Belgiun, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Iceland,
Portugal, Luxembourg, Greece, Turkey; SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization)
consisting of United States, United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Australia,
Thailand, Pakistan, Philippines; and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) consisting
of United Kingdom, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran with the United States pledged to co-
operate for military defense. Bilateral treaties exist between United States
and Japan, United States and South Korea, United States and Taiwan, United
States and Philippines, United States and Australia and New Zealand.
nations fostering alternatives to the policies of the United States and the
Soviet Union, as France and China are doing; with still others creating
special groupings such as the neutralist or African nations are doing to
enhance their own special influence.—It remains increasingly impossible
for any nation to live in isolation or even exist as a selfsufficient nation.
Under these conditions, which are the result of changes vast and unforeseen
by the "founding fathers", another loved and respected President gave his
farewell address to the citizens of the United States. The speech was
directed to the citizens of the United States, but its background and impli-
cations were dictated by the changes in world relationships.
Sherman Adams says President Elsenhower was the greatest influence for
peace in the world. President Eisenhower hoped that furtherance of world
peace would determine his eventual place In history; consequently his
greatest disappointment was that he could not say after eight years in office
that permanent peace with justice was in sight. Nevertheless he felt that
his greatest achievement was the avoidance of war in a hopelessly divided
world, when, as he said, any display of weakness, moral or physical, could
have meant the possible spread of nuclear war.' But above all, he seemed to
think that his efforts in keeping the peace had also created a domestic
problem that threatened the Individual liberties of Americans as well as the
nation's traditional democratic processes. In his farewell address he saidt
A vital element In keeping the peace Is our military establishment.
Our arms must be mighty, ready for Instant action, so that no potential
aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction ...
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no
armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and
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.Sherman Adams, First Hand Report, p. 462.
3New York Tiroes, January VJ, i95T, p. 1.
as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk enter*
gency improvisation of national defense} we have been compelled to
create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to
this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the
defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than
the net income of all United States corporations.
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large
arms industry Is new in American experience. The total influence-
economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State-
house, »/wy office of the Federal Government. We recognize the impera-
tive need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its
grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved;
so is the very structure of our society.
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition
of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-
industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced
power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liber-
ties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only
an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of
the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful
methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.
President Elsenhower was not the first to cite the danger of the growing
military-industrial complex caused by the emphasis on military security. In
1947 Hanson Baldwin warned of "the militarization of our Government and of the
American state of mind."5 H. D. Lasswell6 In 1950 and Associate Justice
William 0. Douglas'' in 1952, among many other serious and respected authors,
wrote critically on various aspects of the military-industrial complex
which was new to the United States and brought on by World War II but con-
tinued since then, even growing and consolidating its position in American x
society because of the continuation of the "cold war". Following the Presl-
Sublic Papers of The President of the United States, Dwiqht D. Eisenhower.
1960-19&1, P. 1037. See Appendix I for entire speech.
SHanson Baldwin, "The Military Move In," Harper's Magazine, December, 1947,
p. 481.
°Harold D. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom, New York,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950.
'William 0. Douglas "Should We Fear The Military?" Look Magazine, March
11, 1952, p. 34.
dent's speech there appeared among commentators, scholars, legislators, and
writers of all types a growing number who wrote even more critically of
military and Industrial leaders. There is substantial evidence of an In-
creasing concern among thoughtful people that the effects of the military-
Industrial complex are detrimental, if not actually changing or destroying
the traditional American freedoms of our democratic society. Some members
of the "anti-war" group** quote Eisenhower's speech as evidence of a milita-
ristic state. As his speech is being quoted and mis-quoted and, further,
1s the basis for this paper, it is necessary to know precisely what the
President said. He made three principal points In the section of the
speech on the military-industrial complex. First, that the need of an
Immense military establishment and a large area industry is, to use his exact
word, "Imperative". Second, that the potential for misplaced power exists
and the Influence of the military-industrial complex is felt in every structure
of our society—economic, political, and even spiritual. The Important word
in the preceding sentence is "potential". President Eisenhower didn't say
that misplaced power exists, as many infer he did, but that only the potential
exists. If he had said that misplaced power actually existed, It would have
Indicted his entire administration and we, as Americans, would have expected
him as President to have done something more than just call such a condition
to the attention of the nation upon his retirement from public office.
8
Robert A. Levine, The Arcr. Dabate , New York, Columbia University Press,
1961. In this book Levine Identifies five groups of thought: the liberal
left which is generally anti-war, the conservative right which is generally
anti-ccranunlst, and the middle three groups which are both antl -communist and
anti-war to different degrees. I have only used the terms antiwar and anti-
comraunlst in this paper as the finer gradations are not necessary.
President Elsenhower's recccmiendation to the problem was that In the
councils of government, acquisition of unwarranted influence and misplaced
power, must be guarded against whether sought or unsought. Further, he said
that only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry could compel the proper
meshing of the huge military machinery of defense so that security and liberty
could prosper together. The President didn't elaborate on how the public could
gain this knowledge. The purpose of this paper is to determine if Eisenhower
1
*
thesis is correct by examining in successive chapters the main points he has
/
raised in his speech. First, "the imperative need" will be examined from the
viewpoint of the American public as well as its elected officials. Second,
examination will be made of the "potential unwarranted influence and misplaced
power" in both industry and the military. Particular attention will be given
to evidence of changes in the political and economic conditions affecting the
complex. Third, examination will also be conducted into the generally accepted
theories of the operation of industry and the military which may be founded on
misconceptions. Safeguards already within the democratic system which nullify
or retard the potential rise of undemocratic tendencies in the complex will
also be enumerated. As Eisenhower's recommendation is not considered suffi-
cient to produce results an attempt will be made to show why it is untenable.
Finally, a possible solution which could produce meaningful results and still
be within the framework of United States democratic tradition is presented.
One of the conclusions reached is that there is actually a third member
of the military-industrial complex, namely the Congress of the United States.
For at least (thr*e) reasons this thesis will seem weighted toward the military
side: (1) as a result of the changed international position of the United
States beginning with World War II, the military's place has radically changed
from the traditional one of a relatively non-political, socially isolated.
even distrusted group to one of political Influence, prestige, and respect}
(2) In the scholarly literature dealing with the complex more attention Is
paid to the military than to the other two members, the Congress and industry}
(3) the author is a soldier who Is personally involved in the
military point
of view and is more familiar with military sources. The latter reason may
produce an unconscious bias as the author views the military from the inside
of the organization while he views the Congress and industry from the outside.
The Congressional Record and Congressional quarterly have been used to
find out what Congressmen have said on this and related subjects. The words
of military scholars, industrial economists, social and political scientists
have been studied. As the subject is a current one and the President specif-
ically said the danger was potential, the New York Times, Kansas City Star
and Times, Newsweek, U. S. News and World Report and Time have been read daily
or weekly, as the case may be, from March \$(M to March 1965, and the material
evaluated. To get the viewpoint of the military and Industry, the author has
reviewed each issue of The Journal of the Armed Forces , Array, Airpower, Aviation
Week, Business Week, and Missiles and Rockets for the same period. Additional
trade and leading scholarly magazines In political science, economics, and
sociology have also been consulted.
CHAPTER II
IMPERATIVE NEED
The traditional reason for a national military establishment Is protection
from an external threat. The United States has only one external threat in
the world today and that Is the U.S.S.R. Beyond doubt the Russians could
devastatingly cripple the United States, in a matter of hours at most and
probably in less time, by a superstate, thermonuclear missile attack. The
only defense the United States has against such an attack Is the assurance of
the U.S.S.R. that this type of attack would automatically trigger a retaliatory
one which would bring as much or more damage to itself than the U.S.S.R. could
possibly accomplish against the Unitod States by Instigating a thermonuclear
exchange.
The President, Congress, and the American People
Congress is responsible to provide for the common defenses to raise, sup-
port, and appropriate money for the military establishment. The President is
Commander-in-Chief of the military forces and the only elected official to
represent all the people. Except for a few vocal members of the anti-war
group who feel that the possibility of nuclear war Is so awesome that the
United States should destroy its own weapons and attempt to gain world
'Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, Princeton University Press,
I960. This book gives a detailed and thorough discussion on all phases of
nuclear war, including minimum and finite deterrents, first strike capabili-
ties, preattack mobilization base, limited war, and balance of terror. It has
been criticized that it is an attempt to make thermonuclear war acceptable.
This is not quite accurate, but it Is easy to see how an "anti-war'- advocate
could reach this conclusion. Kahn's main thesis is that the Unitod States is
not preparing adequately for any type of nucl >ar war. The book is valuable
for a student who desires to understand all the alternatives that must be con-
sidered In reaching a national policy that will assure survival In case of a
nuclear war.
leadership through moral suasion and example, the goal of American nuclear
2
superiority over the U.S.S.R. undoubtedly has overwhelming public support.
The 1964 Presidential Campaign daily provided evidence that this last
statement Is true. On a single day (October 12, 1964) Senator Barry Gold-
water made three separate speeches attacking the Johnson Administration for
(1) being "soft on Communism," (2) eliminating manned bombers to the detriment
of United States military strength, and (3) destroying NATO confidence by re-
fusing use of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO commanders under specified con-
dittons without President Johnson's approval. President Johnson immediately
answered all three charges, as he had many tlicss before. His sensitivity on
the subject of United States military strength not only brought Defense
Secretary HcNamara in particular, but the military civilian chiefs as a whole,
4
into politics to a degree never before witnessed In United States history.
Political commentators of Newsweek were typical in assessing the war and peace
issue as the most decisive In the campaign. Both candidates emphasized peace
through strength with Goldwater arguing for a 'tauscle-flexing" pursuit, while
Johnson said "the key to peace is to be found in strength and the good sense of
the United States."5 In addition, Johnson was Insisting that "his opponent
makes 'reckless' accusations about America's military power" and that "the
6
Democrats have 'vastly Increased' American power."
Ibid., and Robert A. Levine, The Arms Debate, p. 285. Only the student,
the policy makers and military ere interested In the various degrees of nuclear
deterrent. The public as a whole is Interested in assurance of survival and
responsibility in handling nuclear weapons. Levlne and Kahn (See Note #1)
provide a summary of the entire spectrum of nuclear warfare with detailed ram-
ifications.
^Kansas City Times, Associated Press Dispatches, October 12, 1964, pps.
1,2,12.
^Journal Memo, Journal of The Armed Forces , October 24, 1964, p.4.
f'The Peace Issue," Newsweek, November 2, 1964, p. 24.
Journal of The Armed Forces , Joe. cit.
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The Republican and Democratic platforms since 1948 have called, as a
minimum, for an adequate defense which, to Africans, means a defense
establishment superior to that of the U.S.S.R. In all respects. In I960
Kennedy argued, when campaigning for the Presidency, that the United States
was becoming a second-rate military power under the Republicans and was
Q
preparing for the wrong kind of war, at the same time Nixon was saying,
"We must not cut the defense budget. It must remain and Increase if we are
to remain a free and the most important nation in the world*"' Johnson,
on becoming President, said he was going to follow President Kennedy's military
policy which the latter stated as, "There is no discount price on defense.
The Free world must be prepared at all times to face the perils of a global
nuclear war, limited conventional conflict, and covert guerrilla activities."
President Johnson specifically sale1 , "We shall keep the peace by maintaining
both the strength of our arms and the initiation of our diplomacy." 11 And in
his budget message to Congress on January 21, 1964, he said further, "We have
chosen not to concede our opponents' supremacy in any type of potential
12
conflict, be It nuclear war, conventional warfare, or guerrilla conflict."
Congress, as a whole, has willingly supported the military goals of the
administration, whether it be Republican or Democratic. Although some Congress-
men have criticized the size of defense appropriations, individual projects and
poor management, and the ease with which defense appropriations gain legislative
Platforms of the Democratic Party and tha Republican Party, 1964, U. S.
Govergnant Printing Office, p. 56.
rf
"Newsweek, October 3, i960, p. V».
.^Richard M. Nixon, The Challenges We Face, p. 8.
1 John F, Kennedy, Speech at Ccxmond and Ganeral Staff College, Fort Leaven-
worth, Kansas, Hilitary Review, July 1963, p. 66.
* ,,1-yndon B. Johnson "On The Offensive For Peace", Army. December 1963# p. 27.
12Jack Raymond, Power At The Pentagon, p. 6.
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approval in comparison with other measures, no Congressman gained national
recognition in the 1964 campaign by advocating a reduction in defense. Instead
the reverse was true. Congressmen seeking reelection stood for a defense
establishment second to none. Foreign military aid is supported without
question by Congress while economic foreign aid programs backed by the ex-
ecutive branch only pass Congress with deductions, usually after personal
appeal for passage by the President. A study of defense appropriations since
1948 reveals that Congress (which supposedly knows best the desires of its
constituents), in spite of several cuts in selected areas, has had only one
overall effect on the military budget and that is to increase it. In fact,
the Chief Executive has several times impounded appropriated money and refused
to use it as Congress desired. ^ The actions of Congress have produced more
defense but its actions have also produced duplication or pluralism. One
example of this effect is the 19&4 debate between Senator Goldwater and
Secretary McNamara. Goldwater questioned the reliability of missiles. Actually
he was not against missiles but wanted additional money to produce sizable
14
quantities of the B-70, or another intercontinental manned bomber.' Air Force
Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, said that he would accept present
missiles even if they were less reliable than they are, but he supported
Goldwater before Congress by saying it would be dangerous for the United States
to place total reliance on missiles. Both are for development and procurement
of a bomber to replace the B-52 and B-58.' Congress has consistently supported
appropriations for a diversified military establishment that will maintain
United States military superiority in all fields and with all possible weapons
'^Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense
, p. 41,
^U. S. News and World Report , March 9, 1964, p. 28.
1 Catherine Johnsen, "New Bomber Funds Win Early Approval," Aviation Week
& Space Technology, February 24, 1964, pps. 26-27.
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systems, Including airplanes, missiles, submarines, aircraft carriers and
any equipment it takes for all types of special forces. The actions of
Congress point to the conclusion that this pluralistic, diversified type of
defense is what the country needs and wants.
Scientific Superiority
Nuclear weapons superiority is at present a clear-cut aim of the United
States. Solitary possession of the atomic bomb after World War II gave the
United States an Initial sense of security which to the American public was
dismayingly destroyed when Russis exploded an atomic bomb in 1949* followed
by a hydrogen bomb in 1953, and lastly when the achievement In space pro-
pulsion demonstrated by "Sputnik" in 1957 which confirmed a lead in space
propulsion which the United States 8 years later still has not overtaken. As
each scientific success of the Russians has become known, the leaders of the
nation and the American public have demanded an effort by the military-industri-
al complex (augmented by scientific research and development) which would not
only equal but surpass the Russians. National pride, while hard to measure,
has also abetted such an effort.
Undetectable chemical and biological weapons, more powerful thermonuclear
weapons, predictions of cobalt, neutron, and more sophisticated hydrogen
weapons, manned orbiting space ships carrying atomic bombs—all already on the
future scientific time tablej only accentuate the imperative need for the United
States to stay ahead of the U.S.S.R. in scientific progress as far as It relates
to military supremacy. True, thore Is a minority point of view that Is growing
larger, that exploration of spaca, not having an immediate military value,
should be curtailed. However, at the present time there is no absolute
13
agreement on which space projects should be military and which strictly
scientific and civilian. Congress has not cancelled any budgeted space pro-
jects; but, by cut-backs In appropriations. It has delayed some of them. A
persuasive point of view Is the latest statement of the Chairman, Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, J. W. Full right that the war on poverty and
16
education and welfare programs are more important than a "voyage to the moon."
The military has been unsuccessful in its attempts to control all space ex-
ploration; rather, it has supported government space exploration by NASA
(National Aeronautical Space Administration) and, In return, received priority
whenever a project is recognized as having a definite military application.
A Russian space success which appears to have a military application will
undoubtedly have Congress appropriating additional money and applying the
pressure not only on the military and industry, but also on NASA, to equal or
surpass Russian claims to success which are not necessarily justifiable.
Congress, in the present climate of opinion, will support all proven needs for
the military's scientific demands.
But space developments are not the only areas in which military scien-
tific progress is being made. Scientific progress is being made in all mili-
tary fields. This progress runs the entire gamut of conventional weapons,
missiles, submarines, planes, helicopters, munitions, and many others. In
fact scientific progress is making military hardware obsolete, in crany cases
even before it is used. The imperative need of a huge military establish-
rosnt and an industrial base to support it definitely includes scientific
,6Kansas City Star, Associated Press Dispatch, April 6, 1964, p. 9.
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superiority in research and development in all fields, including nuclear.
World Leader and Foreign Policy
The United States is the accepted leader of the so-called free world or
anti -communist nations. The foreign policy of the United States is that
allies are indispensable. This policy stresses keeping the alliances encir-
cling the "iron curtain" militarily and economically functional, but also con-
tinually strengthening them wherever possible. By bitter experience, it was
learned that United States leadership in these alliances could be maintained
only by forces-in-being. Industrial capacity is no longer decisive in keeping
allies or deterring aggression.
Immediately after World War II the U.S.S.R. did not demobilize her Army
as did the United States, with the result that Eastern Europe was sealed off
and became a Soviet preserve. Secretary of State George Marshall at Moscow
and Secretary of State James Byrnes at Berlin tried to modify or alleviate
these actions by negotiation, but they could not gain any concessions, nor could
they remedy or weaken the Soviet domination. The accepted reason for this
failure was, as stated by both Secretaries, simply that they had no negotiating
power. Marshall found his basis for negotiating in China in 1947 even less
rewarding, and this with a much weaker foe. Coincident with Communist expan-
sion in Europe and China were the actions of the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council
of the United Nations where United States proposals on a military force to main-
tain world peace or on control of nuclears, whether realistic or unrealis-
tic, were met only with successive "nyets" by the Soviet Union. China was lost
to the Communists in 1948; only a military effort in 1947 by the United States
''Huntington, op_. cit ., p. 40.
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saved Turkey and Greece from becoming Communist. The Korean War from 1950
to 1953 emphasized the bipolartzation of the world between the two protagonists-
—U.S.S.R. and United States and the formation of NATO in 19*»9 has been given
credit for stopping Soviet expansion In Europe. The Americans learned the
lesson well that Stalin's remark to Franklin D. Roosevelt, "How many divisions
18
has the Pope got?" was not a facetious remark on the part of the Soviet leader.
The international successes of the United States in stopping Communist expansion
have been accomplished because military power was ready for action and used
while the failures can be attributed to the lack of sufficient military power
or failure to use available force. The only answer has been to increase the
size of our own forces as well as those of our allies.
Samuel P. Huntington, one of the most competent scholars writing on the
military today, says that since World War II the dominant goal of United States
foreign policy has been national security, with the aims of national security
having a veto on every foreign policy decision and foreign policy now even often
defined as a branch of national security policy. ' There is no doubt that
national security policy and foraign policy are inextricably intertwined. And
the consequences of separate forsign and national security policies would only
produce confusion and lack of direction at the national level and also among
"I
our allies.
.
Gone ere the days when a Secretary of State can act as Henry
Stimson did in implementing the policy of non-recognition of Manchoukuo without
20
even notifying the Navy Department, or as Secretary Cordell Hull did when he
refused to read the Army plans for occupying Iceland because (as he said) if
18
C. L. Sulzberger, "When The Pope Was Infallible," New York Times, Hay 16,
191*8,0. 3*».
^Huntington, op. cit., p. 426.
20Walter Mil lis, Harvey C. Mansfield, Harold Stein, Arms and Tha State,
p. 20.
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he didn't know them he wouldn't be embarrassed before Congress. And
similarly, gone are the days when the State Department could abdicate its
responsibilities, or be forced to do so by a President, and allow General
Joseph Stilwell to supplant the appointed ambassador to China Clarence Gauss
1n all World War II dealings with Chiang Kai-shek or when determination of
access routes to Berlin or the occupation of Prague and Berlin would be con-
sidered as strictly military decisions to the entire exclusion of the political
22
point of view. The NSC (National Sacurity Council) provides us with the
coordinating organization, whethar we think it Is functioning to its highest
potential or not, where foreign policy-military security problems are discussed
and formulated from both political and military points of view.
>A11ies have another significant effect on the military-industrial complex.
Concentration on nuclear weapons as the only means of conducting warfare
produces one kind of military establishment. If the United States would adopt
this strategy, then the military establishment could be limited to ICBM's
(intercontinental ballistic missiles), antimissile defense against Soviet
nuclear missiles, and civilian defense structures to protect cities and the
non-combatant citizens of the United States. But the type of military establish-
rasnt which places emphasis on a single type of warfare—that of massive re-
taliation as advocated by the Eisenhower admlitistratton-^fai is to protect all
our allies and, of course. Is unsatisfactory to them, as the reason for
alliances is mutual security. In some cases, as In Vietnam and Laos, over-
whelming nuclear superiority fails even to deter the opposition. Allied
2
| Ibid. , pps. k9, 51.
22Tbld., pps. 95, 129, 132.
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troop concentrations In Germany have certainly Influenced Soviet policy.
Again, having available troops to move to Lebanon and Cuba changed conditions
in these two countries. Even in these areas where a war, 1f started, might
well escalate to a thermonuclear war, conventional forces are considered vital
and probably more useful as a shield (if anything else). The United States,
In order to stop the spread of Communism and to protect allies, is committed to
any possible type of warfare commensurate with that used by Comnunists any
place in the world.]
C. Wright Mills bluntly states that only a great nation can threaten
decisive warfare and that military power determines the political standing
of nations.
23
The United States is a great nation and to maintain its preeminent
position in world councils must have commensurate military power. Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., has expressed the same idea in a more subtle and interesting
way and indicates the reason this country must have a diversified military
posture in order to have a viable foreign policy with military policy subor-
dinate to foreign policy.
It is now evident that military power becomes the master of foreign
policy not when there is too much of it but when there is too little. It
is the absence or lopsidedrtess of armed strength that allows the military
situation to run foreign avfcirs. When our military policy is inadequate
to meet a variety of crise:;, our foreign policy must become constrained,
rigid, and inflexible. Balanced and ample military power is consequently
the price we must pay for freedom of national action.
American diplomatic prestige and leadership require that the United States
be recognized as the superior military force in all types of warfare, whether
strategic missile warfare, conventional warfare with large troop concentrations.
23C. Wright Mills, The Powar Elite, p. 85.
2^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Military Force« How Much and Where?,"
--.-, Rcnoriar, August \k, 1953, p. 13.
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or small troop concentrations of the guerrilla or special force type, and
whether on land, or sea, or In the air. The imperative need for a huge
military-Industrial complex is complicated and enhanced by the United States
national policy of world leadership, by the necessity for allies in all parts
of the world, and by the requirement to stop the spread of Communisra. The
United States cannot concentrate on one type of military force, but must
become proficient in all types (of warfare). This has one principal effect—that
is enlargement and profusion of the military establishment and the industrial
structure to support it.
Economic Necessity
&[Defense Industry Is an imporUnt factor in the economy of the United
States. As it Is doubtful that the defense budget will increase in the near
future without a Soviet political or military offensive, and since, for the
moment, the U.S.S.R. is engaged in domestic problems and in maintaining Its
leadership In competition with China in Communist-controlled countries, only
a decrease In the defense budget need bo considered. Any sudden, large
adjustments downward In defense expenditures would drastically affect the Amer-
ican economy. That this is true can be proved by a few facts. Defense, if it
can be considered a single industry, Is admittedly the leading one today.25
With assets three times the combined assets of U. S. Steel, Metropolitan Life
Insurance, American Telephone and Telegraph, General Motors, and Standard Oil
26
of New Jersey; with 22 out of 50 states depending heavily on defense
X
5 It has become common to speak of Defense Industry as one industry similar
to the auto industry. This Is not accurate; the defense tndustry is, according
to Jack Raymond in his book, Power At The Pentagon, "a hybrid arms industry,
financed by the government, controlled by tha covernraent, but labeled free enter-
prise, is one of the characteristics of the military-industrial complex.," (p. 166)2oFred J. Cook, The Warfare State, p. 22.
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spendingj 2? with space (which has many military Implications), now the second
Industry In the United States after having passed steel and steel products In
1963, and at Its present rate of growth about to surpass the leading auto
industry within the next two years; 28 it can be expected that over $20 billion
in new contracts will be negotiated through the Defense Department annual ly
2^
for the foreseeable future, excluding the contracts NASA will negotiate.
Defense contracts are also important internationally. As the world leader
in the production of military equipment, the United States is a foremost advo-
'
cate for the standardization of all military equipment for our allies. This is
without doubt a desirable military objective. With all nations using the
same equipment, Interchangeability of not only equipment but of spare parts is
possible and maintenance, repair, and supply depots can not only be integrated
but become much more efficient. This is important as part of our military
policy, but selling military equipment to our allies is also a significant I
factor in maintaining the balance of payments in a favorable ratio.30
Only one other related fact is necessary So show the importance of
defense industry to our present economy. Presidentj.*eht»»ei{js advocating a
war on poverty. With 5 billion unemployed, is the President or Congress
willing to sacrifice the leading industry of the United States? Would the
President or Congress allow a prolonged strike in the auto industry, let alone
its elimination or partial elimination? The concern of the President and the
country over a strike in the steel, rail, or any other large industry should be
2?Ibtd
., p. 176.
zoWi!Ham Beller, "Missile/Space Industry Rapidly Outdistancing Automo-
tive,"Jj1ssJJes_andRockets, October 28, 1963, p. 22.
fgCook, loc.'cTt:
JU
"Have TSJn, WTl Sell," Tha tow Republic, June 5, 1965, p. 5.
20
sufficient proof that the acceptance by the public or government officials of
the elimination of the defense industry or even of a large-scale reduction in
it would be unacceptable. Defense spending will continue until unemployment
decreases or until defense industry can be shifted to other pursuits, which
will take time. Defense spending will probably increase if even a slight
depression appears as it did under Eisenhower in 1958.31 /\s unsympathetic
a commentator of the present Administration as David Lawrence says that it
would be disastrous to our national economy if the arms budget was cut suddenly,
although he, like many others, including respected economists and industrialists,
thinks it could be cut gradually, but only after detailed plans were made and
effected to shift the economy with a corresponding cut in taxes.' The 1964
cut in taxes stimulated business. There is evary reason to believe that
additional cuts would have the same beneficial effect upon the national economy.
Defense spending only represents 10% of the GNP, so 90% has to come from other
areas. Defense spending does not enter into consumption and is, on the whole,
a wasteful method of government expenditure to produce prosperity. In 1945-46
there was transferred more than twice as much in resources and manpower from
war to civilian employments as would be involved in complete disarmament now
33
without disruption of the economy. There are many suggestions and methods
to reduce the size of the military-industrial complex. Many economists believe
with Kenneth E. Boulding that If the government would spend as much on research
and training for human welfare as Is spent on defense that the results would be
jjHuntington, op_. cit., p. 276.
32David Lawrence, "I?- - -", U. S. News and World Report, October 21, 1963,
"Donald G. Brennan, ed.. Disarmament and National Security, p. 156.
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dramatic* Nevertheless to cut the military budget will not be a simple
task and will at best require detailed planning for conversion.
Conclusion
According to McNamara, the President and Congress are providing the
means to fill this imperative defense need of the American public. He
summarizes the situation pragmatically in this fashion:
The U. S. has 750 intercontinental ballistic missiles on the pads as
against less than 200 Soviet ICBM's. There are 192 Polaris missiles de-
ployed, in contrast to a far fewer number of Russian sublaunchad missiles
which have only one-third as much range and must be fired from the sur-
face. The U. S. has 540 strategic jet bombers on 15 minute alert, while
Russia has no more than 120 heavy bombers capable of hitting U. S. tar-
gets on two-way missions.35
There are wide differences in the various estimates by economic experts
of the GN? (Gross National Product), industrial capacity, per capita income,
and the amount of money spent on defense by the U.S.S.R. as compared to the
United States. These estimates place the U.S.S.R. GNP at a high of one-half
to a low of one-fourth of that of the United States.3" And the amount being
spent on defense in the U.S.S.R. ranges from • low of around $15 billion
annually, which is identifiable, to a high of a much larger amount which is
hidden in the Russian budget, but no experts believe the Russian defense
budget reaches the $50 billion being spent annually by the United States.'''
General Thomas Power, United States Air Force, says Russia spends 40% of its
GNP on defense while the United States has been 'taoving away from Qheifl" and
only spending 10% of her GNP on defense. The average per capita income in
^Ibid
., p. 161.
3
'William J. Coughlln, "The Philosophy of Chance," Hissi1e3 and Rockets ,
April 20, 1964, p. 46.
3°Henry Rowen, Study Paper No. 18, "National Security and the American
Economy in the 1960's» 86th Congress, 2d Session, p. 1.
J/Charles H. Hitch, "National Security Policy as a Field for Economics
Research," World Politics, April I960, p. 437.
3 John G. Hubbell, "Tough Tommy Power—Our Deterrent-In-Chief," The Reader's
Digest. May 1964, p. 75.
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the U.S.S.R. 1s around $858 compared to $2570 for the United States as of
1962. Although Russia's per capita incase is gaining compared to that of
the United States, Russia's industrial production ranges from only 30% to
41
50% of that of the United States. These figures Indicate that there is no
economic reason why the United States cannot stay superior to the U.S.S.R.
militarily If the desire to use her wealth for this purpose continues. In fact,
the United States spent 40% of her GNP for defense In World War II compared to
an estimated 10% In 1963; that the United States could return to this type
42
of economy if necessary for national survival is not questioned.
Even though United States can economically support its own military security
and can provide leadership based on military power. It is a mean goal for a
great nation* Peace, security, and justice for all nations Is certainly a
higher goal for a truly great nation. This is actually what the United States
is striving for. President/Johr,son(has several times reiterated that peace
is the goal of the United States; certainly] President Kennedy and President
Elsenhower both(shared this goal. In fact, a world of law in which the United
Nations would be influential In settling international disputes is a cardinal
policy of the United States.
Political beliefs and ideas in America change slowly. The United States
is a conservative nation. Our form of government, particularly the legtsla-
^Abram Bergson, The Great Economic Race, Challenge, March 1963, p. 6.
™Tha World Almanac, New York World Telegram & Sun, p. 748.
^'"Interview with Or. G. Warren Nutter," U. S. News and World Report,
April.13, 1964, p. 53.
^Charles J. Hitch, "National Policy as a Field for Economics Research,"
World.EoHtics, April I960, pps. 438 and 440.
''John R. Cauley, "Peace Pledge by L.B.J. ," Kansas City Star, Dec. 17, 1963,
p. 1, and "Johnson Pledges Drive For Peace," New York Tiroes . Dec. 15, 1963,
p. 21.
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tive branch, with its preeminent interest localized to its members' state
or district, is not conducive to rapid and radical changes. A strong military
establishment has become, since World War II, a firmly-rooted goal considered
absolutely necessary by both the Congress and the President of the United States,
as well ^.5 a great majority of the American people. Although dissenting voices
are being raised, mainly as to the degree of defense spending and its deleteri-
ous effect on American democratic institutions, they have not been effective
to date in changing the consensus that absolute security without qualification
is essential and that the best way to maintain security, and for that matter
peace, is through an overwhelmingly superior military establishment. If the
thinking of Americans is to be reoriented toward peaceful solutions that are
not based on military power, it will have to cain vocal advocates in our press
as well as with Congressional leader*, and particularly, it must obtain a grass
roots acceptance probably starting in our educational institutions. Eisenhower
is correct in that the majority of Americans end their elected officials
consider a huge military establishment with the industrial base to support
it to be an imperative need for national security, national existence, world
leadership, international prestige, protection of our allies, and, while not
universally accepted, most politicians believe defense industry an imperative
to maintain our present national economy, and economists believe any reduction
in defense spending must be done gradually over a long period of time after
detailed planning.
2k
CHAPTER III
POTENTIAL MISPLACED POWER AND UNWARRANTED INFLUENCE
There seems little doubt that a consensus in the United States supports
the need for an immense military-industrial complex. The next question to
be analyzed is the President's contention that the total influence of this
complex is felt economically, politically, and spiritually in every city,
state, and office of the federal government and that this Influence represents '
a potential for misplaced power that is inimical to democratic processes.
First will be presented evidence to support the President's contention
and in the following chapter will be discussed conditions which nullify or
mitigate the President's argument*
Militarism
Corruption by an Individual or a small group is the common inference
when the words 'taisplacad power" and "unwarranted influence" are used in
connection with government. In every government office, whether it be
national, state, or local, this potential for corruption exists, No one would
argue with the statement that every day, somewhere in the United States, on
some government level, an official is being Investigated and charged with
corruption. "Teapot Dome Scandals" and individuals like Billle Sol Estes or
Bobby Baker involve government officials directly, or even more often Indirectly,
through official lassitude in the wrongful use of power and Influence. On a
lesser degree there are the Talbotts, Adaases, Macks, and Korths, who leave
government service not charged with criminal offenses but with tarnished
reputations because they applied influence gained through government position
»,
'Self Deceivers," Newsweek, Novessber 11, 1963, p. 114.
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in a doubtful manner. There certainly is nothing new in this. While this
condition is unsanctioned, undesirable, and impossible to completely eliminate,
the United States is almost daily showing, as it has many times in the past,
that the means for controlling this type of misconduct and illegal action are
available through the proper functioning of an alert, free, and vigilant press
and the normal legal and investigative powers present at all levels of government.
Unwarranted influence and misplaced power in the military-industrial com-
plex, as evidenced by corruption of individuals, is not the subject of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's warning. Although, if Individual corruption is present and
particularly if corruption is a part of a general lowering in the moral tone
of defense officials, either civilian or military, with a combination of indus-
trial leaders motivated solely for personal po :er or economic profit, the prob-
lems connected with the military-industrial complex are undoubtedly magnified.
However, the President's problem is of a much greater magnitude than that of a
comparatively few individuals so .xv.ig power or money for their own aggrandizement.
It is a power and influence felt simultaneously at all levels of government-
federal, state, and local} and 1n all segments of society—economic, political,
even spiritual; and by Its very weight has the power to endanger not only in-
dividual liberties but democratic processes.
An influence so all -encompassing as that described by President Elsenhower
is traditional militarism, whether he wishes to name the disease or not. A
freely paraphrased definition of a militaristic state taken from A History of
Militarism by Alfred Vagts 1s one in which military thinking permeates all
elements of the society and becomes influential in education, arts, science, and
industry with undue consideration to military requirements, resulting in a
corresponding neglect of welfare and culture. The similarity between President
2
Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism, p. 13.
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Eisenhower's warning and Vagts 1 definition is striking. If we accept the
President's description of the prevalence of the influence of the military-
industrial complex throughout the country, as many writers and public leaders
do, instead of just a potential influence, then it would seem that only one
additional item of proof is necessary to show that the United States has become
a militaristic state. This missing detail is that military requirements are
taking a disproportionate share of the country's wealth to the detriment of
welfare and culture. There is no way to prove that Congress would appropriate
additional money for education, welfare, and culture if cuts in military
appropriations were made. However, a case can be made that a decreased military
budget would result in an increased welfare budget. Congressman Morris K. Udall
remarked that in 1939, forty-four cents of the budget dollar was spent for labor,
health, education, and other welfare progrsrs<°-whereas in 1963» only seven cents
of the budget dollar went for these purposes. Based on the 1939 dollar, federal
welfare expenditures have shrunk from thirty dollars per citizen to sixteen
dollars.'
Several points stressed by ths President in his speech have been over-
looked by writers and commentators who discuss militarism in the context of
this speech.
First, the President said the combination of industry and the military
is a complex. This problem is usually considered strictly as a military one,
while occasionally, considered as an industrial problem, but for the President
it was the combination that presented the potential for misplaced power.
Secondly, even though the complex has within it the seeds of militarism, it
Douglass Cater, Power in Washington, p. 249.
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fulfills, as has been previously shown, an imperative need of our country, so
that the problem is not to destroy the complex but, as Elsenhower has suc-
cinctly said, to compel its proper meshing so that "liberty and security can
prosper together." Thirdly, historical militarism is not necessarily or even
predominantly confined to the military. Civilian militarism of the Hitler,
Mussolini, and Stalin type can be just as daivirous to a democracy and is more
applicable to the United States, if Industry is the controlling partner of the
military-industrial complex, than the military militarism which existed in
pre-Wortd War II Japan or exists in Franco's Spain today. In fact, no industrial
state in modern times has become militaristic without the participation and
cooperation of its industrial leaders, and there is considerable proof that
civilians are more militaristic than the military.
The Third Heater of the Complex
Admiral Hyman Rickover identified Congress with the military-industrial
complex. Before a Congressional Subcommittee he said there were actually two
compl exes—the military-industrial and the political-industrial. He implied
that the political portion was controlled by Congress making its own rules and
said that <f Congress would control the industrial portion through its investi-
gative powers that the military would be automatically controlled. ' Admiral
Rickover would have been more precise if he had said that there was a single
complex: Congressional-railitary-industrial. There are many examples that
prove this concept is more accurate, but none more illustrative than the inter-
relationship of Congress, Industry, and the military in the production of the
B-70.
\agts, op_. cit. , pps. 452, 453.
^Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Ccrraiittec on Appropriations, House
of Reprcsentati
o osnmit o .
ves, bath Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), pps. 467, 469, 512-516.
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This prototype piece of military hardware was to be used to develop future
supersonic planes and the contact was $13 billion." North American Aviation in
California was the prime contractor for the B-70 or, as it was renamed, the (5S-70.
Subcontracts included upper fuselage in Georgia, lower fuselage in Ohio, wings
in Washington, stabilizers in Texas, and navigation system in New York. Alto-
gether twenty states had important subcontracts. Capitol Hill, led by Congress-
man Carl Vinson of Georgia, gave this airplane extraordinary support for over
five years. The Air Force's big bomber men doggedly fought for it.? Nixon
announced a major increase for the B-70 one week before the election in I960.
Newspapers said it would mean 3,000 more jobs in California. Where did Nixon
Q
make the announcement? In California. Whether North American carefully selected
the subcontractors in order to influence as many Congressmen as possible
cannot be proven, but there is a good case that this can be assumed as correct
because, in the case of the later TFX, according to an executive's assessment,
Douglas tried to locate a substantial portion of its subcontracts In Missouri
and Oklahoma, whose Senators, Stuart Symington and the late Robert Kerr, were
influential in military matters. Twice Congress tried to override Secretary
McNaraara's veto on the B-70 and once President Kennedy refused to spend money
appropriated for it. Still, money for the first prototype was provided and
in October 1964 the plane was flown. Finally, the Air Force didn't want the
plane. According to Newsweek, "The B-70 now has become a big disadvantage for
the Air Force. The project must be terminated if we are going to make any
Forti
Aircraft: Huailiating Triumph, Newsweek , May 18, 1964, p. 90.
Zlbld.
"New York Tfc=s , November 1, I960, p. 1 and November 3» I960, p. 33.
'Richard Austin Smith, 'The $7-Billion Contract that Changed the Rules,"
uoe, March, 1963, p. 184.
""Cater, od. cit
., p. 45.
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real progress on new manned bombers."' 1 This is not the only example of
expensive military hardware, costing millions, becoming obsolete before use.
The B-70 development program was continued as a compromise between Congress
representing themselves, as well as industry and the military represented by
the Air Force, and the executive brunch represented by Secretary McNamara and
the Oefense Department.
In a July \9&h report. House Republican leaders charged Secretary McNamara
with planned weapons obsolescence. Admittedly much of the material was for
1964 campaign purposes, but every single recommendation made would increase the
defense budget. Their principal recommendation was for new manned airplanes to
operate in the earth's environment or near space and for full exploration of
the military implications of outer space. Secretary HcNamara's position was that
Minuteman and Polaris had made manned strategic bombers of lesser importance.
The Air Force was undoubtedly for manned bombers in addition to missiles as they
would increase its influence. Also the Republican Congressional Conmittee
recommended an anti -ballistic-missile system, which would support the Army who
had wanted to go into production with Nike Zeis, its anti-missile missile, for
some time. But Secretary McNamtra was insisting upon more tests. Another re-
commendation was an attack aircraft carrier with nuclear instead of conventional
power. Considerable money had already been spent on this project with little
evidence of success. The concluding Republican recommendation was a comprehensive
antisubmarine warfare program to result in end products. The Navy certainly
agreed with this. So the Republican leaders had actually recommended large
increases in areas advocated by each service end a large segment of industry.
These projects were among the most expensive £nd were among those which had
either been eliminated by the executive branch or had shown little progress in
Loc. cit. , Newsweek.
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spite of large expenditures. 12 These recommendations had been made at a
politically sensitive period (July 1964) and ware clear evidence of the political
importance as well as the close connection of Congress with defense industry and
weapons systems proposed by the military.
Economic and Political Importance of Congressional-Military-Industrial Complex
Fifty billion dollars is being spent for defense this year (FY 1965), or
J
one-half of our national budget, or approximately 8% of an over $600 billion
GNP compared to 1% or an $83 billion GNP in 1936. The military budget has
increased $48.5 billion since 1936.' 3 The growth and size of the defense budget
staggers the imagination. If there were no other considerations, the size of
the defense budget alone makes it an overriding political issue. As an example
of the effect of defense industry on an entire area in the midwest east of the
Mississippi—the auto industry was booming in Detroit and the steel industry was
up in Gary, yet this area lagged behind the average growth record of the United
States as a whole for the years 19^2-1962, as far as gains in population, non-
farm jobs and personal incomes were concerned. The reason given was that prime
defense contracts were down 26.5% in this area for the same period. 1 '* No
Congressman can afford to ignore such facts as these. Congressmen are reelected'
on the basis of what they do for their districts. Defense Installations exist
in nearly two of every three congressional districts, averaging two and one-
half per each district. '5 And every district wants more. No one doubts the
12Heather M. David, "Republican Body Charges 00D With Planned Weapons
Obsolescence," Missiles and Rockats, July 6, 1964, p. 18.
'3u. S. Department of Ccnrosrce, Historical Studies of the United States?
Colonial Times to 1957, p. 793.
• '"'what's Happening to the Middle West?", U. S. News and World Report,
October 14, 1963, pps. 55-58.
'Scater, op_. clt., p. 30.
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importance to a Con;;reirman of a reputation that he is able to get industry
for his district* This is accepted by Americans as part of a Congressman's
job, but the extent to which elected officials pursue this quest certainly
provides ample opportunity for unwarranted influence and misplaced pe./er. A
few additional examples, that could be duplicated many times, should prove
this point.
In the case of the MMRBM (mobile medium-range ballistic missile) the
Defense Department asked for $1^3 million. The House Appropriations Committee
cut the funds to $43 million. Secretary McNamara never appeared enthusiastic
for the weapon, so he decided not to fight for the remaining sum. But the con-
tractors got busy, Tha work would he done in Arisona by the Hughas Aircraft
and a subsidiary •# Goodyear. Additional work would be done in Utah by
Thiokol. General Precision would bring jobs to New York and New Jersey. Ford's
Aeronautical Oivision, as well as Hughes Aircraft, would bring work to California.
The contractors presented the case to Interested Senators and Representatives,
beginning with the statement of the importance of this weapon in defense of
the free world and ending by reminding at least one Senator that their company
had contributed to tha Senator's last campaign.' 6 .
The Army, as stated, pressed for early production of the Nike-Zeus anti-
missile missile. Army magazine featured an entire issue praising Nike-Zeus and
containing advertisements from Western Electric, the prime contractor, and
eight aeronautical subcontractors. Contained in the issue was a map showing
thirty-seven states which would get more defense dollars when production
started on o project estimated to cost $20 billion before it was ccr.pl ctcd.
'"Julius Cuscha, "Arirso and the 8ig Money Ken," Harper's Hagazi na, March,
17 Ibid, p. <*5.
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Senator Ted Kennedy campaigned on the slogan, "He can do more for Massa-
chusetts." There was no doubt in anyone's mind that the slogan meant Kennedy
could do more in Washington by getting more business for Massachusetts,
and under our present budget, this means defense business. Even before Kennedy
took office, he went to Grumman Aircraft on Long Island to partially fulfill his
campaign promises. Ordinarily such actions by a freshman Senator would be
deeply resented in the Senate, but censureship was limited; no doubt being the
President's brother assisted young Kennedy. At least he was successful, as he
announced that Grumann had awarded a $50 million subcontract to the RCA (Radio
18
Corporation of America) in Massachusetts.
Convair Oivision of General D""amics, employing about 18,000, was the
largest single employer in Fort Worth. The ccupany was in serious financial
difficulties and was facing personnel reductions if B-58 procurement tapered
off as planned by the Defense Department. Congressman James Wright tried to
influence the Executive branch, members of Congress, and in fact, all Washing-
ton officialdom as to the importance of the B-58 to national security. It is
reported he allowed General Dynamics to use his office as its headquarters and
he even privately visited General Curtis LeMay to convince him of the strategic
necessity of the B-58. He was successful in Congress but President Kennedy re-
fused to spend the money.
°
Senator Jacob Javits of New York complained that statistics revealed that
New York was receiving only 9.9 per cent of military procurement compared to
20
23.9 per cent in California. Representative Ken Hechler rose in the House
ffibid.
^Cater, op. cit. , p. 39.
Ibid., p. 3ST~
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and annou.iceds
I em firmly against the kind of logrolling which would subject our
defense program to narrowly sectional or selfish pulling and hauling.
I am getting pretty hot under the collar about the way my state of
. Virginia is shortchanged in Army, Navy, and Air Force installations
. » . I cm going to stand up on ray hind legs and roar until West Virginia
gats the fair treatment she deserves,
The allocation of military installations and bases still retains its eco-
tc appeal to Congressmen* President Johnson last January announced the
closing of 33 bases and 1; sed the .-.in-,ber to over 60. Within a
C.nd on three naval bases because of additional
information re 'dm Congressional leaders.22 Every Congressman was in
of ::'.osing the baies—except for that installation or base in his own
dist;
-
,.ier and Barry Goldwater indicated, while campaigning
that this -c.-j. ...outh, New Hampshire, Naval Base should not
is wasn't one of the bases President Johnson had decided to keep
snt t d apply to two-thirds of the Congressional
ountry, Kartir ,. Her, the county district attorney in Denver,
..-tin plant, said:
: e last Congressional campaign for our dis-
i or. the question of whether or not the United States Govern-
,.i more rr.oney for military appropriations on de/ense, or
s wall known that President Kennedy campaigned in I960 in West Vir»
Mid Pennsylvania strictly on the issue that he would relieve unemployment
by transferring defense contracts. Later in 1962 he told a Pennsylvania
21 by Defense Procurement Subcommittee of the Joinc Economic Subcom-
mittee of t t iiconoraic SubcoOTittee, I960, Congressional Quarterly, XIX,
March Ik, , ':67.
•_.", Associcted Press Dispatch, April 2k, 1964, p. 1.
.-uary 26, 1964, p. 14», and February 27, 1964, p. 1.
^Jce. .e.- In The ?entagon, p. 219.
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audience that "working with Governor David Lawrence since I960, we have increased
by 50 per cent the number of prime defense contracts that come to Pennsylvania."2^
This political interest in defense industry is expected by Americans. The
Portland Oregonian editorially criticized Senator Wayne Morse as follows:
"Washington State's working Senators won a billion dollars in military spending
in one year for their people. . .Oregon's talking Senator has won only 64 percent
26
of what Washington received." Republican nominee Jean Bradshaw of Missouri
tried to unseat the incumbent Senator Stuart Symington in 1964 and several
times charged that Senator Symington has done nothing to get defense industry
27
into Missouri. The charge was mado despite the fact that Senator Symington
is recognized as one of the most influential Senators in Congress in defense
matters. Similar charges are repeated by political opponents throughout the
nation.
Similarly Congressmen still retain their interest in the traditional
"pork barrel" legislation of military construction and civil works but these
combined programs are less than $2 billion," compared to the military procurement
contracts running annually between $20 and $25 billion. Interest of Congressmen
in government money to be spent in their district is not of itself evidence of
unwarranted influence, it is a part of their job and does have this potential.
Defense Department carefully notifies Senators and Congressmen of approved
contracts so that they can get the credit at home even though they had nothing
to do with the contract. This has been going on at least since the days of WPA
^Duscha, op_. cit
., p. 42.
t°Cator, op. cit., pps. 38-39.
^Kansas City Star, August 11, 1964, pps. 4-5.
28Budget of The United States Government, Fiscal Year Ending June 30« 1965,
p. 357.
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(Works Progress Administration) ° when Roosevelt tried to eradicate the depression
through public works and other projects. Some people believe that the publicity
a Congressman receives from such actions objectionable, particularly as the
Congressman should be interested in legislation not defense contracts, while
30
others agree that it is just good politics. If the Administration played
favorites in notification, then certainly objections by Congress would be heard.
Even if it is accepted that most Congressmen and Senators are a group of
men dedicated to the best interests of the United States, it must be admitted
that, even with dedicated men, personal interests and the also dedicated interest
to their states or districts may often achieve an unwarranted or illogical
priority. None of the Illustrations given have definitively proven misplaced
power or unwarranted Influence, but they do show that the opportunity is present,
and the tendency to do whatever is necessary to accomplish a desired result is
also evident. The influence of individual Senators and Representatives varies
greatly, and it is doubtful if the actions of a single Senator or Congressman,
unsupported by his colleagues, could achieve a result sufficiently detrimental
to the best interests of the United States to require notice by a retiring
President. But a group of perhaps misguided but dedicated and convinced
Congressmen, working in concert with Industrialists and the military, certainly
has the power and influence for this abuse.
Particularly is this power important when the size of the military budget
has such an overriding effect on what is recognized by officials as the major
political issue—the economic welfare of their constituents. Year in and
°The author, as a clerk in UPA from 1935-35, had the duty of notifying Sena-
tors and Congressmen of all projects approved in their states or districts at
least one day in advance of the Administration's announcement. The status of some
projects was followed closely by some Congressmen, while at other times the Con-
gressmen called to have the project explained to them. This was done purely to
give the elected legislators publicity, but Republicans and Democrats were treated
exactly the same as far as notification was concerned.
' Duscha, o£. cit
., p. 41.
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year out, economic prosperity is probably the underlying decisive issue in
electing or defeating more Representatives, Senators, and Governors than any
other single issue. Prosperity brings reelection and conversely economic
depressions are certainly conducive to political change of the party in power.
Changed Relationship Between Congress and the Military
Congressmen have always been, as they must be, vitally interested in any
federal money spent in their districts or states, and military appropriations
do not differ from any other type of federal grants. "Pork barrel" legislation
refers to appropriations for the development of harbors, flood control, and
the general development of water resources to be supervised by the Army Corps
of Engineers. Between Congressmen and the Army Engineers a close and understanding
association developed. Outside of this special relationship, prior to World War
II, Congress and the military had been to a large degree, antagonists. Tradi-
tionally the military have been concerned with an improved military establishment,
while Congress was interested solely with the effect of the military establish-
ment on the well-being of their constituents. Consequently we find the 125
pre-World War II Army posts scattered throughout the country. All attempts
to consolidate them in order to train a more efficient Army met immediate and
successful resistance by Congressmen, each of whom would not willingly submit
to the financial loss of an Army post to his district. Similarly Senator
Alben Barkley protested the elimination of the number of horses allocated to
officers and the reduction of the Cavalry because these actions meant a decrease
in the number of Army horses, many of which were raised in Kentucky. Likewise
farmers raising hay had the support of their Congressmen in resisting the
mechanization of the Arrny.3' These are typical examples of Congressional
31 Edward Pendelton Herring, The Impact of War. See Chapter V for a complete
analysis of the inter-relationship of Congress and the military before World War II.
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influence considered as normal in our political traditions before World War II.
Since World War II this has changed. Now no Congressman can afford to
fight against a more efficient military establishment. Further, as is now
recognized, it is an imperative need of our country to have the finest military
establishment in the world. A Congressman now needs support of the military
for whatever action he proposes. The $20 billion annually in military contracts
represents economic survival for many communities, as much defense industry has
no civilian counterpart and, in other communities, it takes time to switch to
civilian production even if it is feasible. No Congressman is doing any more
than his predecessors did when he attempts to get and keep as much military
business in his community as he possibly can. The important fact now is that
Congressmen go to the Defense Department for assistance to get projects
while formerly Congress closely controlled all increases in defense expendi-
tures. The military and Congress are no longer antagonists. If a Congressman
is to succeed in getting military industry, he must have the military on his
side. Consequently, the result is that Congressmen now seek military support
whenever possible, just to get or keep military industry in their district.
The history of the TFX contract, already related, is a prime example of
this willing and special pleading.'
The Military Side
Military leaders have studied their military history well. They know the
United States has never been prepared for any war it has fought. Now with
supersonic atomic missiles threatening instant destruction, they have the
responsibility for the security of the nation. This Is their job. Unpreparedness
32Duscha, o£. cit., This article gives additional examples of Congressmen
and Senators In dealing with Defense Department officials on defense contracts.
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in this missile age may not only mean defeat, but invites attack. The Air Force
recognizes the danger to the country that can come through the air. The Navy
recognizes the danger that potential warfare at sea offers. The Army recog-
nizes the danger to our country of the constant nibbling expansion of Communists
on the periphery of areas once considered part of the free world. Under these
conditions, the Army recommends UHT (Universal Military Training), more and
better atomic missiles for the ground soldier, more and better tanks, more and
better trained soldiers, more and better helicopters; the Navy reconmends more
and better atomic submarines, mere and better nuclear-powered ships, more and
better means to fight enemy submarines; the Air Force recommends more and
better planes of all types, more and better strategic missiles. Scientific
advances are constantly producing recorcmendati ons from both industry and the
military for improvement and changes on equipmant and hardware. To guarantee
security, only the latest and best equipment is acceptable. In fact, the
American public feels that the /ir.e:-ican soldier, sailor, and airman deserve
the very finest equipment. A Ccng/essional investigation almost followed
the report from Vietnam that American airmen were being killed because they
were being forced to use second rate equipment." No longer will Americans be
satisfied with the use of a thirty-year-old rifle, as they were in World War II
with the use of the famous Springfield rifle. As Charles J. Hitch, Comptroller
of the Defense Department, says:
There can be no question regarding the crucial importance of promoting
military technology in the nuclear era. Any power that lags significantly
in military technology, no matter how large its military budget or how
efficiently it allocates resources, is likely to be at the mercy of a more
progressive enemy. Both weapons and systems for delivering them have gone
through several revolutions in the few years since the end of the Second
World War. Individual bombs are now 1,0C0 times as powerful as those
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were themselves 1,000 times as
powerful as the largest dropped on Germany. Breakthroughs in missile
33 New York Times, Hay 13, 1964, p. 2 and May 14, 1964, p. 1.
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technology are continually threatening the whole offensive or defensive
apparatus of one side or the other. Keeping ahead in the technological
race is not in itself a guarantee of security in these circumstances
j
it remains essential to incorporate the technology in operational hardware
I forces in being") and to deploy them and use them with skill and intelli-gence. Sut no amount of production, skill and intelligent use can compen-
sate for significant technological inferiority.} 4*
With this scientific revolution in military equipment and the general rise
in prices since World War II, defense equipment costs have skyrocketed. For
instance, a World War II Sherman tank cost $50,000; a tank to do its equivalent
job today costs $236,000. The jeep and 2^-ton truck of World War II cost
$1,400 and $2,300 respectively; today the costs are $2,850 and $8,513.35
Airplanes present even greater variations. Fighters late in World War II cost
$50,985; their replacements today cost $5,200,000. The late World War II
bomber cost $509,465 compared to the $8,000,000 cost of a modern bomber.?6 An
Army Air Assault Division has eliminated many vehicles and replaced them with
aircraft many of which cost $3,000,000 apiece.37 Radios, individual equipment,
crew weapons, and all other equipment show the same type of increase. Prices
in the civilian economy have also risen, and in some areas even doubled. The
dollar lost 43% of its purchasing power between 1945 and I965 which accounts for
about one-half of the increased costs. The great strides in technological
development offer no price comparisons that are valid with the civilian economy
but it does not appear that prices have risen proportionately. But the
American soldier, sailor, and airman must have the latest and best of every-
thing. This thesis is praiseworthy and the only acceptable one but there does
seem to be evidence that defense equipment and hardware costs have risen out
34Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. HcKean, T!:e Economics of Defense in the
Nuclear Age, pps. 243-244.
'
—
^Department of the Army, U. S. Army and National Security, p. 71.
fMistory of U. S. Air Force
, 1907-1957, pps. 92, 117 and Aviation Week
.August 2b, 1963, p. 32 and November 25, 1961 p. 28.
—
> ^ Newsweek, April 27, 1964, p. 36.
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of proportion with the general rise in prices. Certainly equipment with the
latest scientific advances and huge contracts present opportunities as well as
difficulties to defense contractors.
<J
Military men are fully cognizant of the threat to this nation, recognize
their responsibility as an awesome task, and it is not too much to say that
many of them are honestly afraid for the consequences to our country posed by
the enemy threat. Being dedicated to the security of the nation and knowing
the possibility of enemy air, sea and ground power. Army, Navy and Air Force
leaders would consider they had failed in their mission if they hadn't done
everything possible to maintain their service at its highest potential. And
this means using every worthwhile improvement or advancement science and in-
dustry can produce. Further, the military firmly believes that any enemy who
recognizes that the superiority of the United States is unquestioned will never
attack. Every budget presented by the military since World Uar II has had the
military recommendations pared down by civilicn chiefs. The military will
never feel they have sufficient ar:,is and equipment to give the people of the
United States the assurance of security they would like to offer. Under these
conditions, any recommendations for curtailment in defense funds must come from
the civilian Secretaries in the military departments, Bureau of the Budget,
or the President and be implemented by Congress. If left to the military, the
[ military-industrial complex will grow in size and importance. If the amount of
money spent on defense contracts presents a potential for misplaced power and
unwarranted influence, unchecked military influence will increase this potential.
Industry and the Military
The effect of industry on defense spending is to increase it. Individual
industrialists often advocate a decrease in government spending and even
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decreases in the defense budget, but this advocacy consists of a general
reconmendation which does not affect their own specific product or industry.
In this latter case, it is strictly in the American tradition for business-
men to use every method possible including Congressional pressure,
to sell
their product. One of the widely accepted beliefs, which undoubtedly
has
much truth in it, is that industry has made America a great country and
that
anything that legally promotes profits is acceptable.
It is, in fact, a prime duty of government to protect and promote industry.
J
On the other hand, Americans have also recognized that control of
business is
necessary to prevent preferential treatment and unfair competition, to
protect
the individual citizen, and to prevent panics and recessions. Beginning with
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1387 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890,
there has been continuing legislation to regulate business, to create new
commissions, and even to allow the government to enter business where industry
has failed to provide what the government thinks is necessary, as in the case
of the TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority) and the REA (Rural Electrification
Administration). Most of this original legislation came during the administra-
tion of Franklin 0. Roosevelt.
During World War II economic controls were extensive and, while they
were relaxed after World War II, no Congress now adjourns without new or amending
legislation which affects industry; particularly is this true with the relation-
ship of workers or unions with industry, as in the case of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The twin propositions, which may at first appear antithetical, that industry
must be controlled as well as promoted by government, is no longer
questioned.
Unlike Congress, business always had a close relationship with the military
although, except in time of war, the amount has been so small as not to affect
to
the industrial community as a whole. Beginning in 1844 with the "Treaty of
Wanghia" the United States was guaranteed equal opportunity for American
businessmen in China. The Navy, Army, and Marines were each present at
different times to protect American interests. Japan was opened up for trade
by Perry in 1854, although the Spanish-American War may not have been mainly
expansionist, business interests in the Philippines and Hawaii were furthered
by close collaboration with the military. Until recently Latin America has
been considered a special province of American businessmen. "Dollar
Diplomacy" was the name given to this policy. "This name had stuck to the
efforts of the Taft Administration to force other nations to accept American
investments and then to employ havy and Marines to protect American capital. 3
Wars have always resulted In big profits. George Washington complained of
the lack of patriotism and the price-gouging of those who supplied our first
Army. Almost the same conditions listed in 5312 and 1848. Throughout the
settlement of the west, the Army had difficulty supplying posts at what they
considered a fair price. Large fortunes were made in expanding wool and cotton
industries, shoes, food processing, and iron industries during the Civil War,
legally for the most part, but with the knowledge and assistance of the govern-
ment. Suppliers again became rich during the Spanish-American War.
After World War I a Congressional Report, in five small volumes, of the
Senate Munitions Investigating Com-irittee, chaired by Senator Gerald P. Nye
of North Dakota, stressed the heavy profits made by American financiers and
armament makers during World War I and attempted to prove, (though most present
commentators consider its proof to be inconclusive) that the United States entry
into World War I was due to the covert pressure exerted by the munitions makers.
William A. Miller, A New History of the United States, p. 339.
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The Nye Committee Report was unanimous in it presentation of facts, but its
recommended solutions presented a variety of opinions. Among the accepted
allegations were that American companies adopted methods of bribery of foreign
government officials to secure business after World War I. One agent (Cole
Arms Company) "brought into play the most despicable side of human nature,
lies, deceit, hypocrisy, greed, and graft occupying a most prominent part
in the transactions." The report further said that the munitions companies
were more interested in selling armaments than in furthering peace, and that
they never aided any proposal for limitation of armaments but rather actively
39
opposed it.
In 1929 William D. Shearer told the press that he had been hired by cer-
tain shipbuilders to break up the Disarmament Conference. He insisted that he
had done his work well, but that he had not been properly compensated for his
pains and hence he was willing to betray his former employers. The Committee
pointed out that munitions people were opposed to the arms embargo as were the
Army and Navy Department, inferring that they were in league. Seles abroad
were assisted by the War, Navy, Coramerce,and even State Departments. War
scares were even created, toppling some Latin American countries.
Today with Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) in 40 countries
and with the United States bound by treaties with countries surrounding
the iron curtain, no one censures American military men for actively selling
41
American military equipment.
"l). s. Cong., Senate Report 944, Report of the Special Committee on Inves-
tigation of the Munitions Committee, 74th Cong., 2nd Session (1936), Parts 3 and
TT, passim.
4uHerring, op_. cit., p. 188.
41|<ansas City Star, Associated Press Dispatch, May 9, 1964, p. 1.
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No member of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) would purchase Ameri-
can equipment unless it was recommended and used by the United States Army, Navy,
or Air Force. Some of the smaller underdeveloped countries are willing and
forced to take obsolete equipment but, even in these cases they prefer the latest
and best for prestige reasons, if nothing else. Most large companies have repre-
sentatives in Europe, usually retired military men acting as their salesmen.
General Joe W. Kelly, who recently retired from the Air Force, will be Senior
European Representative for General Dynamics Corporation in Paris. He will work
for Roger Lewis, General Dynamics President, a former Air Force Assistant Sec-
retary. This type of announcement is a frequent occurrence. American arms
industry is truly a world-wide concern.
It is claimed that World Wsr I created 23,000 new millionaires, with one
estimate as high as 29,000. ^ it aopears that if this is so, and considering
the relative costs of World War I and World War II, there must have been at
least as many as 290,000 new millionaires after World War II.
William 0. Miller sums up World War II experience as follows:
Taxes covered an unprecedented forty percent of American wartime
expenditures. Federal corporation and graduated personal income taxes
reached record highs, which brought a good deal of grumbling but few
criminal attempts at evasion. Yet corporation profits after taxes,
swollen by the standard "cost plus 1 contracts, rose from $5,000,000,000 J
to nearly $10,000,000,000 five years later.
There is no doubt that wars bring profits to industrialists. And the
cold war appears to be no exception. The M. A. Hanna company made 57 percent
profit on selling nickel to the government for defense stockpiling from 1955 to
I960, while the mining industry as a whole was making only 8.4 percent. This
cost the government $20 million, while at the same time 12 copper companies that
J
2The Journal of The Armed Forces, August 15, 1964, p. 6.
t^Edwin S. Corwin, Total Use and The Constitution, p. 85.
^Miller, op. cit., pps. 396-397.
kS
had agreed to furnish copper for stockpiling were excused from their contracts
and able to make a quick $3 million profit because of a temporary increase in
the price of copper. The government is interested in industry making profits.
One example that can be duplicated many times is that of Western Electric, the
prime contractor for Army's Nike performing only about 25% of the work, yet
earning a profit of $112,500,000. Industry, of course, would say that this
is an invalid comparison and that profits must be compared with investment and
not work. Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts which are necessary in war time continue
in the cold war period. In these contracts the government is taking all the
risk. In 1952 13% of defense contracts were of this type but by 1961 they had
increased to 38%. McNamara says he hopes to cut this type of contract to less
than 20% with a goal of 12% within a year. Savings through competitive bidding
have proven to be substantial, but still over 85% of the defense contracts are
negotiated.
1
*^ The Defense Department appears to be a good customer well worth
keeping. And of course, its patronage is vital to the businesses which have
no civilian counterparts and of which the military is the sole customer.
It is an unarguable truth that a disregard for profits means business
failures and, without profits, there would be no private American industry. But
there is also evidence that the dollar is without conscience and its accumulation
can become an overriding motive of industrialists to the detrement of the
general welfare. The fact that the stock market went down when Khruschev and
Eisenhower proclaimed the "Geneva Spirit" and skyrocketed when the Summit
Conference failed after the U-2 incident seems to indicate that those people
interested in the stock market are able to evaluate the effects of the cold war.
4
^Julius Duscha, "The Costly Mysteries ov Defense Spending," Harper's Maga-
zine, April, 1964, pps. 59-65 pnssira.
**6Fred J. Cook, The Warfare; State, p. 168.
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And above all, It appears reasonable to state (as was stated) of the military,
that any reduction in the military-industrial complex will never be accomplished
by the willing cooperation of defense industry but will be resisted by every
means and pressures that industry can employ.
Combination in Place of Separation
C. Wright Mills whose theory of a ruling "power elite" is probably the
most quoted theory among those who believe that traditional American liberties
are endangered, points out that at one time our economy was a scattering of
small productive units but is now dominated by two or three hundred giant
corporations; that our political order was once decentralized among the states,
but is now controlled by an executive establishment reaching into every cranny
of social structure; and that the military order was once a small, distrusted
establishment, but is now the largest bureaucratic domain in the government.
American capitalism is now to a considerable degree, military capvc^lism. All
decisions of national consequence are made by a small coterie of political,
economic, and military men. Congressmen whose prestige must be based on their
location are now in the second tier of power and have been superseded by
approximately fifty men in the executive branch who have never been elected to
office, but are strictly appointive. This "power elite"
exists all over the country, and it is a coalition of generals in
the roles of corporation executives, of politicians masquerading as
admirals, of corporation executives acting like politicians, of civil
servants who become majors, of vice-admirals who are also assistants
to a cabinet offi cer, , who is himself, by the way, really a member of
the managerial elite.4 '
Hills' arguments, undoubtedly appear plaisible to some but are unproved.
^C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite , p. 273. This entire paragraph is a
consideration of several points made by Mills and in some cases follows closely
his actual wordage. Passim and pps. 8, 10, 18, 224, 231, 252, 275, 276.
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To prove his thesis, he would have to analyze important decisions, show who was
responsible for them, and demonstrate that these decisions were adverse to the
concept of democratic government or individual liberty and freedom. This he has
not done, and it would be impossible to do until government files ara declassi-
fied; even then positive proof will be, at best debatable, and more probably
sti 1 1 unproven.
Admittedly the largest single impact on the United States economy today
comes from defense and allied industries such as those connected with the
space program. It is also true that the executive establishment is increasingly
concentrated on the national level with a corresponding decrease in power of
state governments. Whether this fact has increased or decreased individual
liberties is arguable. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and proposed one for 1965
are good examples. They are taking considerable authority away fros some
states, but are increasing greatly the freedom of American Negroes. Other
examples of concentration of power at the national level have accomplished vital
jobs because they were left undone by the states, such as TVA, social security
and aid to education, or because their regulations must be national in scope
in order to work, such as the regulation of business performed by the Federal
Trade Commission, Interstate Carjr.orce Commission, etc.
It is also true that there has been a shift in the background of the
Presidential appointee. Beginning with Roosevelt's "Brain Trust" there has
been a growing tendency for the cabinet heads and personal advisors to the
President to be non-political, at least concerning ambition for an elective
office. There are many exceptions to this statement, but it is certainly true
that Truman had a predilection for the military, as Eisenhower did for the
1*8
businessman, and Kennedy did for the scholar. It is too soon to judge the
Richard Neustadt, "The President at Mid-Century," Law and Contemporary
Problems, Autumn 1956, p. 634.
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U a|Johnson ppointees, as the few appointments he has made have been men who have
been close to him for years, but thuy have not gained their reputations through
elective office. \This brings up the most important point made by Mil1s--that
decisions of national importance are made by a small group of men in the
industrial, executive, and military hierarchy whose positions are interchangeable.
To assure that power at the national level does not become concentrated,
the Constitution is based on the "separation of powers" and "checks and balances."
If the power of the legislative branch, as Mills and others claim, has been
superseded by the executive branch and the power of decision of the executive
branch is in turn in the hands of a small, non-elective, inextricably mixed
group of men whose positions are at times in the military establishment, at
times in the industrial complex, and at times in the executive branch, not only
has there been an erosion of the principle of the "separation of powers" as
envisioned by the framers, but the coordinate powers of legislative and executive
are no longer applicable and also there is certainly a greater potential for
misplaced power and unwarranted influence than if these three segrsants of our
society were separate and distinct and operated with a check on each other.
As previously stated, Mills has not proved this conclusion because he has not
shown what decisions were made by whom. Still there is evidence of interpene-
tration of the military, industrial, and executive segments of our society to
a greater degree than before.
From early in American history. Army and Navy officers have conducted
negotiations and concluded treaties with foreign countries, attended international
conferences and carried out foreign military occupations; at home, starting with
the Civil War, officers became responsible for, and experienced in, the new de-
mands of military logistics in the era of the industrial revolution; and in the
<*9
westward expansion, Array engineers in particular associated with govern-
ment and private business in the building of the nation; finally, military
officers in Washington were no strangers to politics either, as it effected
ba
them personally or as it influenced their responsibilities. In the Roose-
velt Administration many Army and Havy officers were brought into WPA to organ-
ize and supervise its growth. But these numbers seem minuscule compared to
those of military men now used in the executive establishment.
In 1953 nine Army Generais and 58 Colonels were assigned to civilian
agencies of government; in 1957 about 200 Generals or Admirals were ser-
ving in international or i ntet-servi ce agencies, with more than 1300
Colonels or naval officers of comparable rank and about 6000 officers of
lower grade as support.'
The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) was originally directed and largely
staffed by military men.51 George Marshall became Secretary of State; Major
General John H. Hildring became Assistant Secretary of State; General Bedell
Smith became head of CIA and then Assistant Secretary of State; General Max-
well Taylor has been made Ambassador to South Vietnam, probably the most sen-
sitive political assignment in the foreign service; and there are General Herbert
B. Powell, Ambassador to Australia; Admiral Jerald Wright, Ambassador to the
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Republic of China; Admiral George Anderson, Ambassador to Portugal f General
James Gavin recently resigned as Ambassador to France. Military men have pene-
trated the executive establishment and are being used in responsible jobs.
The I960 House investigation on conflict of interest reveals some in-
teresting facts. This report lists 33,326 regular officers on the retired list.
^Raymond, o£. cit
., p. 8.
-50john M. Swomley, Jr., The Military Establishment, p. 9.
51 Raymond, op_. cit.
, p. BTI
52Army-Havy-Ai r Force Register , June 27, 196*», p. *».
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This list does not include retired career reservists, other reservists, or
National Guard officers. Of this number 1,426 are employed by 72 of the lead-
ing corporations queried by the committee. The number employed in corporations
not queried in unknown. At this time 100 corporations were receiving 75% of
all defense contracts and 86% of these defense contracts are decided by the
Defense Department without competitive bidding. In order of priority, the top
five companies receiving defense contracts have hired the following retired
officers: General Dynamics, 186 retired officers, including 27 Generals or
Admirals, and Frank Pace, a fonr.:r Secretary of the Army, Chairman of the
Board! Lockheed, 171 officers, including 27 Generals or Admirals; Boeing, 61
officers, including 5 Generals or Aomirals; General Electric, 26 officers,
including 7 Generals or Admirals* North American Aviation, 92 officers, in-
eluding 8 Generals or Admirals." \
A few of the Generals or Admirals who accapted positions in industry in
other than the top five companies include General Lucius Clay, who was Military
Governor in Germany, who became head of Continental Can Corporation and later
a senior partner in Lehman Brothers; General Douglas MacArthur, who became
Chairman of the Board at Remington Rand; Admiral Ben Moreel went to Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corporation; General Brehon Sorcervall became head of Koppers
Company; General Omar Bradley headed Bulova Watch Company.
7 Taking at random
one issue of the Journal of the Armed Forces (September 5, 1964), one finds
announcements of 11 officers accepting jobs in industry. This happens
practically each week on a comparable scale.
53u. S» Cong., House, Subccmmittee for Special Investigations of the Com-
mittee on Armed Service, Hearings on Employment of Retired Military and Civi-
lian Personnel By Defense Industries, 86th Cor.g., 1st Sess (1959) passim, here-
after called Hebert Comnittee.
^Raymond, op_. cit. , p. 83.
55journa1 of The Armed Forces, September 5, 1964, p. 28.
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There is no doubt that industry finds retired officers valuable employees.
The easing of military professionals into the top echelons of industry seems
to underscore both the caliber of the individual officer and the similarities
between military and Industrial management. For officers to continue after
retirement an association with industry begun while in uniform is profit-
able to both and only natural. Industry is continually looking for men who
understand military procurement and officers retiring, on the average
between 40 and 55, are looking for a second career. The possibility for unwar-
ranted influence in this condition has been expressed by Admiral Hyr.ian Rickover
in a remark that retired officers frequently laave their jobs to man "who are
dear friends, or . . . whom they tv.ve been influential in appointing and natur-
ally they will be listened to."' 6
If this is true of military officers, it is also true of industrial
leaders; they do not change their friends when they enter the executive branch.
Mills probably goes too far when ha says it would be ridiculous to seriously
believe that Charles Erwin Wilson of General Electric (as an example of all
businessmen in government) represented anyone or any interest other than that
of the corporate world. And this is not because he is dishonest, but probably
because he is a man of solid integrity—"as sound as a dollar."57 Businessmen
in government sincerely believe that what is good for business is good for the
country, as the military believe that the United States cannot have too much
defense. Even if both the military and industry sincerely attempt to be entirely
dispassionate, they would find it difficult to divorce themselves from a life-
time of professional experience. Increasing the danger is the greater size of
the defense budget, the greater number of industrialists in government, and the
5°Congressiona1 Quarterly, op. cit ., p. 464.
57Hills, 0£. cit., p. 285.
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greater number of military men in industry as well as in the executive branch,
which conditions present additional opportunities for unwarranted influence
or misplaced power by their very multiplicity.
Lobbying
Lobbying for the military and for defense industry comes from all
angles and is probably as ruthless as any at the Capitol. Presentations by
teams of experts and expensive brochures are given to Congressmen in their
offices where the briefers are not adverse to describing the importance of
their weapon to the defense of the free world, the economic benefits that
production would bring to the Senators or Representative's constituency,
and, at least in one case, reminding the Senator of contributions to his last
campaign.58 The NAM (National Association of Manufacturers) has a lobbying
office in Washington which presents the viewpoint of industry to the legis-
lators. It spends $2 million yearly in advertising and as defense industry
is the largest, its viewpoint is undoubtedly well represented.
59 Space, air-
craft, and many other industries now have their own magazines, well prepared
by experts, which are influential in industry, and also have a national
circulation.
Industry also supports all three national military organizations with
advertising. These organizations are operated by retired officers for the most
part. The Navy League is the oldest and smallest, having 25,000 members, was
an early and consistent supporter of Polaris and aircraft carriers, and offered
resistance to service unification. The Air F^rce Association, with 58,000 mem-
58Julius Duscha, "Arms and the Big Money Men," Harper's Magazine, March,
1964, p. Z»3.
59James MacGregor Burns and Jack Walter Peltason, Government By The
People, p. 298.
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bers, has backed the Air Force position on bombers, missiles, and favored mili-
tary unification and counterforce strategies. The Army Association, with
55,000 members, advocates weapons for fighting ground warfare to include a larger
standing Army.60
President Truroan said in 1945, "The veterans of this war are going to run
the country." Veterans 1 organizations include the American Legion (the
largest and most durable), Veterans of Foreign Wars, AMVETS, Disabled American
Veterans, Disabled Officers Association and Retired Officers. In I960 the
Veterans of World War I of the U.S.A., or "Wonnies," as they were known, headed
62the list of lobby registrants, representing 930,000 persons. It is diffi-
cult to gauge the effectiveness of the military associations and veterans
organizations, as the legislators already are committed to maintenance of a
large military-industrial complex. At one titr.s the veterans associations
were considered among the most influential in Washington, but it is doubtful
that this is still true; however, by concentrating on programs of direct
benefit to their members, such as cash payments and tax benefits, their influence
is for greater defense appropriations.
Two organizations, though, th^t are powerful are the R0A (Reserve Officers'
Association) and the National Gu3rd. The latter derives its importance from
its close link to the community, its origin and its status as a state militia
while the R0A gets a great deal of its importance from the fact that its member-
ship includes over 70 Congressmen, five of whom are flag or field grade.^ The
great majority of R0A members are businessmen, many of whom are influential in
their community. It is not unreasonable to say that Senator Goldwater's interest
Raymond, od. cit
., p. 192.
°^Burns and Peltason, op_. cit., pps. 288-289,
^Raymond, op. cit
., p. 193*
°3Tristam Coffin, The Passion of the Hawks. Appendix I.
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and promotion of manned bombers for the Air Force stems from his experience as
a World War II bomber pilot and his continued training since then in the Air
Force. The National Guard and ROA do not always accept the Pentagon's view,
but the Congressional members of these organizations are at least susceptible
to military indoctrination and as each of them, as a rule, is active in his
own military organization, he is well informed on military objectives. As far
as appropriations are concerned, the ROA and National Guard have had the sole
effect of increasing them.
Another lobbying group of importance is formed from the offices that each
individual service maintains at the Capitol. Their job is to keep Congress
informed and to solicit its interest in particular problems. With defense
problems growing more complicated, this is an important and often worthwhile
practice.°5 At the Pentagon are two supplemental organizations of rather large
proportions. These are the legislative liaison representatives and the public
relations organizations. These two offices handle a multitude of duties, including
Congressional inquiries of all types, but they also execute vast public affairs
programs consisting of press re. esses, pamphlets, documentary films, orientation
trips for reporters, industrialists, and government officials, and arrangements
for speakers throughout the country. The official count of military men per-
forming these jobs in May 1963 was as follows: Office of Secretary of Defense,
149; Army, 119; Navy, 99; Marine Corps, 24; and Air Force, 116, for a total of
507; and in Legislative Liaison: Office of Secretary of Defense, 13; Army, 23;
Navy and Marine Corps, 20; and Air Force, 40.
*T*The Kansas City Star, Associated Press Dispatch, January 9, 1964, p. 1.
6|Raymond, op. cit., p. 202.6&Ibid., p. 201~
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The focus of military activities in Congress is the appearance of the
JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) and their aides before the committees to answer
questions. It is doubtful if there will ever be hearings again similar to the
Navy's defense of its aviation requirements in 19^9 against the administration's
disposition to side with the Air Force. Undoubtedly this was lobbying of the
most blatant type. Admirals presented lengthy, wel 1 -rehearsed statements and
Captain Walter Karig, a reserve officer on active duty, held regular briefings
for newsman.67 This type of lobbying is simply not necessary in most cases but
the publicity is usable. With industrialists applying pressure and making
certain that Congressmen have all the information necessary to get contracts
for their companies; with each service having ambitious officers on duty at
the Capitol looking for ways to assist their service and also please Congress-
men, and with large staffs in the Pentagon whose only job is to provide
information to Congressmen and particularly friendly Congressmen; with
Congressmen who also hold National Guard or Reserve commissions and who also
have many friends at the Pentagon; only a disinterested legislator could
fail to be well prepared to elicit the type of information he desires from
a member of the JCS at a hearing. And of course, some questions are carefully
— 68
planted in advance with favorite and cooperative Congressmen.
When Congressmen show particular prescience in extracting statements from
the military inimical to the administration, the press often attributes this
to leaks. This accusation may or may not be true, as a knowledgeable Congress
has sufficient opportunities, as has been shown, to get all the information
it desires. Furthermore, Congressmen are very adept at getting into the record!-
67 Ibid
., p. 199.
68ibid., p. 203.
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statements to support their position. Recently McNamara called it a dis-
grace that a secret vote of the JCS was, as he said, leaked to Congress. Han-
son Baldwin said that this was nothing new, as it had happened innumerable times
before, to his knowledge. 9 General Taylor says it is the duty of the military
chiefs to tell Congress the truth while remaining loyal to the decisions of the
President and the Secretary of Cefense. Howevsr, he says this is an impossible
ethic to apply in practice. Congress listens attentively and seriously to the
views of the Secretary of Defense. When the JCS or their aides appear, Congress'
is not interested in hearing a repetition of the views of the administration.
They are interested in the original views of the individual Chiefs, and partic-
ularly in differences of opinion. This places the military men in impossible
situations. They either appear to be withholding information from Congress,
which Congress feels strongly entitled to receive and which, in many cases,
they need in order to legislate wisely, or they appear to be opposing their
civilian superiors.
This situation has one effect on military appropriations—it tinds to
increase them. Undoubtedly more and better defense is provided by Congressmen
dedicated to Naval strategy, to manned bombers, to certain missile systems, and
to the ground Army; but those often divergent interests also apply pressures in
the opposite direction on a President or a Secretary of Defense trying to limit
appropriations. New bomber funds approved by the Congress and never requested
by the administration provide only the latest example of many similar appro-
priations.^
Array-Mavy-Ai r Force Journal and Register, "Secretary McNamara Calls JCS
QisgracefeV' December 21, 1963, p?s. 4, 13.
7nnaxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet , pps. 111-114. General Taylor gives
a frank discussion of the dilemma facing a member appearing before Congress.
7'Kansas City Times, Associated Press Dispatch, March 10, 1964, p. 21.
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Cultural or Spiritual Militarism
To recapitulate, President Eisenhower sa-;d that the military-industrial
complex was influential economically, politically, even spiritually throughout
the country and that this influence provided the potential for misplaced power.
It should now be evident that this complex has disturbing implications in the
country economically and politically and implications of overriding economic
control in some sections of the country, and that this combination, with the
approval of the majority of Congress, has the opportunity for misplaced power
and unwarranted influence. As to the allegation of spiritual effect on the
country, President Eisenhower teemed to explain this by saying, "There is
becoming a great influence, almost an insidious penetration of our minds, that
the only thing this country is engaged in is weaponry and missiles."'*
If this interpretation is correct, President Eisenhower has some rather
strange supporters, at least for a Republican President, who are using his
speech as evidence of militarism in the United States. This group of thinkers
are categorized in the "Arms Debate" by Robert A. Levins as the "anti-war"
group.'-* While this group has many theories in disagreement, its members are to
the left and liberal side of the American political spectrum. They seek, in
the main, a political and military detente with Communism. They do not think
that Communism is the greatest threat to the United States and that its threat
is subordinate to the dangers of thermonuclear war. But there is general
agreement among them that the United States is in danger of being dominated by
a militaristic psychology and the political power of the military.' John M.
' Public Papers of The President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61, p. 1045.
73Robert A. Levine, The Arms Debate. Throughout this book, in discussions
of the "anti-war" group, you would expect Pres. Eisenhower to be on the opposite
side and this is exactly where his beliefs place him on most questions.
^Ibid., p. 215.
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Swomley, Jr. has written a book, the thesis of which is that the new influence
of the military is a result of conscious planning for power.'] Fred J. Cook,
in "The Warfare State," used President Eisenhower's speech as the subject for
his opening chapter and insists that the military has a vested interest in
creating and prolonging tension, that its power is growing, and that the
behind-the-scenes actions of the military are just as dangerous to democratic
liberties as an actual coup d'etat .7^ Senator Fulbright says, "The American
—J
people are not now exercising effective control over the military, and neither
is Congress."77 He further believes that the war on poverty, education-wel-
fare programs, foreign cultural exchanges, and other domestic programs could
be accelerated by eliminating supe-fluous defense funds. ^Associate Justice
Douglas says that "we have taker: the military rather than the political approach
to these world problems. . .thai: wo have becccr.e victims of the military mind. . .
the civilian heads by and large are merely spokesmen for what the military
want."78 Mills says "The American Elite does not have any real image of peace-
other than as an uneasy interlude existing precariously by virtue of the
balance of mutual fright. The only accepted plan for 'peace' is the fully
loaded pistol.^J
It takes only a reading of one of the weekly news magazines or the daily
paper to note that defense and related subjects is certainly the main subject
in America. It is doubtful if even the subject of civil rights has occupied
as many columns. With Vietnam, tha Congo, Cyprus, Cuba, NATO—America is
7 5swornley, op_. cit., p. 7.
7°Cook, op_. cit .. This is a paraphrase o? the thesis of his book.
77Kansas City Star , Associated Press Dispatch, April 6, 1964, p. 9.
78William 0. Douglas, "Should We Fear Tha Military?", Look Magazine, March
11, 1252, p. 34.
79Mills, op. cit. , p. 134.
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deeply concerned, by necessity, with war or lack of peace. With announcements
of new missiles, missile firings and new military scientific achievements appear-
ing almost daily, it is easy to see how President Eisenhower and others would
think that the country is thinking of nothing but conflict, weaponry, and missiles.
With an average of $20 billion in defense contracts yearly, with each company
trying to get maximum support for its proposal, with Congressmen determined
that the publicity in their community will advertise their efforts, with almost
continuous Congressional hearings concerning the defense budget or some other
military subject, with the livelihood of entire communities determined by
defense contracts, there is no doubt that America is preoccupied with defense.
The prestige of the military has risen considerably since World War II.
It was normal for military men to keep in the background. This is not so at
present. The military leaders are in demand as speakers in all types of meetings,
conventions and celebrations. According to Senator Fulbright, a 1958 NSC
document authorized the military to hold seminars and to educate the public to
the dangers of Communism. President Eisenhower says this is an error. Regard-
less of the source from which the authority is derived, the military is involved
to a considerable extent in such education. Senator Fulbright said in a speech
before Congress that it was not tha job of the military to educate the public
on political issues. This was for elected officials. He cited 11 instances of
education and propaganda activities by military personnel. To quels the Senator:
There are many indications that the philosophy of the program is repre-
sentative of a substantial element of military thought and has great appeal
to the military mind. A strong case can be made, logically, that this type
of activity is the inevitable consequences of such a directive. There is
little in the education, training, or experience of most military officers
^°U. S. Cong. Senate, Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee
of Armed Services, Hearings Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Poll-
cies, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess, (19°2), Part 1, p. 6.
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to equip them with the baUnce of judgment necessary to put their own ulti- li
mate solutions—those with which their education, training, and experience
are concerned, ointo proper perspective in the President's total strategy for
a nuclear age. /
Among others. Senators Goldwater a;id Thurmond took exception to Fulbright's
speech, saying that it was "shocking," that the military men were the most
loyal and dedicated Americans, that they composed the best informed group on the
dangers of the cold war and that, as the fight against Communism required a
go
total effort, they should be used to the maximum to educate the public.
Perhaps Fulbright wasn't completely informed because, if he had been, he
could have pointed to many more than these 11 cases of military support for
cold war seminars or speeches to civilian groups about the dangers of Communism
and he could also have pointed cut that one of the missions of the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces is to present a two-weeks symposium, based on the
material of its ten months course, to selected reserve officers, executives of
industry and labor, representatives of business, professions, religion, education,
agriculture, women's organizations, government, and community life. These
seminars have been going on since 1948. The 5964-65 schedule includes 14 cities,
with expected attendance of between 800 and 1000 for each two-week period. A
partial list of the subjects covered are civil defense, counterinsu.-gency, space
exploration, national security financing, geoeconomics, geopolitics^ international
relations, mutual security, public opinion, techniques of Communis^;, technological
progress, and organization and perspectives of national security. This compre-
hensive program covers many subjects which, since World War II, have been
considered in the province of the military. This program has been thoroughly
investigated by Congress and passed the test. Both former Presidents, Eisenhower
®lcono_. Rec , 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), Vol. 107, Part II, p. 14433.
53SJ.» P. 14398.
"^National Security Seminar, Presentation Outlines and Reading List, Indus-
trial College of the Armed Force's, 1964-1965, pps. VIII, X.
^•Owen G. Birt^stle, Personal Letter to Thomas J. Badger, 30 October 1964.
61
and Kennedy, enthusiastically endorsed the program.85 In the foreword to the
lesson manual for these seminars, President Johnson says,
An enlightened citizenry is our greatest hope in meeting this
challenge. It is the high mission of tha Industrial College of the
Armed Forces to promote a broad understanding of the various elements of
our national security—economic, political, and military. The College is
a major instrument for instilling in growing numbers of our people the
essential principles of a free society.
°
These seminars have been received with high praise by the conferees. Two
examples of many are from a Salt Lake City engineer who says, "It should be
required for everyone in the teaching profession and a required course in
every college in the country," and a New Orleans realtor who says,
The seminars are an outstanding accomplishment on the part of the
Industrial College to provide the civilian—industrialist—business-
executive with comprehensive and timely data and statistics on U. S. andg^
world resources and on important influences in our nation and the world.
It appears that the military are in the field of public education with the
authority, cognizance, and approval of the President of the United States
to include the political and economic factors that affect the security of the
United States in connection with Communism, both as an external and internal
threat. The extent to which the military has engaged in this educational
effort is accepted with unstinting praise by the conferees who not only recommend
its continuance but favor increased presentations so that more people can receive
the instruction. Fulbright's criticism brought on a Congressional investigation
with the result that Congress also approved of military efforts as follows: "That
military participation in and support of proper and appropriate cold war or
anti -Communist seminars for the public be continued." Furthermore the report
^National Security, Seminar Prospectus--! S^k-oS, Industrial College of the
Armed
fl
STorces, p. 3.
"°Uational Security Seminar, on. cit., p. XI.
^Handout, What Others Have Said , Industrial College of Armed Forces.
>»d
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recognized that it is not the primary responsibility of the military to educate
the public on the menace of Communism but, because of its experience and
specialized knowledge, the military still has a legitimate function in this
field.88
Besides the military being able to carry its thinking personally to the
public, all three services have highly respected citizens, dedicated and patriotic,
mostly retired, who tour the country at their own expense to tell the military
story. In the Army these civilians are called "Civilian Aides to the Secretary
of the Army". As examples of the type of man that serves in this capacity are
Charles S. Stevenson, Civilian Aide for Western Missouri, who is also Chairman
of the Board of Hallmark Cards, Edward C. Logelin, Vice-President, United States
Steel Corporation from Chicago, Walter K. Koch, President, Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Company from Colorado, John Slezak, Chairman of the
Board, Kable Printing Company from Chicago, Kermit R. Hansen, Vice-President,
U. S. National Bank of Omaha and Carlisle P. Runge, Special Assistant to the
President, University of Wisconsin. They receive special briefings and are well
qualified to present the military picture.
Civil Defense presents another important aspect of the "cold war" which
has been given little attention but is an area which extends the military's
influence into cities, counties, and states. At the present time, planning
for Civil Oefense is a responsibility of OEP (Office of Emergency Planning)
whose head is a member of the NSC, but operations are under the Defense Depart-
ment where a civilian is also in charge. But the Army, Navy, and Air Force
have important operational missions and in an emergency their duties would
U. S. Cong. Senate, Report by Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services, Military Cold War Education and Speech Review
Policies , 87th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7, #.
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increase. No one doubts that the military would be needed badly in a
thermonuclear exchange involving the continental United States. In this
cold war interim there are many advocates of more military activity in this
sphere, of military responsibility being as much a part of national security
as training soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and of close coordination and
89
planning between the military and local civilians.
The Defense Department publishes 125 different kinds of indoctrination
pamphlets, books, magazines, and newspapers each year with a total distribu-
tion of eight million copies. For the most part these are scrupulously
handled to avoid giving servicemen and their families any feeling of propaganda
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intent, even in international affairs. The Pentagon is busy in other fields.
In the Audio-Visual Division it is continually assisting private producers of
film projects and television seriais which, at this time, number 35 and 10
respectively. It also extends assistance to documentaries prepared for school
use and to cartoon strips, such as "Steve Canyon" and "Terry and The Pirates"
which show a consistent partiality for Air Force doctrine. Over a five-year
period the Air Force Book Branch claimed credit for spawning more than four
hundred air and space books. At a recent date, more than 115 volumes were
under commercial contract. One such project, The Manned Missile, The Story of
the B-70 by Ed Rees, who was former military correspondent for Time was written
at the express suggestion of the Chief of the Air Force Book Branch. Ed Rees
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now works for the manufacturer of the B-70.
^Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, pps. 626-6it0.
5°Raymond, op_. cit
., p. 133.
9'Cater. od. cit.. dds. 33-3 1*.' , p_ , pp
(A
In I960 there were 248 colleges and universities with Array ROTC (Reserve
Officer Training Corps) programs which enrolled a total of 155,871 cadets.^ 2
These do not include institutions with Air Force and Navy ROTC programs. These
cadets are the chief source of officers for the services and every opportunity
is used to indoctrinate these cadets toward a military career. In addition,
the three million men in the services receive special indoctrination. Over
one-half of all young men in the United States will have had some type of military
training. The Army Reserve, not even counting Air Force and Navy, has 442,000
Ready Reservists, 270,000 in Standby Reserve, and 20,000 students who are not
in a Reserve unit. The Army National Guard maintains a strength of 400,000.
Retired military personnel in 1S45 were 180,000 and have grown at, least at a
rate of 10,000 a year. In 1955 alone, 2,000 officers retired and took another
job in industry.93 The services have plenty of opportunity to penetrate the
minds of Americans with military thinking.
Our educational institutions, which have long prided themselves upon a
tradition of freedom of thought and action, have also been invaded by the
military through defense contracts for research and development. While not
a subject of this paper, this danger is also treated in President Eisenhower's
speech. It is sufficient to state that, with Massachusetts Institute of
Technology receiving nearly $75 million in defense research money and Harvard
receiving 25% of its income (more than $21 million) from Federal funds,"
there is the potential that government contracts become so important to the
educational institution that its freedom of thought may be impaired.
° 2Swomley, op . cit. , p. 28.
93nebert Committee, passim
.
^Raymond, op. cit., pps 139-141.
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Summary
Military thinking is paramount in the United States today. The 196*t
Presidential election dramatized this. Both candidates, Johnson and Goldwater,
said that the subject of peace end ..ar was the single most important issue.
The continuance of the cold war with its thermonuclear possibilities has
made it absolutely necessary thet the United States remain ahead in all
scientific developments so that no "breakthrough" will give the U.S.S.R. a
commanding position of strength in international power politics and has
created an interconnected military-industrial-scientific team that appears
invulnerable. The costs of this dsfense establishment, and particularly of
the military equipment involved, affect every governmental budgetary decision.
Entire communities are dependent upon defense industry. Military man hold
prominent positions in practically every defense industry, including those
industries mainly research in nature, in the country. Military implications
are considered in all national governmental decisions and, in international
relations, these considerations undoubtedly receive priority. Military men are
used generously throughout the federal govern >ent in position of responsibility.
The prestige the military has traditionally enjoyed for a short time
immediately after a war, only to find this prominence receding to unimportance
in peacetime, continued to grow after World War II, enhanced by the Korean War,
the Vietnamese combat, and most significantly by the cold war until now its
leaders are influential in all areas of society. The size of the armed forces
and their deployment all over the world, with the requirement for large
reserves, has a personal effect upon practically every home in the country.
The relationship of the military and industry to Congress has been
completely changed. Congressmen, in many cases, now seek the support of the
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military to bring industry to their communities. This all-pervasive military
atmosphere combined with the actual military presence and the si2e of the
military-industrial complex presents untold opportunities for misplaced power
and unwarranted influence. Furthermore, the ingredients for traditional
militarism are undoubtedly present. However, the opportunity for misplaced
power and unwarranted influence does not prove that the opportunity has been
used. Nor does the presence of the ingredients that have produced militarism
in other states rule out the possibility that this country has inherent
traits and governmental methods thst are safeguarding the democratic processes
of the nation. These aspects krtll be considered next.
CHAPTER IV
MISCONCEPTIONS AND SAFEGUARDS
What is meant by "the military"? Is it limited to the professional
officer, or does it include every man in uniform, willingly or unwillingly,
active, retired, or reserve, or does it embrace the entire military establishment
from the Secretary of Defense to the lowest paid civilian? Does Secretary
McNamara represent the civilian control of the military or is he merely a part
of the military chain-of-conmand? What is meant by civil -military relations?
Discussion of these questions is not purely semantic but should prove valuable
in determining whether there are inherent safeguards in our government operating
against tlfe formation of a militaristic state. Similarly a new ideology is
evolving in industry. This new ideology of social responsibility must be
examined as to its validity and contrasted with the generally accepted doctrine
of American capitalism to see if this new doctrine represents a different
influence than expected within the complex.
The Military
The armed forces consist of a conglomeration of professionals, reservists,
draftees, and enlistees as well as Presidential appointees and civil servants.
In discussing the military, only the opinions, ideas, and actions of the leaders
who are influential in making decisions or forming policy are of importance
as far as the military-industrial complex is concerned. These are the Presidential
appointees and the top men among military professionals and in Civil Service.
The civilian secretaries represent the military point of view in government
councils but symbolize the civilian control within the military establishment.
No difficulty in this regard is experienced until civil -military relations are
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considered. Congress and the press arc most apt to draw a sharp line between
the two if there seems to be any difference of opinion. The term military, in
this thesis, intends no distinction between the military and civilian portions
of the military establishment unless so specified.
There is a similar misunderstanding in regard to military influence.
Military factors are considered by the State Department in making foreign policy.
Military security may be the dominant factor but as Burton M. Sapin and Richard
C. Snyder state:
It is quite possible that United States foreign policy could be
overbalanced toward military objectives or the use of military techniques
without this necessarily being a result of Military Establishment thinking
or influence. It is interesting to note that oftentimes some members of
Congress are more prone to ar-;ue for quid;, military solutions of problems
than the high-ranking officers who testify before their coimiittees. 1
It is also noteworthy that foreign policy is not the only area in which
military decisions may be principally civilian. George C. Marshall is considered
the prime mover for UMT but this does not concur exactly with President Truman
who considered this program as his own and concluded his account by stating,
I am morally certain that: if Congress had enacted this program
in 19^5, when I first reconr nended it, we would have had a poo', of basically
trained men, which would have caused the Soviets to hesitate and perhaps
not bring on the Berlin crisis or the Korean aggression.
In judging decisions and influences that are military in character it must
be recognized that they may or may not be espoused or originated within the
military establishment.
Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American
Foreign Policy
, p. 23.
2Harry S. Truman, The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: Years of Tr-:a1 and Hope,
p. 55. c-
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Types of Militarism
Militarism is flourishing throughout the world today. It has practically
as many different faces as ther^ rre militaristic countries. Each country has
its own brand of militarism, but all militaristic countries, whether China under
Mao Tse-tung, Indonesia under Sukarno, Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, Ethiopia
under Haile Selaissie, Yugoslavia under Tito, Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nassar,
Pakistan under Ayub Khan, Algeria under Ahmed Ben Bella, or the Congo under
Moise Tshombe, possess one distinguishing characteristic—they are all dictator-
ships. A militaristic state and a dictatorship are synonomous. Either the
military is the dictator or the dictator controls the military.
Prior to World War II the Axis Powers (Csrmany, Japan, Italy) were all
militaristic in different ways. Germany under Hitler was predominantly a
civilian dictatorship; Italy under Mussolini was a broad-based dictatorship
having both military and civilian -upportj Jcpan was strictly a military
dictatorship—at first the top governmtnt positions were held by civilians and
controlled by the military, but arter Pearl Harbor the military took over in
name as well as in fact. Except for East Germany where the U.S.S.R. was in
control, militarism was eliminated from these three countries after World War II.
But in Eastern Europe civilian dictatorships were employed by Russia, except in
Yugoslavia where Marshal Tito was able to maintain independence from Russia and
was both the military and political leader.
Militarism can occur in a variety and combination of ways. The coup d'etat
is the most coranon in underdeveloped countries. Two occurred in 1964 in Latin
America. In Bolivia General Rone Sarrientos Ortuno ousted the government of
President Victor Paz Extenssorc^ and in Brazil President (General) Humberto
3
"Huge Task in Bolivia," Kansas City Ster, New York Times News Service,
November 3, 1964, p. 12A.
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Castelo Branco replaced Joao Goutart as head of the government. A recent
article by General Benjamin Rattenbach of Argentina says that the theory of
militarism is changing in United States and that by some authorities it is
being recognized that the military is the only group to foster peace and order
and necessary in order to prevent chaos. The United States accepts the theory
that some dictatorships may represent the only available solution, as the
military represents the only source of stability; but the U.S. also hopes the
result of a military dictatorship will ultimately be an initial step toward
democracy. Examples are Pakistan and South Korea.
However, militarism can come gradually, as has happened in Saudi Arabia
where, after several years of gradual reduction of King Saud's power, Prince
Faisal has finally assumed total power. The rare politically sophisticated
a country is, the longer it usually takes for a new dictator to replace
another one or for a dictatorship .:o succeed cnother form of government. In
some cases the change takes a period of years, the steps being perhaps inpercep-
tible by the people concerned. Military thought can become so persuasive that
military solutions appear to be the only acceptable ones in areas not normally
considered of military concern and, in the most important area of economics,
military aims can become the vested interests of a majority of the people.
Regardless of how militarism arrives, whether gradually or suddenly, and
regardless of its type or form it is inimical to democracy and to bo avoided, as
^Clarence U. Hall, "The Country That Saved Itself," Readers' Digest, Decem-
ber, 1964, pps. 135-158. This article is entirely complimentary of the role
played by the military in this cou-3 d'etat .
^Lt. Gen. Benjamin Rattenbach, "The Military Sector of Society," Military
Revievj, July 1964, p. 82.
""Where a Friend of the West Runs Things Now," U. S. News and Vtorld Report ,
November 16, 1964, p. 20.
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a peril to liberty and freedom.
President Eisenhower in his farewell address and other speeches repeatedly
emphasized concern with government centralization at the national level. Without
centralization, militarization cannot be effective. A military organization
is centrally controlled, with orders emanating from the top and proceeding down
through all echelons. Centralization undoubtedly increases the opportunity
for militarization. To repeat the most typical of President Eisenhower's
frequent statements on the subject:
It has long been my judgment that the real threat to liberty in this
republic will not come from any sudden calculated onslaught. Rather the
threat to our liberties will be primarily found in a steady erosion of
self-reliant citizenship and in excessive power concentration resulting
from the lodging of more and r-^re decision in an ever growing federal
bureaucracy.'
As was noted, the President did no: mention the military-industrial complex by
name, but as the defense Oepartaiini is tha largest bureaucracy in the federal
government, it is certainly implied in his statement. Further, frow this
statement it cannot be proved exactly what Eisenhower means by "sudden calcu-
lated onslaught." If perchance any news analyst had thought there was a
possibility that Eisenhower was alluding to internal military threat, his comments
would have created news of rather a momentous nature. But proof that the Pres-
ident believes that the military presents no threat to our established government
can best be shown by his own words before a Stiate Committee:
I, for one, want to be on record as expressing my indestructible
faith and pride in our armed services~avan though their loyalty,
patriotism, and breadth of understanding .ieed no defense from me or
anyone else. . .In a half century of national service, I have yet to
meet the American military officer, who viewed himself as a budding
Napoleon or even a Rasputin.
?"The Real Threat to Liberty as Ike Sees It," U. S. News and World Report ,
Hay 12, 1962, p. 15.
"U.S. Cong. Senate Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee of Armed
Services, Hearings Military Cold W<~r and S peech Review Policies, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (196^; p. /. Hereafter reference to these hearings or the report will be
"Senate Military Cold War Educate Hearings or Report" as the case may be.
S. E. Finer, In The Man On Horseback, says that militarism is least
likely in a country in which, first, military professionalism is high, second,
civilian control is accepted by the military, and third, the public attachment
to civilian institutions is strong." These three conditions exist in the
United States to a greater degree than in any other country with the possible
exception of countries such as England and Canada with long democratic traditions.
However, Finer's first two points, although this author considers them correct,
should not be accepted without additional evidence.
Professionalism and Politics
The professional man is an expert with specialized knowledge and skill
in a significant field of hurr.an endeavor. . . .The professional man is a
practicing expert, working in a social context, and performing a service,
such as the promotion of haalth, education, or justice, which is essential
to the functioning of society.
The skill of the officer is neither a craft (which is primarily
mechanical) nor an art (which requires unique and nontransferable talent).
It is instead an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring
comprehensive study and training. It must be remembered that the peculiar
skill of the officer is the management of violence not the act of violence
itself. Firing a rifle, for instance, is basically a mechanical craft;
directing the operations of a rifle company requires an entirely different
type of ability which may in part be learned from books and in part from
practice and experience. The intellectual content of the military profession
requires the modern officer to devote about one-third of his professional
life to formal schooling, probably a higher ration 6f educational time to
practice time than in any other profession. In part this reflects the
limited opportunities of the officer to acquire practical experience in the
most important elements of his vocation. But to a large degree it also
reflects the extreme complexity of the military expertise.'
The outstanding professionalism of the Arierican officer is recognized
throughout the world. American professional i:.m consists both of technical
expertise in sophisticated weapons as well as its theoretical application.
Entire foreign units, as well as many officer.; and non-commissioned officers,
S. E. Finer, The Han On Horseback, pps. 21-26.
lOsamuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pps. 8, 9, and 13.
73
come to the branch schools. This attendance could be attributed to the fact
that American military equipment is used throughout the world and the Americans
have always had mechanical ability. Eighty foreign officers from fifty nations
(including all NATO allies except Iceland) graduated from the Army Command and
General Staff College in 1965.
11 This is a school of classroom instruction
which trains officers for duty at the Division and Army Group level. Wide
acceptance by allies at both the theoretical and operational military schools
is certainly an indication of an outstanding professional reputation. Also, as
'
the United States is in most Western political alliances, their military
leadership also becomes American. The prestige of our government, and the
fact that the American military commitment is the largest, gives the American
officer preeminence.
Just as the primary responsibility of a physician is to his patient, and
that of a lawyer to his client, the primary responsibility of a military
officer is to his country. He is an expert in fighting wars, in the management
and organization of violence. As Samuel P. Huntington, one of the ablest
critics of the military establishment, says, "The motivations of the officer
are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to
12
utilize his craft for the benefit of society." Economic incentives are not a
motivating force, but Finer overstates the case in listing poverty among the
virtues of the military, as far as the American military man is concerned.
To obtain an officer of the requisite caliber, the country provides reasonable
economic security for him and his family.
"phone call between author and Secretary of the Command and General Staff
qe, June 16, 1965.
2Huntington, op_. cit.
, p. 15. For a more complete discussion of the
military as a profession, see pps. 17-18.
13Finer, op_. cit., p. 10.
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The officer remains a professional as long as he stays within his own
field of competence. If an officer becomes interested in politics to the ex-
tent that his actions are affected by the intrigues and maneuvering^ common
to professional politicians, he has not only cone to his country and to the
entire military organization a disservice, but he has undoubtedly compromised
his professional judgment. An officer's advice, to be accepted, must be based
on military considerations without reservation. Hills says that the renunciation
of political power is a part of tho military point of honor.'
It is drummed into every military manager in the course of his not
inconsiderable education, from the day he enters West Point to the day
death makes him eligible for an Arlington burial with honors, that he is
to back away from anything resembling a jolitical decision.'^
Further he states,
There is no doubt abot.t it, there £i a now Republican and Democratic
generals. There is also, ; s e now know well, officers who are for or
against individual Senators - uch as KcC. rthy™and who in their military
positions lean one way or the other to reveal it or to hide it. 10
To cite McCarthy as the single example of a trend toward partisan politics by
the military is certainly inadequate. McCarthy was not a character who
inspired neutrality and pro-McCarthyism, if prevalent in the military (for
which there is no proof), at least turned to cnti-McCarthyism after the Army
hearings. Military officers are expected and even urged to vote. The Defense
Department yearly carries on an intensive campaign to get out the military
vote by absentee ballot. This is considered to be democratic. Many officers
vote and many do not. It is well known that Eisenhower inferred he had
never voted in his life until after World War II in 1948, and President Truman
was enough In doubt as to the General's politics to try to persuade him to
'^C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite , p. 174.
15ibid., footnote, p. 200.
lojbid., p. 204.
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run for President on the Democratic ticket as late as December, 1951.
Eisenhower is no different from most officers who admit or even boast they have
never voted. '^ Perhaps Mills is concerned about the close friendship existing
between senior officers and members of Congress, although he does not pinpoint
any such relationships. For senior military officers and senior Congressmen to
get to know each other during official business and thereby to gain mutual respect
resulting in an even closer friendship, particularly when their beliefs coincide,
is only natural. There appears nothing sinister in this type of association.
On the other hand, if a Senator or Congressman strongly supports the military
or a particular service, there is no doubt that the military officers, or the
officers of that particular service, may voice their Hkes or dislikes. Not
to indicate satisfaction under such conditions would be unnatural. And, as
Mills himself claims, only the very few military officers at the top are in
a position to influence decisions.^ This latter fact seems to limit the
relevance of his argument considerably.
Approximately half our Presidents have had military experience and three,
(excepting Washington) Taylor, Grant, and Eisenhower, were career soldiers.
The military careers of Jackson, Harrison, and possibly Garfield and the first
Roosevelt, assisted their political careers. This would seem to indicate that
the Presidency and military experience are closely allied. But the reverse is
more near the truth: military officers are poor politicians. Americans seem to
trust military heroes, but that politically successful military men sought high
governmental elective office is unsubstantiated. Rather, politicians have
capitalized on the popularity ard reputations of military men for political
17Dwight D. Eisenhower, Kar.date For Chancy, p. 79.
,8Jack Raymond, Power In The Pentagon, p.~170.
19Mills, 0£. cit., p. 231.
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purposes. True, there have been military men ambitious politically-Scott
in 1852, McClelland in 1864, Hancock in 1880, Dewey in 1904,
Wood in 1920,
and MacArthur in 19^8, but all were defeated and it is most
important that
not one attempted to organize the military for political purposes.
Since World War II there have been military chiefs who have challenged
the
President on specific items of policy, particularly Admiral Louis Denfield,
Chief of Naval Operations under Truman, and General Matthew Ridgway,
Army
Chief of Staff under Eisenhower.
20
These challenges were on military matters
and not politically inspired. Both resigned, wrote books, and are now
practically forgotten by most of the public. Neither had a political following.
It is also known that General Haxwel 1 Taylor disagreed with President
Eisenhower.
He also wrote a book that President Kennedy supposedly read and approved.
He
was brought back into the administration finally to become Chairman of the JCS
and is now Ambassador to Vietnam. His very few speeches have been exceptionally
circumspect, restricted entirely to military implications and non-controversial
policy-making. While he may be a Democrat, this fact could not be definitely
proved through any of his actions, speeches, or writings. Senator Fulbright,
as critical as he is of military influence in national affairs, says that mili-
tary involvement has not been a quest for power.
21 Even Mills says that the
military are not out for political power but tliat they enter the political
realm
unwillingly, after having been forced to take a political stand because of
22
civilian default." »_j I
20Samuel P. Huntington, The Ccnrnon Defense, p. 115.
21 Cong.. Rec., 87th CongreTs," 1st Sess. (1961), Vol. 107, Part 12, p. 1<M3.
22MTlls, od. cit., pps. 200-201.
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If a political campaign ev^r seemed to o;:fer the military an opportunity
to experss their opinion, it was the Presidential campaign of 1964. Senator
Goldwater employed a report from the House Republican Policy Committee which
promised each service a weapons system that each had urgently reccrr.-nended
as necessary but that had been -ejected or postponed by McNamara and he used
another report from a task fore: leaded by a ."ormer Secretary of Defense and
including, among others, two reiired members of the JCS--a11 members of the
Eisenhower team.2^ President John! on answered these charges, but ficNamara and
other civilian members of the Democratic administration reinforced the President
in much more detail. It was reported that th's election had involved the mili-
tary more than any other previous election and that top-ranking military officers
24
were unhappy with the Pentagon becoming involved in partisan politics. In
none of the sources2^ used has there appeared a single case of a tcp-ranking
officer in uniform and on active duty supporting or not supporting a partisan
issue. Military officers have reiterated their testimony before Congress when
asked, but their speeches suppo.-tcd views which, though partisan as to service,
had been previously stated. This problem as already explained, is a question
of semantics and it recurs often. The word "military" was used to represent the
views of the Pentagon. No distinction was made between the civilien members
and the men in uniform. No man in uniform publicly supported the Goldwater
thesis. 26
2
^G0P "Charges a Nuclear Lag," Associated Press Dispatch, The Kansas City
Times , October 12, 1964, p. 22. See also notes 4 and 5, and pps. 9 and 10 of
Chapter II.
^"Washington Whisper," U. S. News S- World Report, September 21, 1964, p. 31.
25see page 7.
""The Nuclear Issue," Newsweek, September 21, 1964, p. 34.
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It was true that retired officers did encage in the campaign. General
Thomas 0. White, retired Chief of Staff of the Air Force says,
Currently a number of retired generals and admirals, genuinely per-
turbed about America's status in world affairs, are taking active part
in the political campaign. It would be possible to have a situation in
which the actively serving senior generals and admirals espouse the poli-
tics of the 'ins' and a group of retired officers constitute an opposing
military view for the 'outs' .'
This did not happen in the \$6k campaign because the "ins" kept quiet or con-
fined their remarks to previously stated positions already on record before
Congressional committees. If such a controversy ever materialized, it would
have a deleterious effect on the "professionalism" of the military and also
injure our country. While it is not too important to differentiate between
civilian and military between elac.ions, as their policies theoretically
should coincide, it would be wall .or informed citizens to make this distinction
during elections.
General White, expressed the accepted military view on political questions
as follows:
When a man enters the military career he knowingly enters a field which
with respect to politics is a narrow one. I consider that in this connec-
tion the military career represents almost a polar extremity from that of
the politician's career.
If the military man is compelled by conscience to speak out, either in
contravention of policy or the propriety which must govern the man in uni-
form, let him leave the service. This often is a hard choice but I see no
alternative under our systen of government. Such a man can be indeed, a
patriot and a fearless leader; public opiiion will at a rainimu.; applaud
his courage even though it might not be converted to his views
=
27Gen. Thomas D. White, USA, Retired, "Tho Military and Politics: A Dan-
gerous Mixture," Newsweek, October 19, 1964, p., 33.
1 Senate Military War Education Hearings, p. 5.
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Foreign Policy, National Security Council, and The Bureau of the Budget
John J. McCloy said, "The isolationism of the 1920-19^0 period produced
a vacuum of political objectives. The State Department did not have, indeed
it was not encouraged to have, any political aims in the world."
9 During this
period the military prepared officers for functions that went beyond the training
and directing of combat forces. It is not agreed that the military performed
30
well, but they seemed to be the best planners available. Walter Millis says:
The Second World War. . »had inextricably intermingled the civilian
and the military components on all the higher levels of policy-making;
and the difficult future into which we were gazing as the war ended
seemed to offer little hope that they could ever be fully separated. In
1945 the stage was filled with civilians r.ore militaristic than the
military, and with military men— like Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradly and
a host of others—with a breadth of view on national and world problems
which often made them seem more 'civilistic' than the civilians. It
was no longer clear that the substitution of a politician or businessman
for a professional soldier at.any given post of command would necessarily
affect the course of policy.
After World War II the military establishment regularly submits its
recommendations on economic and political matters and probably has a predominant
role in military economic aid. Its administrative roles in places like South
Korea and Berlin and in formulating position papers for international conferences
considering Japanese terms of surrender, for the Truman Doctrine in 19*»7, for
NATO (North American Treaty Organization) and for many other ... .led Hasland
and Radway to say,
To limit the purpose ;:nd scope of war requires the closest cooperation
between military and diplonatic personnel. To attain national security
objectives without resort to war requires a national strategy in which the
disposition of military forces is integrated with political bargaining,
"Raymond, op . cit., p. 68.
3°Loc. cit .
3'Walter Millis, Arms and the State, p. 140.
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policy statements, alliances, foreign economic policy, propaganda, and
any and all measures that nay foster the growth of friendly factions
within foreign governments. In either case the role of the military
officer of tomorrow will be even less conventional than the role he has
played in the recent past.;2
To carry out this increased participation of the military in foreign
affairs the Secretary of Defense h^s an Assistant Secretary for International
Security Offices with Lt. Gen. Robert Wood (1SS5) as a Deputy. Each service has
an organization dealing with international affairs. Some have argued that
this military involvement in foreign policy indicates a lack of civilian control
but, as Walter Hillis observes, it is not a matter of restoring civilian control
over the military establishment bui of integrating military factors, forces,
and plans with civil diplomacy ?.nd domestic policy.33 As General Maxwell
Taylor states, "The military are entitled by law and right to a seat at the
national table—there to advise,, not to dominate or command.
"
3;t The military
position is to clarify political alternatives and to show the military
implications of alternate courses of action. After policy has beer, determined,
the military implements it but does not change it.
Some misunderstanding exists as to the actual military influence in our
government. The NSC by law is the organization which recommends national policy
to the President. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for the military
point of view. Unless specifically requested, the JCS do not advisa the
President directly; in fact, their advice goes to the Secretary of defense.
By law, either the Chairman or any member of the JCS has the authority to go to
the President with a matter he deems of sufficient importance. This would be an
32John W. Kasland and Lawr;nce I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars; Military
Education and National Policy, >. 26.
JJHillis, op. cit., p. \k2,
3'tyiaxwell 0. Taylor, "What Really Takes '.'lace in The Pentagon Engine Room,"
Army-Navy-Ai r Force Journal and Register , February 29, 196**, p. 13.
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extreme measure and, if used very often, would destroy relationships, making
removal of either the military or civilian involved necessary. It is granted
that on many occassions the Chairman of the JCS does advise the President
personally, but this depends upcn the wishes of the President. Organizationally
the JCS have no direct access to the President or the NSC, where the actual
national decisions are made.
The same is true of the budget. It is not a budget made by the man in
uniform. It is a military budget made by the civilians in charge of the mili-
tary. The individual services present their budgets to civilian comptrollers
and civilian secretaries. The JCS reviews the budget and makes recommenda-
tions to a Defense Comptroller who presents it to the Secretary of Defense, a
civilian. Of course, if the Chief of any of the services, or his civilian
Secretary, has reservations on the budget, a wise Secretary of Defense gives
each service a complete hearing, but the decision nevertheless is civilian.
From here the budget goes to tht Bureau of the Budget, where it is integrated
into the overall national budget, entirely a civilian product, and the
Bureau of the Budget presents the overall budget to the President, 'ho submits
it to Congress. Both in money matters and poiicy, the man in uniform is
isolated organizationally from the decision-nuking body unless his personal
advice is requested. As a matter of practice, the military chiefs :-.ave no trouble
in having their recommendations reviewed. The Secretary of Defense undoubtedly
presents substantive non-concurrences of the Chiefs of services to the President
or the NSC. Congress would be quick to ferret out any such lack of consideration
of a military recommendation by either the Secretary of Defense or one of the
Service Secretaries, or by any of their civilian subordinates.
One of our national objectives is to prevent the spread of Corr.nunismj
32
another is the maintenance of free world alliances. The press for the most
part (but public figures and authors military as well as civilian) popularized
various names to indicate the military strategies to accomplish these objectives.
First, it was "containment," then "massive retaliation," and now it is "flexible
response," which includes "limited warfare," "mutual deterrence," and "balance
of terror." Certainly none of these terms produces an image of peace, which
is another national objective. The country as a whole is preoccupied with
the problem of security. Several of these terms may produce a feeling of
security in some people and certainly insecurity in others, but for all, these
descriptive terms are warlike terms. In the minds of many Americans these terms
are attributed to military leaders. This is ;iot entirely right. The military
is not responsible for these te,-ms nor for the national objectives connected
with them, although the military undoubtedly participated in formulation of the
policies. Rightfully, George Kennan, former U. S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.
and Yugoslavia, is responsible for the "containment" policy.35 "Massive
retaliation" was the policy of Eisenhower and was popularized by the press as
the policy of his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. However, theoreticians
such as Dr. Robert Strauz-Hupe, Colonel (Retired) William R. Kintner, Stefan
T. Possony, and many others are responsible for outlining the ramifications of
this policy.'' "Flexible response" is the term representing the Kennedy policy.
Ho less authoritative a person than General H:,xwell D. Taylor says
that the public first was to receive intimations of the limitations
of dependence on a nuclear strategy.
. . .(These writings) fro.n unofficial
35
^Huntington, op_„ crt., p. 15.
>6Robert A. Levfne, The Arns Debate
, p. 77.
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sources represented the first public questioning of the validity of the
New Look policy of Massive Retaliation and I welcomed them warmly. Their
acuity was all the more remarkable from the fact that the authors did not
have access to complete information with regard to atomic weapons effects.-3 '
Henry Kissinger, Robert Osgood, William W. Kaufman, and others, educators
employed by civilian educational institutions or scholarly research organiza-
tions, deserve the credit for not only originating but explaining these policies
to the country. It is true that the Army had been interested in limited warfare
for some time but, despite all Army efforts to get its policies considered in
official circles, the public retrained mostly unaware that a debate which would
alter the entire structure of the armed forces was going on behind Pentagon
walls.38
In late 1964 there was an argument in NATO over MLF (multinational
nuclear force), a proposal supported by the United States and Germany, and
opposed firmly by France and, to a lesser degree, by Great Britain. The author
of this proposal is Prof. Robert R. Bowie, Director of Harvard's Center for
International Affairs.39 Undoubtedly MLF was an administration concept and
supported by the military, but to give credit to the military for originating the
proposal is giving the military too much credit. In budgetary matters, deter-
mination of national objectives, foreign policies, and even military strategy,
it does not appear that the military are as influential as generally believed.
At the highest levels the military, for the most part, is represented by the
Secretary of Defense. There has been a gradual change since World War II, when
^Huntington, op_. cit
., p. 34B.
38Loc. cit.
.
39"Mi'nuet of the Powers," Newsweek, Novo .bar 9, 1964, pps. 46-50.
'"Raymond, op_. cit. pps. 2^3-24B. There are many discussions of who ori-
ginated what aspect of U. S. policy. This citation is in agreement with the
facts as presented. It is not particularly important who originated these
concepts but the point being made is that it was not a man in uniform but the
State Dept., civilian educators, or research institutions.
8k
the man in uniform was more influential than the civilian Secretaries.
Civil
-Military Relations
There are few principles more honored and respected in this country than
civilian control of the military. The speeches and writings of the framers of
our Constitution showed a keen interest in this subject and all agreed that
the military should be subordinate to civil power.
A fear of the military rooted in American traditions. The
framers of the Constitution, recognizing that military domination was in-
compatible with free government, wove into ihe Constitution several pre-
cautions, '
Congress controls the purscj the President directs the sword. Congressdeclares war; the President runs it. Cong: ,ss appropriates the r,.oney and
determines the size, structure, and organization of the fighting forces;
the President is the commander in chief of ;hese forces.^2
Most authorities agree that in thi.; r.anner the framers provided for civilian
control in the Constitution.
Huntington presents the argument that the separation of powers works
against objective civilian control; that the framers believed in a citizen Army
that would rise up when necessary with the officers coming from the leaders of
the nation who, in many cases, would be meabers of the national legislature.
T:ie framers chief concern was that politicians wculd gain military control.
They did not even envisage a separc.te military Cass. Jefferson condo ined the
distinction between military and civiiian and George Washington said that the
soldier and civilian were the same man. An analogy is found in the rise of the
party system. The framers did not envisage political parties nor did ;hey
envisage a professional military class so they provided for neither in the
41
o. 605
S MaCGre9°r BUrnS and Jack Wa1ter Pe,tason, Government by t;-,e People ,
felbid., p. 591.
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Constitution, although both are now firmly embedded in our political tradition.
Hence the theory that civilian control is extra-constitutional has some
credence.
"Liberalism has always beer, the dominant ideology in the United States.
Throughout the years the American liberal approach to military affairs has
been hostile. They believe that
a nation at war or in constant fear of war does not provide a very
satisfactory milieu for the toleration and encouragement of difference
and discussion. Concern with security matters, fear of disloyal persons,
demand for swift action, and an atmosphere of fear are not conducive to
free and open.debate, protection of individual liberty, and careful
deliberation.
These liberals have consistently pointed out that democracies have failed in
countries with large standing armies. Isolated incidents (which will be
discussed later) have been used to justify their fears and hostility along with
exa-nples from Latin America, Europe, and other places. These liberals fail to
realize that the military in the United States are dedicated supporters of
civilian control—that this dedication is to the Constitution, and to the
President as their Commander-in-Chief. The military have shown little interest,
with few exceptions, in the niceties of the evolution of civilian control but
support the civilians appointed to the military establishment by the President
and confirmed by the Senate as their superiors without qualification.
Former CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) Arleigh A. Burke says
In regard to the military, there is the principle of civilian control.
No mature U. S. military officer I know of has ever questioned it. Indeed,
'Samuel P. Huntington, "Civilian Control and the Constitution," American
Political Science Review , Sep. 1956, Vol. 50, pps. 679, 698. This article gives
an excellent analysis of the origins of civilian control.
Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State, " p. T*3. "or a complete
analysis of the effect of the liberal society versus military professionalism see
pps. iy-162.
45Haroid D. Lasswell, Natio nal Security end Individual Freedom
, p. 28.
^"These include the cases cf Generals Air.swcrth, MacArthur, Walker and Anderson.
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it is a sacred part of our mi'iitary tradition itself. If a military man
cannot reconcile his convictions with his civilian superior's order, he
had only the recourse of leaving the service.^'
Former Chairman of the JCS and now Supre.T.2 Coirmander of NATO Gen. Lyman
Lemnitzer says, "The principle cf Military subordination to civilian control
48
is one of the most important foundations or o^r form of government." Former
Chief of Intelligence and Research and Development of the Army Lt. Gen. Arthur
G. Trudeau says
I know of no military officer who questions the historically accepted
'
principle of civilian control of the military, or the responsibility and
authority of the Secretary of Defense and higher officials to review, for
policy and propriety, the statements of military spokesmen.4
"
Civilian control of the military is not just merely accepted or endured
by the military but it is repeatedly stressed to prospective officers from the
time military training is started in ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) units,
in the universities, at West Point, or at other military schools. Americans
can be proud of and reassured by the devotion to this principle of civilian
supremacy displayed at the academies and all higher military schoojj. It is
drilled into every officer. The military ccrsiders civilian control not only
a necessity of the democracy which it has sworn to protect, but also a guarantee
of its professionalism. There jxe many recent statements of both civilian
scholars and military leaders emphasizing civilian control. I car. rind no
military leader who has ever questioned civilian control; however, General
Bradley appears to think that tie ilitary would prefer a less public role when
47
'Military Cold War Educatio.-. Report , p. 201.
7
8Hilitary Cold War Education Hearings, p. 6127.
ffibid., p. 127.
5°john W. Mas land and Laurence I. Radway, op_. cit ., p. 506.
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he said,
Economically, politically and militarily, the control of our govern-
ment resides with the civilian executive and legislative agencies.
. .
When you have civilians like these in charge, no military clique can develop.
And when you have trained and skilled businessmen and scientists advising
the military as frequently as we have had since 1940, admirals and generals
are not likely to influence u.-.duly the policy and plans of our government
. . .1 also am sure that as soon as civilian agencies are organized to
take over such civilian problems, the military will gladly withdraw to its
purely professional duties.
Except for MacArthur, not since the turn of the century, when General
Ainsworth, with Congressional assistance, challenged the authority of Secretary
Root, has a military man attempted to override his civilian superior.'' It is
true that, as a result of the Congressional B-36 hearings, President Truman
53dismissed Admiral Denfield. Also President Eisenhower did not reappoint General
Ridgway after his first two years, as would have been customary, but allowed him
to retire, supposedly from disagreement over personnel cuts in Army strength and
the strategic role for the Army. Neither Ridgway nor Denfield ever implied that
the decisions being made were not wholly civilian decisions. In fact, Ridgway
said,
When all my protests against reductions in the combat strength of
the Army proved unavailing, there was but one course left open to me~
to support the course of action prescribed by ray civilian superiors,
no matter how dangerous it seemed to me.''
Then General Ridgway visited all his subordinate commands and informed the
Generals he had tried his best to forestall cuts in Army strength and that
none of them should do or say anything that failed to support the civilian
decision. Both Denfield and Ridgway were supported by their immediate Army
5 General Omar H. Bradley, "Should We Fear the Military? Civilians Are
in Charge." took , Mar. 11, 1952, p. 35.
52samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 311.
53Harry S. Truman, op_. cit
., p. 53.
5jHi11is, op_. cit
., p. W» and Sherman Adams, First Hand Report , p. 27.
^Matthew P. Ridgway, Soldier
, p. 303.
56Loc. cit.
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and Navy civilian secretaries. After Congressmen had their say for the record,
Denfield and Ridgway, as civilians, dropped out of the picture except as
examples for future historians who become interested in their careers. The
principle of civilian control was enhanced rather than challenged in these two
cases.
MacArthur's words,
I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous con-
cept that the members of our crmed forces owe primary allegiance and
loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive
Branch of government rather than to the country and its Constitution which
they are sworn to defend. (Jo proposition could be more dangerous.57
are often used as evidence of a military challenge to civilian control. Mills
gives this speech as his only example of military ascendancy and dangerous mili-
tary thinking.' Few remember that MacArthur prefaced this remark by stating,
"We of the military shall always do what we are told to do."" /\nd several days
later at a press conference, he elaborated by saying that "any idea that a
military compandor in any position would possess authority over the civil func-
tions of this government is a treasonable concept in my mind." It must be
remembered that, when MacArthur talked before Congress, he was a civilian and,
at the most, his revolt (if revc'it it was) was that of one soldier unsupported
by other military men in power or on active duty. General Thomas A. Lane in
writing about MacArthur says:
The implication of the T.'uman supporters has been that this letter was
written to embarrass the President. It obviously was not. This country
once had a tradition, only recently abrogated, that Congress was entitled
to the candid views of the country's military leaders. It was in the
Constitutional tradition that General MacArthur had responded to an inquiry
by the House minority leader. He had no reason to believe that his
^Mills, op_. cit., p. 204.
5°Loc. cit .
•pLoc. cit
.
°uMillis, op_. cit
., p. 325.
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appraisal, which was available to all inquiring Congressmen would be
tossed into a hot political debate. He night have asked that his views
be kept confidential; but it would have fc^en a reflection on Congressional
prudence for him to suggest what should or should not be made public. As
in all his advice to Congress, General MicArthur left the judgment of the
public interest to Congress.
You will find in this as in his other actions a meticulous observance
by General MacArthur of his d :ty to his : jperiors. The significance of
the MacArthur removal from cocmiand is thct the actions of a forthright and
loyal commander were so misinterpreted by hostile allies and a coterie
of White House toadies that the President lacked a real comprehension of
the war being waged in Korea. 3 '
MacArthur was a very forceful and complicated personality. He had dealt
successfully with considerable freedom in policy matters with Japan and felt
himself perfectly capable of doing so. He had been Chief of Staff of the Army
and in this capacity had many time:; forcefully represented the Army before Congress.
He had many friends in Congress.. Ae was the Corcmander of United Nations forces
but the chain-of-command originete.i with UN resolution (drafted by the United
States), then sent to the United States for execution. The UN resolution would
be considered by the NSC, approved by the President, and sent to the JCS who
sent it to the Array as the executive agent. General Collins, a man much junior
to General MacArthur would transmit the orders to General MacArthur. To the Army,
with few exceptions, MacArthur had been disobedient to a superior officer, and
obedience is the highest military virtue. General Lane's explanation maybe plausi-
ble to some but testimony before Congress is a regularized method with a Committee
requesting information and not by personal correspondence. All four members of the
JCS testified strongly against l.im. Some of his immediate subordinates and a few
who had been on his staff tried to justify his actions. No one doubted President
Truman's authority, but there w<is considerable emotional opinion among the
military, particularly retired officers, that a great commander had been treated
6l Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Lane, "MacArthur Misjudged," Array , June 1965,
pps. 6, 8.
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shabbily. No doubt President Truman could hava relieved the General in a more
generous manner. Since then MacArthur's cause has been adopted by "rightist"
groups, including a few senior retired military officers. This list includes
General Bonner Fellers, General James A. Van Fleet, General Albert C. Wedemeyer,
General Mark Clark, General George E. Stratemeyer, Admiral Sen Moreel, Admiral
Chester Ward. A distinguishing characteristic of all these officers, represent-
ing all three services, is that they fought in the Pacific, mostly in Korea.
There have been other cases or momentary importance, the most recent of
which is that of General Edwin Walker who said that "the oath of an Army officer
was a convenant with Almighty Gcd.' ^ It is true that the oath of office, as
both MacArthur and Walker state it, is to support the Constitution but an officer's
commission from the President charges an officer to obey his military as well as
civilian superiors. But this is quibbling about words.
But Walker before a Senate subcommittee after his retirement, said, "I
want to say first that, like all officers of the Armed Services known to me, I
have always respected and supported the principle of civilian control over the
6h
military. ... Civilian authority is supreme." Walker was a minor figure, an
embarrassment to the Army, and his case would never have received the publicity
it did except that it was exploited by Congress and the "Anti -Communists" and
"rightest" groups.
Admiral Burke said he had never heard of an officer advocating preventive
war. ' The admiral was mistaken and it concerned a case of disobedience involving
national policy.
Preventive war, which was strictly against national policy, wa^ advocated
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Hew York Times, January ]k, 1962, p» 1.
°3Tristram Coffin, Passion of the Hawks
, p. 102.
"^Senate Military Cold War Education Hearings, p. 1390.
°%enate Military Cold War Hearings, p. 1 74.
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by Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews and also by General Orvil Anderson,
Commandant of the Air War College, in August and September (respectively) of
1950. No one should object to a senior military school theoretically considering
the possibility of preventive war, particularly at this time, because in 1950
the United States superiority in nuclear warfa.-e was unquestioned and time was
considered in favor of the U.S.S.R., But for such a policy to be publicly
advocated by people in authority could have had the most serious effects on
foreign policy and, more to the Joint, the military was openly advocating a
solution to a political question—end this is not the prerogative of the military.
It would seem that the most serious mistake wa-. made by Secretary Matthews who,
as a member of the NSC, should have known prec'sely what the national policy was,
while General Anderson, as the h;ac of a school, Might be excused on the basis
that his job required him to des with all possible theoretical questions
connected with war and peace. General Anderson was dismissed but Secretary
Matthews was only privately censured by President Truman, who felt that, due to
inexperience, Matthews had not fully realized .he impact of his remarks and
he had been listening too much to ; :vy admirals. As Admiral Burke says the
possibility, advantages, and disadvantages, of preventive war, in strategic plans
are discussed. ' Admiral Robert B, ;arney, Chief of Naval Operations, made
some very restrained remarks in ; 1954 speech, but no evidence has been produced
that indicates the military ever reduced such a recommendation to writing even
for discussion purposes.
There is no doubt that the military accepts civilian control when it comes
from the Commander-in-Chief, but William J. Coughlin, in Missiles and Rockets
.
Truman, op. cit., p. 383-and Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Aoe,
P. 229.
=*-'
iLoc. cit.
°°Brodie, op. cit
., p. 229.
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expresses doubt about acceptance of the same control from Secretary HcNamara who,
more than any other Secretary of Defense, has taken command of and done much to
unify the services. He says
It should be understood that the high officers in the Pentagon, with-
out exception, acknowledged the need of civilian control of the; military
establishment. But in most cases it was felt that this civilian authority
rested across the Potomac, on Capitol Hi 51 and in the White House, and
most certainly was not required to make its presence felt in the halls
of the Pentagon itself. The actual running of the military establishment,
it was agreed, most properly belonged in the hands of the military.
Recently the top military men he v.: not spoken out, except in Congressional tes-
timony, but there is increasing „ ;dence that junior officers of field grade
think there is too much civilian control at the Pentagon level. Colonel Robert
H. Ginsburgh advances the theory that civilians have not only taken over control
to the point of invading the mi'.itory man's traditional province and that
military professionalism is endangered by civilians taking over military strategy,
but that science and industry are preempting weapons requirements end that
several layers of civilian appointees are isolating and downgrading military
opinion.' Colonel Francis X. Kane, in another article, claims thr.t the present
civilian control of the military has "computerized" military decisions, removing
human considerations from military problems which have been the military's
traditional area of expertise. These two officers are supported by many
civilian experts, and recently Admiral Willia.1 J. McNeil, a World War II Reserve
Naval Admiral, who was the civilian comptrollor of the Defense Department from
1949 to 1959, said,
The present tendency to increasing!.' greater civilian control, over
both defense planning and execution, rau;i be tempered by an increasingly
69Williara J. Coughlin, "The Revolution, Part II," Missiles and Rockets ,
April 6, 1964, p. 54.
'"Colonel Robert H. Ginsburgh, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism,"
Air Force and Space Digest , March, 1964, pps. 50-56.
7'Colonel Francis X. Kane, "Security is Too Important to be Left to Com-
puters," Fortune, April, 1964, pps. 146-147.
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skilled and competent Offic..-- Corps. . .there seems to be a dangerous
tendency in our defense to try to anticipate what is wanted from the top
(referring to civilian heads) and then supply it.' 2
tot all junior officers agree. Major John W. Seigle has written an article
entitled "The Myth of Decision by Computer." He claims that the civilians have
instituted what the military can use to its acVantage. He says, "The idea
that diabolic computers are making defense decisions is misleading. The proper
concern is whether the right people are operating the machines! ' i The fact
that General Taylor has said,
On the one side there are those who stress the dangers of excessive
military influence in the development of national policy. . .the other
side of the debate holds. , .that there is presently over-control of the
military which is causing cr may causa ar erosion of military authority
and prestige,_gnd the subxerg-nce of military professionalism to civilian
dilettantism.'
indicates that the highest ranking officer in the country recognizes a problem.
Does the fact that junior officers of today, who will be senior officers of
tomorrow, are restless under tic,ht civilian control at the Pentagon level now
make it possible that this influence will increase and spread so as to endanger
civilian control? Evidence does not corroborate this conclusion, particularly
because the officers publicly complaining of excessive civilian control are
Air Force officers concerned with the replacement of manned bombers with
missiles, while the Army, whose mission of limited warfare has increased in
importance under McNamara, is not complaining. The underlying dissatisfaction
appears to be service-or mission-oriented, rather than oriented toward civilian
control
.
^ Daniel S. Henkin, "The Speech That Wasn't Cleared," Army-Navy-Air Force
Journal and Register, June 20, \s6k, pps. 1 and 8.
/^Major John W. Seigle, "The Myth of Decision by Computer," Army, May, \Sdk,
P. 67.
/''Taylor, o£. cit., p. 8.
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There is a much more subtle military influence which must be considered.
Walter Lippmannhas said that the talkativeness of American military men is an
international scandal which has caused loss of respect and confidence toward
the United States.7^ Finer says that the American system of goverrcr.cnt and the
enhanced role of the military force* military men into a spotlight of constant
publicity. Further,
In this (the military) is neither better nor worse off than any
other government agency in Jni' ad SUtes. The generals and admirals
are accused of 'speaking out of turn 1 , and of uttering sentiments which
are bigoted, or contrary to official policy, or which deal with matters-
like foreign policy—which ara no conce.-r of theirs. They certainly do
do these things. Often, the publicity 3-; /en to their view is not intended
by them. . .Yet in all tha;c cases it is not only not censured by the
American public but is positively defended on the grounds that 'the public
have a right to know'. It mu t never be forgotten that the American
panacea for any policy protle.71 is publicity. In this respect the militai^
are no more open-mouthed or undisciplined than the civil administrators.
In this connection Hills points out that the military aims are legitimate
and that military men are most competent to pi rsue them, but he finds because
of the new military prestige, what the military says tends weight to controversial
matters which are mainly political and raises military matters above the political.
He also says that military men ; re expert in : orking behind the scenes to accom-
plish their purposes.77 It is well known that Eisenhower was irritated many times
78
by speeches which seemed in conflict with administration policy, and Secretary
McNamara found it necessary to -issue the following directive: "After the
President has taken a position, has established a policy, I expect no member of
the Department, either civilian or military, will discuss that policy other than
in a way to support it before the public."' . ecretary McNarnara refused to give
names or incidents regarding civilians or rail tary which had made the directive
?John M. Swomley, Jr., Th
;
_i ilitary Establishment , p. 113.
3Finer, op. cit., p. 142.
'l-lills, op_. cit., pps. 185, 199, 202.
'Swomley, op. cit ., p. 113.
^Coruj. Rec., op_. cit ., p. 14439.
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necessary and said:
The only case I can recall involving discipline of any kind relating
to a public statement by an officer or a civilian employee of the Department
of any kind including statements relating to Communism is the discipline
applied to General Walker. The infractions certainly were not major ones.°°
The military leaders are popular speakers at all types of meetings and they
naturally try to say something cf .mportance. Such a normal instinct is hard to
control, particularly when the public and press seem to approve. And it 1s not
true to say that this "talkativeness" is usually not without a purpose. There
is no more ambitious group of men than the military. They are power hungry, too.
3ut their ambition and longing for power is directed in one of two directions:
toward the enhancement of their particular service or toward the increase of their
prestige within their own service* Mo military man ever talks against civilian
control, although his talks are exploited by the press and partisan advocates
for every possible anti-administration recommendation.or for controversial
material.
In reviewing the speeches of military leaders, one finds General Power
advocating an air alert, General Ridgway mere ground troops, General LeMay more
airplanes. While patriotism ar.; the n^3d to protect our democracy are woven
into the speeches, the emphasis is on the military needs of their own service.
This orientation of military men toward power and prestige for their own
service is undoubtedly one of the jest safeguards against militarism which a
democratic government has. The Air Force espouses massive retaliation because
the Air Force would have the top defense taskj the Army espouses limited warfare
for the same reason; the Navy argues for atomic submarines to take over strategic
nuclear missions while the Air Force opposes them. A victory for one service is
a defeat for the other.
Senate Cold War Education K^arings , p. 139**.
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It is the same way with the budget. Strategic goals are converted into
military appropriations in which e ch service is dedicated to getting its
share, or more, from the budget. If the military ever agreed on strategic
goals, the equipment to attain the e gccls, or the size and proportionate share
of military appropriations, then the danger of militarism would be greatly
increased. The present system is ^pensive, and produces pluralism, but as
Senator Henry Jackson (D.-Wash.) SQys, "The life and death issues of National
Security are too important to sacrifice a healthy competition in the name of effi-
ciency."
General Bradley when asked to comment on what would happen to the United
States if the Communists took ova.- Europe and Asia, said, "We'd have to mili-
tarize completely for 100 or 15C years, and that would be as bad ss defeat."32
In other words, General Bradley thinks that militarism would be as bad for this
country as would Communism. It is doubtful if many civilians see the dangers
of militarism as clearly as do the military men themselves—they are experts by
training and schooling on the effects produced by militarism in other countries
and have both intellectually and emotionally rejected it for the United States.
That love of country and patriotism are motivating forces in young officers
cannot be denied. The letters of Captain J. P. Spruill to his wife, published
after his untimely death, are classics in this regard. J Additional evidence
is supplied by another young officer who asserts that the public does not
fully understand the military profession and says:
Si'Too Much Unifying Can be Costly Senator Jackson Tells Career Men,"
Amy-Navy-Air Force Journal and Register , June 20, 1964, p. 8.
°^Alfred Vogts, A History of Militarism
, p. 486.
83Army Information Digest , July, 1964, pps. 46-47.
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Today the armed services ^re rapidly assuming a role in American
society which leaves them virtually the scie repository of those virtues
upon which the American Reptbl:c was founded: devotion to pub'Kc service,
high moral standards, selfless obedience e.id sacrifice to the ideal of
service to the nation, and cth-.r virtues fast fading from the world
scene.
Military teaching and a military csi-eir are still producing young msn who
recognize values of liberty and justice and art willing and anxious to
pattern their military careers in this tradition. Undoubtedly the two examples
shown above are rather extreme symptoms of selfless, patriotic idealism and
there is a danger connected with such absolutist. For military men to believe
that they are the sole repositories of American virtues shows a lack of
understanding of our other great democratic institutions—educational, political,
and spiritual. Such extremism ir youth can be accepted as immature judgment
but, if extended to senior military officers, v.ould be dangerous and would
be an evidence of extreme mil its. .
S. L. A. Marshall, in a recent article entitled "Why Do They Slander Our
Military Men?" said,
The American military, like all the rest of us, want a better deal
for themselves if it can be got. But I maintain that they are beyond
the rest of us in their active, thinking support of the time-tinted ideals
that have kept this a goverrme.it of, by and for the people. Here I speak
of the principle of civiliar. cjntrcl in its broadest, most mear. ngful
implication. The principle has stayed firm through almost two centuries,
because the American military have given it wholehearted support. Had
they not been so dedicated, co stitutions':ity might have run as devious
course in the U. S. as in a ba .ana republic. In our union, the military
alone have had the power to ch 5 1 er.ge Gove rnment decisively—and they
have served but to uphold Government.8'
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""Major Carl M. Guel zo, "In Defense of an Elusive Ideal," Army, July, 1964,
p. 64.
°$S. L. A. Marshall, "Why Do They Slander Our Military Men?", Post,
September 5, 1964.
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Former Secretary of Defense Robert A, Lovett said:
Alarmist cries about the lack of civilian control over the military,
in our Nation, deal with a str=>uwan issue,. They are concerned with a
problem that does not really exist, and they are divisive and damaging
by falsely implying that the military does not accept our historic
tradition of civilian supremacy. Nothing could be more wrong.
Former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates expressed the same idea in this
manners
Civilian control, in a historic sense, is not debatable. 1 have never
heard it questioned. Military men respect it and believe it. . . .No mill- •
tary man nor military group ..'..> its poiiticjl control. I have no fear what-
soever in this regard. 'The man on the wl ite horse' is no more real than
Don Quixote tilting at wind /cry foolish worry of some ex-
tremists. This will not ant c nnot ...er our system and it would
never be accepted by responsible officers.^7
Dr. James D. Atkinson, associate professor of government at Georgetown Uni-
versity, was asked by the Subcommittee for a statement. He made a statement and
it is interesting to note that he pointed out that Andrew Jackson, '/infield
Scott, George B. McClelland, and Leonard Wood, although soldiers, brought polit-
ical issues before the public and that this was accepted as natural by the
people of the United States.00 In feet, it wasn't until the 1920's that the
military were supposed to be exel Jded from politics. The important point is
that not one of these generals who ciscussed political issues before the public
and even ran for office attempted to enhance their political position by military
support. Atkinson's conclusion is that the military should be nonpartisan, and
it closely follows that of other rej itable scholars of the military tradition.
No myth has been more persistent—especially since the 192G's--than
that there existed a military mind which w:s alien to American soil and
which had to be watched carefully lest it i ,-jderraine our national insti-
tutions. The myth that somehow an officer caste night arise and create
a dictatorship has never had any foundatio. in fact in the United States,
Senate Cold War Education Hearings
, p. 12.
°7ibid„ p. 3ii8.
0oSenate Military Cold War Education Hearings
, pps. 31^7-3160.
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yet it has somehow managed to persist. The myth has been nourished on
the idea that there has been a conflict between the military and the
civil authorities over the question of 'civilian supremacy' over the
military. Actually, this is a false dichotomy. Even a cursory survey
of American military history reveals the fact civilian supremacy—even
during the darkest days of the Civil War--had never been questioned by
military people. 9
With evidence from two Secretaries of Defense (one Republican and one
Democrat) and with opinions of prominent scholars' to corroborate such
views, there seems little room for argument with Senator Thurmond's conclusion
before the Senate Subcommittee: "The information developed by the subcommittee
shows conclusively that there is no threat from the military to civilian suprem-
acy."
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j^Ibid., p. 31<*7.
7 Gene M. Lyons, "The Mew Civil Military Relations," American Political
Science Review, March 1961, pps. 53-55 says that the military accept civilian
supremacy and that they have been thrown into a political role in formation
of policy. Lewis J. Edinger, "Military Leaders and Foreign Policy Making,"
American Political Science Review, June I9<>3, p. ^05 says "In the study of
'civil -military relations' the effect of military influence have been difficult
to assess.- After reading all the factors required to determine military
influence—it can be practically said that no one has produced studies that
would confirm military influence." Paul Y. Hcmroond, Organization for Defense :
The American Military Establi sh- v; : in the 20th Century comes to the conclusion
that any risk of losing civiliar control is considerably less than is commonly
believed. William T. R. Fox, "Civilian Soldiers and American Military Policy,"
World Politics , April 1955, pps, ^03-418 presents a stronger argument for military
inclusion and actions in civil-fi;ilitary relations.
*
'Senate Military Cold War Education Report , p. 203.
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Military Mind
H. G. Wells once said, "The professional military mind is by necessity an
inferior and unimaginative mind; no man of high intellectual quality would
willingly imprison his gifts in such a calling. '&2 The concept of a military mind
that lacks balance of judgment, uses dictatorial methods instead of persuasion,
looks at problems narrowly and illiberally, and by education, training and
experience is not equipped to perform a role in society outside of a constricted
military sphere, stems from the liberal tradition in the United States from
1920 to 1940.93
Several political scientists have observed that our present pluralistic
society has become so mixed that there is no longer a clearly defined military
group in contradistinction to a civilian group. Gene M. Lyons is not the first
or only one to express the idea that civilians are becoming militarized and
the military civilianized.94 Just exactly what is meant by this statement is
not amplified but the impression given from the entire article is that senior
officers today show a broader interpretation and knowledge of political, economic,
psychological, and sociological factors while the civilian knowledge and use
of the same factors is becoming narrower.
John './. Masland and Laurence I. Radway portray the military today as follows:
The traditional distinction between military and civilian affairs in
American life has become less significant. Under present conditions at home
and abroad, it is obviously not enough for the armed forces to provide good
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and the leaders necessary to command them in
battle. Today many of these leaders are called upon to work closely with
92Lt. Col. Gordon K. Fleishman, "The Myth of the Military Mind," Military
Revi ew, November 19°^, p. k.
93See Chapter 1, page 4, footnote 7 and speech of Senator Ful bright, Cong.
Rec , 1st Sess. (1961) Vol. 107
;,
Part 1, p. 1^33.
S^Gene M. Lyons, "The New Civil-Military Relations," American Political Science
Review, March 1961, pp. 53-55; see also "Washington Play It Cool," .Newsweek
,
January 8, 1964, p. 3k, and footnote 31 on page 79.
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foreign affairs experts, industrial managers, scientists, labor leaders
and educators. They participate in the drafting and promotion of
legislation, in the preparation of a national budget, and in the^
determination of the American position on a wide variety of foreign policy
issues. They are required to understand, to communicate with, and to
evaluate the judgment of political leaders, officials of other executive
agencies, and countless specialists; they must make sound judgments
themselves on matters which affect a wide variety of civilian concerns.
They are called upon to evaluate the motivations and capabilities of foreign
nations and to estimate the effects of American action or inaction upon
these nations. And above all, the new role of military leaders requires j r
of them a heightened awareness of the principles of our democratic society.
C. P. Snow has divided the intellectuals into two classes, scientific and
humanistic. He claims that each has its separate dialogue and one of the dangers
of the present era is that they do not understand each other.
9 It could be said
that each discipline has its own methods and individualistic mental views.
Similarly business, law, niedicine, profession;! athletics, have general charac—
-
teristics which could be classi.'led as separate mentalities. General George H.
Decker said, "The real test of the military decision maker is to weed out the
trivia, to go to the heart of the matter, to decide, and having decided to
execute."^ General Taylor, giving mere detail, agrees that there is a military
mind and described it in a speech before the rtnerican Bar Association as follows:
Personally, I've never baen overly exercised by the chares of possessing
a military mind. How would you lawyers feel if you were said not to possess
a legal mind? 3y the same token we soldiers, sailors/ and airmen regard a
military mind as something to be sought nd developed—an indispensable
professional asset which con only be acquired after years of training in
reflecting and acting on mill :ary and related problems. We hope that such
a mind, when properly matured, will prova itself analytical, accurate and
decisive in time of crisis because history has shown that neither the battle-
field nor the national coyncil table is the place for conjecture, vagueness,
or obscurity of thought."
55|/.as1and and Radway, 0£. cit ., p. vii.
9 C„ P. Snow, The Two Cultures and A Second Look , pp. 11-12.
97=AFleishman, cjd«, cit., p. 7.
y Taylor, op_. cit. , p. 8.
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The influx of retired officers into positions of responsibility in industry
and government has already been noted. Obviously their performance is creditable
or industry would not accept them neither would the President appoint them nor
would Congress approve. It is also important that 200 generals or admirals
(17 percent), 1400 colonels or Naval captains (11 percent), and 6,000 officers of
lower grades are on assignment to interservice or international agencies or to
99
other departments of the government.
To meet these increased challenges the military establishment is increasingly
placing emphasis on education both in service schools and civilian institutions.
Take the 1964 Army figures as an example (the same approximate percentages are
true for the Navy and Air Force). More than 73% hold college degrees, a gain of
24% since 195^, and 8% hold master's degrees excluding medicine, law and theology.
When the last of the World War II officers, \i\~o became officers after serving
in enlisted status, are retired, these percentages will rise considerably. Post
graduates degrees originally were .'.llowed only for disciplines which could show
an immediate military use or need but now officers ara allowed to take advanced
degrees in almost any field but th3 biggest gains are in biological and physical
science, management, economics, psychology, and political science with emphasis
on international relations. At present there are 800 Army officers enrolled
at government expense in full-time graduate study and an additional 7,000 in
off-duty study of their own, many of them for graduate degrees. During the past
10 years, 4,500 have received Master's and Doctor's degrees.
Masland and Radway, who have produced a recent and comprehensive study on
military education, point out that the following subjects are among those taught
at the various branch schools: public and international affairs, community
99
.QQMasland and Radway, op. oit., p. 517.
"Officers Achieve Impressive Gains in Degrees Held," ANF Army News Features
,
November 16, 1964, p. 1.
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relations, military government, civil disturbances, Congressional relations,
general management, foreign military aid program, public speaking, conference
and committee techniques, and a course dealing with Communism, fascism, and
democracy (each school teaches these subjects in different proportion and no
school teaches all of the above subjects).
At the National War College three quarters of the time is spent on non-military
102
subjects dealing with international relations. The authors felt too much
time was spent on the foundations of Communism (Marxism and Leninism) and thought
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more time should be spent on the emerging nations of Asia and Africa. This
college's entire curriculum is directed toward preparing officers for assignments
10^
to positions involving the formulation of security policy at the NSC level.
At the Army, Navy, and Air Force War College the authors were impressed by the
breadth of the curriculum. "At no other place can an individual secure in-
struction on the full range of circumstances that bear upon the security of the
United States today and during the foreseeable future. "'°'
The conclusion of the authors on professional military education is as
follows:
It is a record of which the armed forces justly may be proud; it is
far better than many civilian educators and laymen realize. The services
recognize the need to prepare officers for the newer demands that have been
placed upon them. The awareness has led to both specialized training
programs and broader educational opportunities. ...
Ue conclude that military education does make a very substantial con-
tribution to the preparation of officers for policy roles. . . .The range
of subjects presented in military schools helps him to see the relevance of
his task to the larger context in which he operates. It helps him to see
broader technical, organizational and social relationships, and to appreciate
the dynamic quality of decision making in an era of revolutionary change.
In many cases the educational experience helps him to diminish a narrow
JplKasland and Radway, op. cit., pps. 273, 279, 291.
°glbid„ p. 358.
"fold,., p. 359.
gfoid., P. 368.105Ibid„ p. 367.
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parochialism and to increase versatility. They facilitate creative
military service under civilian leadership in a democratic society. 100
The most important factor concerning West Point, Annapolis, and the
Air Academy was that the amount of instruction provided was much closer to the
amount provided by civilian colleges than was expected. This was accomplished
because the total education program is unusually long. No academy offers less
work in the humanities, composition, and speech than is required at a civilian
college. Social sciences have inc.-eased in importance with a diplor.iatic history
course devoted to a systematic analysis of international relations. The cadets
spend more time in arts and sciences than on either engineering or military
subjects. 107
Over 65% of regular Army officers come from ROTC, the Navy has a lesser
percentage and the Air Force approximately the same. In 1965 there were
13,000 Second Lieutenants commissioned in the Army alone (goal is 17,000)
with only 500 from West Point, a ratio of 26 to 1. By weight of numbers
alone, the military graduates of civilian institutions are becoming more
influential in the policies and actions of our military establishment every day.
Gene H. Lyons' and John W. Masl.:nd's Educatio . and Military Leadership is the
most recent and authoritative study of the ROTC. Among their conclusions are
that:
The programs were originally designed for the preparation of reserve
officers available to lead a citizen army and navy mobilized in an
emergency. . . Present trends suggest a diminishing role for reserve officers. ,
and a rising demand in the career service for officers trained in colleges
and universities.'
"
10oIbid., pps. 502, 503.
107JFid., pps. 214-217.
1o8Newsletter Issue No. 2, U. S. Army Trcop Support Unit , August 20, 1963
p. 2.
'°9Gene H. Lyons and John W. Masland, Ed-ication and Military leadership : A
Study of ROTC
, p. 3.
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These men (ROTC graduates) must understand the role of the military
establishment in a democratic society and be sensitive to political,
economic, and social developments at home and abroad. They must have
analytical skill and good judgment of high order. Perhaps of greatest
importance is the need for wisdom and a broad perspective, not only among
officers who advance to hither levels of responsibility but among officers
at all levels, in peacetime, and war.""
Quantitatively ROTC oi/tp it looks all right.
. .
.Qualitatively the
situation is different. The UOTC programs are not contributing adequately
to the strong professional officer base required for the forces-in-being.
Almost all of the testimony that we have obtained has confirmed that the
ROTC product makes excellent officer material. But too few of these men
elect to remain in the military. The services are not securing their share.
of talent for long-term and career duty, particularly in certain specialized
categories. '
Responsibility for achieving a proper relationship of higher education
to the needs of society rests with individuals and agencies of the federal
government and with leaders in higher education. 1 '2
Civilian institutions and the services must realize that this group of
young Americans has an important job to do and that how well it performs and
how well the future military officer is imbued with democratic principles may
be determined at our educational institutions* One conclusion is evident: that the
type of officer desired will not evolve if civilian institutions and the services
fail to recognize that this is an croa for which they have a responsibility to
provide the necessary background and instruction and that not just any curriculum
is satisfactory.
If an American military mir.d was at one time narrow and parochial, the
evidence available now is that by education, training, and experience it has
grown with its expanded responsibilities in science, technology, and political
and economic affairs. In fact, "the far-flung operations of military officers
at mid-century may be viewed by the future historian as the start of a fundamental
11 Ibid„ p. 13.
Hl lbid.
, p. 212.
112Ibid„ p. 237.
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change in the American social order and the future American system. 11
Although there are no statistics available, retired military personnel
as well as the more than 50% of American men who have some kind of military
service, do not seem to be having difficulty in being assimilated into civilian
communities. Officers now are Republicans as well as Democrat; Methodists,
Catholics, and every other religious denomination; members of Rotary, Lions,
K.iwanis; and active in PTA and other public-minded groups. "Much of the isolation
and austerity that characterized the military forces was pressed upon them by an
' 14indifferent or suspicious people"' but now they represent a cross-section of
America as broad as any other group. Martin 3!unenson says:
World V/ar II was a watershed in the relations between the American
public and the military servi ces. Since that time, the American people
have come to understand ttu precarious equilibrium of our world and the
necessity for maintaining I arge Militi.'y Establishment. Officers are
no longer outside the mainstream of American life, but perform a vital
function of protecting and conserving it. They are now recognized as
professionals in the full sense of the term, not only as the opposite of
amateurs, but achieving a knowledge acquired by study and experience."5
Public Education by the Military
As has been indicated earlier, Senator Fulbright in a Senate speech took
exception to the military engaging in public education on the dangers of Communism.
He said that the military does not have this ability nor should it have this
responsibility. And, of course, this public instruction was just cnother evidence
of the spreading influence of the military into every phase of American life.
If the military could move into one sphere of political education of the public,
it could certainly extend its inflcance into other areas of education. It was
further evidence of Eisenhower's contention tliat the military portion of the
complex was, by its very size, taking over vital areas in American culture that
JJ^Masland anj Radway, Ibid. , p. 25.mlbid.
, p. k.
115Martin Blumenson "Some Thoughts On Professionalism," Military Review ,
September 1964, p. 13.
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had never before been subjected to military direction. Fulbright's speech
resulted in a Senate Subcommittee being appointed which the press called the
investigation into the "muzzling of the military." The subcommittee report was
almost a complete repudiation of Fulbright's thesis and, as this report, which
has been quoted several times already, is the most exhaustive study by a Senate
Subcommittee of the proliferation or penetration of the military into extra-
military fields, in this case education of the public, it will be considered in
some detail, even though its consideration may repeat other parts of this
study. It recommended that the military participation in anti -Communist
seminars be continued because the experience snd specialized knowledge of the
military gave it a legitimate function, due to the dangers and menace of
Communism. Two Senators dissent ;d to this conclusion. Senator Sirom Thurmond
went considerably further and reconmended that "the Military Establishment should
continue to utilize its personnel and facilities to the maximum extent to inform
"117
the public on the issues of the cold war."' Senator E. L. Bartlett said, "I
continue to be, and likely always will be opposed to public education by the
military on the subject of communism." His reason was that the officers did not
*
fQ
have time, with all their other duties. The concurring members of the
Committee consisted of Democrat:;, John Stennis, Mississippi, Stuart Symington,
Missouri, Henry Jackson, Washington and Republicans Leverett Sultonstall, Massa-
chusetts, Francis Case, South Dakota, and Margaret Chase Smith, Maine. George
W, Brown, in his study of the findings of the Committee, considered them
"reasonably representative of feelings of the attitudes in the Senate as a wholei'"?
This assessment seems accurate.
'^Military Cold War Education Report
,
pps. 7, 8.
!
JiLpc. cit., p. 191.
1lSt°£« Sll" PPS « **3, V*.
George W, Brown, Generals and the Public; Recent Policymaking in Civil-
Military Relations
, p. 4.
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Judging from the parade of witnesses supporting military participation
in cold war seminars to educate thj public on the menace of Communism, there
could be little doubt as to the conclusion the Subcommittee would roach.
Witnesses were politically bipartisan. They included the military and civilian
heads under both Democratic and Republican Administrations, a professor of
government from Georgetown University, other government officials, and many of
the officers who had participated in or conducted cold war seminars. However,
there was some evidence submitted in dissent particularly by Norman Thomas and
1 20
the Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation and the Jewish War Veterans.
There was also Senator Fulbright's speech in t.ie Senate, containing his
memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and other evidence he had placed in the
1 ot
Congressional Record which was r.-ado a part of the hearings. The preponderance
of witnesses came from the military, many of i . 10m were retired, or were civilians
who had held top positions in the Defense Department or, in some cases, the State
Department. The absence of educators as witnesses, in a matter in which they
should have priority interest, was very apparent. These hearings wore well
reported. It is admitted that the impact of the hearings could not be evaluated
at the time but, as students study them their impact will probably become greater.
Any educator desiring to make a written statement or to present testimony could
have done so, as Norman Thomas did but none took the opportunity. Senator Ful-
bright's speech and memorandum iii-iated the investigation; yet he didn't appear
at the investigation or comment about it while it was in session, .as he
satisfied that the subject was bsing covered :Vom all angles? Or did he feel,
for political reasons, that he should not inte.-vene? Or was he just too busy?
No one knows, but his opinion would have been valuable in assessing the objectiv-
ity of the investigation.
IZOSenate Cold War Education Hearings, p. 3016 and 3142«43,
121 loc. cit
., p. 3053.
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The subcommittee presented much valuable material and undoubtedly brought
several subjects, general ly misunderstood by the public, into focus. It was
universally recognized that military men have a responsibility to indoctrinate
the members of the armed forces on the military aspects of Communism and ,-.
subversion by Communists within the military establishment. There was no
argument by anyone that the U.S..S.:!. represents the only threat to the security
of the United States. There war. no doubt that Communist subversive activities
within the United States are antithetical to the government of the United
States and that knowledge of these subversive activities should be available to
every American. It was recognised that the subject of Communism, in any of
its various aspects, is a politica'. question end it was also recognized that
the military should not appear in the same seminar with controversial speakers
such as those of the various "rightist" groups, or retired officers who have
become politically aligned.
President Eisenhower's statement at the hearings is typical of those who
testified:
I am sure that all of us would deplore any move which would restrict
public access to reliable information on the deadliness, implacability,
totality, and cunning of the Communist assault on freedom. We should not
trouble ourselves over the possibility of overinforming the public.' 22
And later on he qualified this statement with regard to the military: "Military
involvement in the providing of information concerning Communist potential aggres-
sion—indeed its involvement in all matters—must be clearly nonpartisan, directed
to subjects related to the defense of America, and in harmony with approved
national policies. "' 23
The subcommittee report stated that military participation must be factual
and non-partisan. As far as Communism is concerned, it is my opinion that these
1 22
Loc. cit
., p. 5.
123lqc. cit., p. 178.
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two conditions are impossible. An illustration will suffice to demonstrate this.
President Eisenhower says that it is not the function of the military services
to ferret out the details of attempted Communist subversion in our nation. This
is the job of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but the long professional
experience with Communist tactics and with Coir.nunism's highly developed
educational system makes the military singularly well trained to provide the
public and members of the Armed Forces with the implications of the extreme
threat of Communist imperialism, in other words President Eisenhower would
allow the military to choose the facts to be presented and to put them into
proper context for presentation* The military is capable of performing this job,
and the job needs to be done. But in the case of Communism, either as an external
or an internal threat, identica'. facts will bring disagreement in interpretation.
To quote from Newsweek :
The FBI is charged with laving developed 'a vested interest in security
1
--to the point where it ha:, bsen exaggerrting the internal threat posed by
a steadily weakening Communist Party. S;;ys one congressman: 'They are, in
effect, shoring up the Comnunist Party, making it appear much more of a^
menace than it can possibly b.; considering its decline. This is a gimmick
that helps the agency score with Congress. Hoover scares hel i out of a lot
of Congressmen. How can they refuse to go along on his appropriation when
he is in the forefront in the fight to oust Commies and spies?' 1
"
Stewart Alsop says:
Finally, the change proves that American policy has worked remarkably
well. . . .Only a few year:: tgo the 'iron curtain
1 was indeed impenetrable
and the 'satellites' were satellites indeed. Now those long-familiar words
are outmoded—the iron curtain is full of great, gaping holes., and the
satellites are very visibl tiginning to shake loose. In short, the con-
tainment policy has succeeded.
1 2JtHewr.y;eek, December 7, V)i>k, p. 23.
Ill
If the West can only hang together, if there is no disaster in Asia,
if the conditions which mace the policy work are not foolishly or complacently
altered, the policy will continue to succeed, as the memory of Stalin's
terror fades, and the Soviet system changes at an accelerated pace.' 25
Whether Newsweek or A1sop are right, wrong, or partially right is not the ques-
tion and is not the subject of this work. The question is, would David
Lawrence, Walter Lippmann, Walter Judd, Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond, or
William Fulbright derive the same interpretation from the same set of facts on
Communism? They are all intelligent and respected Americans but they would
produce different answers. For the military to be, in any way, drawn into
such an argument brings it not only into the political arena, which is re-
cognized, but places it in a position of using facts which, regardless of how
they are used, would result in a partisan position. Practically everyone who
testified before the subcommittee said the military must be factual and non-
partisan. Communism is an area in which non-partisanship, under present
political conditions, is impossible to achieve. McCarthy brought on his downfall
when he attacked the integrity of an Army general. This is the military's most
valuable attribute and the surest way to lose it would be for the military to
be recognized by either side as partisan in any type of Communist indoctrination.
There is much confusion concerning the scope and attendance of cold war
seminars. The seminars can be divided into four different classifications: (1)
instruction by military personnel vor their ov.n personnel, (2) seminars for
military and State Department personnel at the highest level of military education,
(3) seminars for military personnel in the Reserve and for the public given by
military instructors, (k) lectures for Reserve personnel and for the public by
' 25stewart Alsop, "Communism: The Meaning of Change," Saturday Evening Post
,
December 5, 1964, p. 12.
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military and civilians.
As to the first classification, there is little if any question that the
military should instruct its own personnel concerning Communism with particular
emphasis on the possibility of subversion within military organizations. Major
General Edwin A. V/alker was called as a subcoir.nittee witness, as it was generally
accepted even by the New York Times that he had been censured by the Army
for his troop indoctrination program, or "pro-3lue" program. This is not so.
His "pro-Blue" program was considered basically sound and continued implementation
in the 2*»th Infantry Division was .-ecomended.. General Walker's offense was in
127
recommending use of voting materia. s not obtained through military sources.
Specifically he recommended in talks, as well as in the "Taro Leaf", the official
publication of the 2*»th Divisior : . a column carrying his signature, that the
ACA (Americans for Constitutional ction) index was available for use by anyone
who wished to consult it before vouing. A high rating on the ACA index
indicated that the Senator or Representative had voted for Americanism and a
low rating indicated the indivicua". voted for bills that aided Communism. General
Walker rightly claims that he did not specifically tell anyone how to vote and
that other indexes were available for anyone who wished to use them. However, no
mention of this other material was made in the "Taro Leaf". Naively he claimed.
that these actions were not partisan. General Walker's entire performance
before the Subcommittee was ineffectual, incoherent, biased almost to a patholog-
ical degree, and humiliating to the Army. The subcommittee tried to get
128
straightforward answers out of General Walker, but it was almost impossible.
The only recommendation of the hearings in regard to presence of the military
129
in the field of Communism was that it should be intensified.
j
ZoSenate Military Cold War Education Hearings
, p. 3064.
l^Senate Military Cold War Education Report
, p. 31.
12HSenate Military Cold War Education Hearings
,
pps. 1387-153'u
l29Senate Military Cold War Education Report, p. 27.
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The second classification is that of the seminars of the Industrial College
and National War College. These, in my opinion, cannot logically be criticized.
Senior officers of the Defense Department and State Department attend these
colleges who have already been picked as prospects for top echelon positions
in the military and foreign policy establishments of our government. The
speakers at these year-long courses represent the top thinkers in government,
and industry, past and present, as well as university scholars with accepted
reputations and other leaders throughout the country. Certainly those students
'
are able to evaluate the materiel presented. A sampling of the lecturers included
at the War and Industrial Colleges are Senator Fulbright, ex-Secretary of State
Dean Acheson, Walter Reuther of United Auto Workers and scholars such as W. W.
Rostow, Roger Hilsman, Bernard Fall, Paul Hanr.ond, Richard E. Neustadt, Hans
Morgenthau, Max F. Hillikan, Chrrles 0. Lerchc, Jr., William C. Johnstone, and
William T. R. Fox, and William C. roster, head of ACDA (United States Arms Control
Disarmament Agency).
The only criticism of the War College was special seminars conducted by
Dr. Frank R. Sarnett, Director of Research for the Institute of American
Strategy and one of the top men in the Richarcson Foundation, who was responsible
for presenting material as well as lectures, end it is true that this Foundations
position is anti -Communist and -:ts view of world conditions is one of protracted
conflict as espoused by Dr. Robert Strauz-Kupj, Director of the Foreign Policy
Research Institute, which is also supported by the Richardson Foundation. In
looking over the names of those connected with these two institutes sponsored
by the Richardson Foundation, one finds that they are all scholars of repute
who have held top positions either in govern:.-.out or in universities throughout
the country, most of them have published works recognized as scholarly and, above
all they have popularized and, In some degree been responsible for the
Uh
Eisenhower-Dulles "massive retaliation" policy. The important point is that
they represent one sector of the political spectrum in their reasoning toward
Communism. Every thinking American should understand the point of view of these
scholars. The Richardson Foundation is reportedly supported by several industrial
firms engaged in defense industry. There is no evidence that these firms
influence the thinking of the Foundation but these two organizations present
only one point of view consistently and the assumption is, though unproved,
that this position is satisfactory to the sponsor. Frank Barnett has been for
some time a speaker at the annual conventions of the AHA (American Medical
Association) and NAM (National Association of Manufacturers). These organizations
are thoroughly American and their views respected by many, but they, too, represent
only one portion of the politic;.! spectrum.
The professional military man is considered generally conservative and
his position of "peace through military strength" is strongly supported by this
group of thinkers. In order for the military to remain independent and for
its judgment to be considered entirely professional, connection with such groups
must be avoided. For the Richardson Foundation to present lectures, with which,
according to its own thinking military men are more apt to agree, places the
military in a political and partisan group and therefore makes it more suscep-
tible to attacks from opposing political groups and to misinterpretation of its
motives and actions by the uninformed.
A third group of seminars is presented throughout the country by the Indus-
trial College. These have already been discussed.^" They are given to a
broad group of the American public. Although these lectures cover the entire
field of world political, geographical, and economic thinking, there have been
130See pps. 59-62 of Chapter III.
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comparatively few objections to them and none traceable to persons attending
the seminars. From all indications, these seminars are factual, well presented,
and as non-partisan as a seminar on Comiunism can be. While these seminars
are always supported by a civilian organization, such as the Chamber of Commerce,
military men are the only lecturers.
The fourth type of seminars are the most controversial, reaching by far
the largest number of people, including all types of Americans from all sectors
of society, and the instructors are both military and civilian. The most active
example was Captain Kenneth J. Sanger of the Naval Air Station in Seattle. He
gave over 200 lectures on Communi s.ti personally, and officers under him gave about
<*00 in little more than a year. These lectures were given for organizations such
as Rotary, Lions, Kiwanis, Parer.t Teachers Associations, Mothers Clubs, Church
Groups, high schools and even colleges. Thes^ lecturing officers roamed the
entire Pacific Northwest. Capt.in Sanger officially was responsible for training
given to reserve officers who normally attend training once a week. Seminars
on Communism were certainly within the scope of his training directive. Reserve
officers were urged to give similar lectures to the public. It can easily be
seen, with such a diffusion of effort and regardless of how factual or non-
partisan the basic data may be, interpretation inevitably creeps in and the
source of the material is credited to the military. Captain Sanger testified
that his program in Seattle was given wholehearted support by the Seattle-Times ,
Post-Intelligence and the Pacific Northwest Progress , the three leading newspapers
in Seattle. The subcommittee brought out the complaints of the Daily Worker ,
New York Times and Time Magazine about Captain Sanger's program but congratulated
131
Captain Sanger profusely on his efforts.
131 Senate Military Cold War Education Hearings, pps. 2k\7-Zk5$,
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As has been stated, the subcommittee reco.imended continuance of military
participation in these seminars, saying that the complaints were for the most
part picayune or unjustified, but in a few cases valid.' 32 while no organiza-
tions were pin-pointed, the valid cases, without doubt, consisted of a very
few times in which Dr. George S. Benson, John Green, and Dr. Clifton L. Ganus
of Harding College, Admiral Chester Ward (Retired), or Dr. Fred C. Schwarts,
William P. Strube, Herbert Philbrick, and Richard Arens of the Christian Anti-
133Communism Crusade appeared. " That the military should not participate with any
of these gentlemen or organizations appears unquestioned. The fact that the
military did appear with, or sponsor, these organizations on less than six
occasions out of the hundreds of meetings, that these occasions received the
publicity which they should have.- and that all meetings became tarred with
the same brush, should have alerted the military to take action to protect its
professionalism. There is no record that this was done. In fact, the articles
in Time13 and the New York Time: 135 which accused the military of having officers
presenting "right-wing" doctrine. w 2re found to be unreliable. Senator Strom
Thurmond labelled these criticisms as misleading, distorted, and factually
inaccurate. If the testimony of the officers concerned, which was under
oath before a Senate subcommittee, is to be believed, Senator Thurmond's
assessment is correct. However, the label of "right-wing" trends did not change
because of the Senate hearings. No retraction by Time or the New York Times
132<
"'""= military k.oia war taucation )<l poT, p. 2y.
3057-3060.
Senate Military Cold War Education Report, p. 180.J/Senate Military Cold War Education Hear.nqs , testimony
.'deling, Sanger, Wagasky, Warden, passim.
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has been found. The damage to military profess! onalism was already accomplished.
Accepting the thesis of President Eisenhower and the subcommittee that the
military are best prepared to ec'ucate the public on Communism, which is a
debatable conclusion, and accepting the fact that accusations against the
military have been exaggerated, it is still true that respected and thoughtful
commentators have made the accusation that the military are assisting in
spreading "right-wing" doctrine. Only one Navy Captain expressed any concern
about "guilt by association," ard ;;,is after a specific question as to this
possibility by Senator Stennis.
130 Witness after witness, including President
Eisenhower, Admiral Radford, General Hewlett, Admiral Burke, and Ex-Secretary
of Oefense Gates thought that military participation in these seminars was
fulfilling a natJoial need.' 39 That senior officers do not see any danger to
military professionalism indicates the degree to which the function of the
military in a democratic society is now accepted. Supposedly no one would
object if, at one of these seniuar3, Senator Thurmond was to participate or
no one would object if Senator Ful bright participated. It is doubtful if Senator
Fulbright would be invited, but there is no dcubt that these two respected and
intelligent Americans would present different points of view, even using the
same factual data. The cold war and Caaraunisn, which is internally subversive
as wall as externally dangerous to national survival, are partisan political
questions. The military should ec/jcate its ov.'n members but public education,
except on strictly military sub^ecis that have already had administration
approval, is not a proper field for the militc.ry, if the professionalism which
requires politically unbiased advice is to renain inviotate. Public education
uyiBTd
., passim.
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should be left to our democratic Institutions—educators, politicians, press and
pulpit. If the public is not being properly educated on these matters, then
the political leaders should take action*
The subcommittee recommendstlon is
that adequate guidelines, policies end procedures be established to
insure that proposed semlnt.rs will be given advance screening, assessment
and evaluation to preclude military involvement in a seminar (a) not based
on a broad base of ccroaunity support; (b) at which a controversial or parti-
san speaker is to appear on the progrem; (c) at which partisan or political
subjects are to be discussed; or (d).which otherwise Involves partisan,
political, or controversies issues."
It is a aisconccption, despite estseraed opinion to the contrary, that Communism,
in any of its aspects, can be the jubject of a seminar without Decerning partisan,
political, or controversial, as required by tt.e subcommittee recomrendation.
If this fact were recognized, than the recoir.-.. ndafcion of the subcommittee is
acceptable; otherwise the raitifc;r> cannot publicly enter this Meld without
damage to its professional reputation, as well as to the country.
Ethos and Peace
Knowledge of the distinguishing characteristics, habits, attitudes,
beliefs, and standard of conduct of a group creates confidence or lack of
confidence in the group as a whole.
Dr. John A. Hannah, President of Michigan State University and former
Assistant Secretary of Defense vor Manpower and Personnel, in testifying before
the Armad Services Ccnsnittee, siidt
Before I came to thi3 post I weighel West Point and Annapolis solely
on the basis of educational r-ounc's. . . While there are mm things they
may not do as wall as our good civilian Institutions. . . thay do one
thing cuch batter and that ie they do in it. .1 in their students. . • a
loyalty to the service, a loyalty to the government, an appreciation for
ethics and Integrity to a decree beyond what we do at our civilian insti-
tutions.''*1
!
^°Senate Military Cold War Education Report, p. 8.
14lMas!and and Radway, og.. c-it., p. 125.
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Has land and Radway say that the service academies spend more time on character
building than on anything else and that they are the repositories of the service
ethos and are acquiring young men at a relatively impressionable age, so they are
able to
define the ideals to which they expect their officers, from whatever source
derived, to aspire. Here they (service academies) formulate the standards
of excellence suggested by their corporate experience. Here, they confront
the prospective martial leader with the great models of the past. Hopefully
and prayerfully the desired characteristics of heart and mind are laid
before young men, and every incentive that can be imagined is employed to
encourage them to follow. '^2
Among the ideals of the American officer already discussed are pride in his pro-
fessionalism, dedication to civilian supremacy, and obedience as the highest
virtue. Huntington has provided the most complete discussion of the military
ethic. One of the traits he assigns to the military is that of pacifism.'^ a
dictionary definition of pacifism is: "opposition to all war and armed hostili-
ty,"l^ Under this definition Huntington is incorrect and the military cannot
logically be considered pacifist. However, the love of war which is militaristic
is the counterpart of the love ov' peace which is pacifist. If this latter conno-
tation is used for pacifism then Huntington's argument has some merit. The
Military are for peace but it is a peace guaranteed by superior military strength.
"Power for Peace" has been the slogan of the U. S. Armed Forces since 1961.
The military do not believe that strong forces bring wars; rather they believe
that the strongest nation will never be attacked if the weaker nation knows the
true relative strength and knows the stronger nation will use its force if
attacked. The military further believe, as has been previously stated, that the
1 '*2 Ibid., p. 169. See also chapter on "character building," pps. 197-231.
'^Huntington, op_. cit
., p. 79. Chapter 3 is recommended for anyone who
desires a more complete discussion, pps. 59-79.
'^Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition,
1962.
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United States has never been prepared for a war and that in this thermonuclear
age there must be no doubt in the mind of a potential enemy that this country
will be protected. They also believe that the decision for peace or war is
a political one and the military must be ready at anytime to win a war that is
not of their choice. This is not the pacifism which means opposition to any
war but it does not eliminate a dedication for peace. To quote General
KacArthur: "Ho one desires peace as much as the soldier, for he must pay the
greatest penalty in war." 1 '*5 General Sarksdale Hamlett, Deputy Chief of Staff
of the Army, recently said,
Today, the common defense requires a military establishment capable
of supporting American foreign policy who^e ultimate goal is to secure an
enduring peace. A necessary, intermediate step in accomplishing this opal
is to deter or defeat Communist attempts at inroads of the Free World.P*
General Thomas D. White, former Or ef of Staff of the Air Force says, quoting
President Kennedy,
The primary purpose of our arms is pc;ace, not war—to make certain
that they will never have to be used—to Jeter all wars, general or
limited, nuclear or conventional, large or small—to convince all aggres-
sors that any attack would be futile—to provide backing for diplomatic
settlement of disputes—to insure the adequacy of our bargaining power for
an end to the arms race.
. . Our military posture must be sufficiently
flexible and under control to be consistent with our efforts to explore
all possibilities and to take every step to lessen tensions, to obtain
peaceful solutions and to secure arms limitations.
W
Then General White continues his argument to the effect that we need flexi-
bility in all strategies, meaning more manned bombers, and should not forswear
the "first strike" capability.'^ This type of argument is not inconsistent
with a love for peace; however it does recognise the likelihood of war, and
that peace can be maintained oniy through military strength. Similarly this
concern for peace is shown by General J. Lawton Collins, former
'^"Selected Quotations: U. S. Military Leaders," Office of the Chief of
Milita ry History , Department of the Army, May 10, 1955, p. 42.
'^General Barksdale Hamlett, Army Information Digest , May 11, 1964, p. 11.
WGen. Thomas D. White, "The Pendulum Is Swinging Too Far," Newsweek,
February, 24, 19o4, p. 22.
as.
,
148 Loc. cit.
121
Army Chief of Staff, who said that it was tima to think mora about preventing
a war than about preparing for war.
Othy Programs
Another of the main allegations of the anti-war group is that concentration
on the military aspects of fighting Communi sm prevents serious consideration of
other programs of more importance. Senator Fulbright expressed the idea that
the military lacked the experience and judgment to put into proper perspective
the President's total "strategy vo- a nuclear age." 1 ^ Proposals to decrease
tension'^ are among the goals cr the present administration, as thay were under
Eisenhower. Before he had beer, in office a month, President Johnson told
disarmament officials that in his ...pinion the Kennedy administration would be
remembered longest for the nuclear test ban t; eaty and that the greatest goal
of his own administration would b^ world peao.. and he urged these officials to
search for new ways to reach this goal; however, he reiterated that the United
1 52
States would continue to lead from strength in its search for peace. * In April
of 1964 President Johnson announced a reduction in the production of enriched
uranium Khrushchev followed with a similar announcement. 1 53
With disarmament there wou'.d be no further need of the industrial base
to support a huge military establishment. This would require a reconversion of
industry to other pursuits and would release funds and other resources for such
programs as the "war on poverty," aid to education, improvement to highways, and
assistance to underdeveloped countries, to nane a few. It should be expected
that the military would oppose disarmament as contrary to the "peace through
'^scmuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 46.
150soe Note 88 on p. 65.
ISlThese include all phases of disarmament, "test ban" under Kennedy, "open
skies" under Eisenhower and while they can be considered under one group as means
to lessen tension, they should not be confused as they are distinct proposals.
152"johnson Pledges Drive For Peace," He.i York Times, December 15, 1963, p. 21.
>53Kansas Citv Star. Associated Press Dispatch, April 20, 1964, p. 1.
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military strength" concept which it supports* But the reverse seems to have
more substance. Disarmament has been accepted by the military as a political
question to be decided by civilians. While, r.ost assuredly the military has
never advocated disarmament, and it has loyally presented alternatives
connected with problems of inspection which would provide adequate assurance
that treaties could not be vioUtcJ without the guaranteed knowledge of the
United States. Julius Duscha wis, as via have seen, is very critical of the
military-industrial complex, says,
The major force working against disarmament and reconversion planning
in the United States today is not the military; nor is it the 18,000 cor-
porations holding defense contacts, the thousands of sub-contractors, and
the thousands of communities that depend on defense plants and military
bases for their prosperity. The main obstacle is massive popular and
governmental distrust (includes the military and perhaps to a greater
degree than most governmant agencies) of the Soviet Union—based on the
Soviet record of aggression and broken agreements. '
Similarly Jack Raymond of the New York Times claims that the JCS has worked hard
at disarmament and arms control,. They endorsed the test ban treaty with
"aditsonitions of caution and apparent disappointment that they would not get a
chance to test warheads for sons or their weapons." '' Congress, on the other
hand, has many rr.CT.ber3 interested ",i disansanr-nt but they have neve;* been able
to get a majority to agree on ore positive program. And there are .any who are
much more bellicose than the military. An ex; uple is Congressman Craig Hosmer
of California who last November, warned the country against the "nuiballs" and
"domestic idiots" working for the U. S. Arms Control and DisarraaraenS Agency.
This latter organization has a high-level conr.ittee of military generals and
admirals working for it continuously at the Pentagon, and also has an Army unit
on a full-time basis at Fort Kocd testing inspection and verification techniques."
j" Julius Duscha, "The Disarmament Blues," Harper's Magazine, Hay 1964, p. 57.
!
^Raymond, o£. cit., p. 2/3.
JViQuscha, loc. cit .
,:>
'Lloyd Norman, "Gap in the Clouds of Wer," Army, March, 1964, pps. 23-28.
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As far as reconversion is concerned, Secretary McNaraara has several times
urged industry to consider non-defense markets and has warned that defense budgets
have reached their peak and will dacrease in the future. 15 There appears to be
no basis to the charge that the military has not supported the administration
on disarmament or reconversion es concepts, nor has it unduly objected to the
theory of a decline in overall defense appropriations. As can be expected, each
service has objected strenuously to cuts within its own service while, at the
same time, supporting the proposition of a reduction in the overall defense
budget. It is interesting to note that Genercl Bradley said, after his retirement,
that he never should have testified on what the country could afford in budget
hearings on military appropriations but should have confined his remarks to mil-
itary requirements needed for security of the country.159 He later realized that,
by supporting the administration by testimony outside his field of expertise,
he had to a degree compromised his military professionalism.
The United States People-tc-People Progrcn was launched by President
Eisenhower in May 1956. One of the committees formed to launch this effort was
the Armed Services Committee, responsible for directing the program's activities
for the Array, Navy, and Air Force. The Army Veterinary Corps has advisory
groups in areas ranging from Ethiopia and Iran to Bolivia, Panama, San Salvador,
Thailand, Vietnam, Okinawa to help raise sanitary standards. There is a Medical
Civil Action Program sponsored by the military in Vietnam, Thailand, Colombia,
Turkey, Korea, and other places. It is well known that the Army advisors in
Vietnam are assisting the villagers to raise crops, build schools, improve
drainage. The Army Engineers ara busy in many countries performing the same
15 Russell Hawkes, "DOD Official Urges Industry to Consider Non-Defense
Markets." Missiles and Rocket3, Docesaber 23, 1963, p. 16.
'59mHiam T. R. Fox, World Politics, April. 1955, p. kik.
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type of civil works that they do in the United States. Perhaps these jobs
should be done by civilian groups like the Pe ice Corps but they are forwarding
the President's program for detuicracy in underdeveloped countries.
Richard Van Wagenen studied tiio views of American officers on the United
Nations. He says that none of 'chvti saw the UN as a potential world government
in the near future. All realized the UN's limitations but none even hinted
that the United States should desert it or give it fewer functions. Several
wanted the UN to reach decisions that could be enforced, even against the United
States. 1 6l
There is no evidence, as would be expected, that the military supports or
doesn't support the President's programs on cultural exchanges or domestic
programs such as thi poverty progren* But Senator Fulbright's contention that
the military lacks the experience and judgasnt to put into proper perspective
the President's "total strategy for a nuclear age" is also unsubstantiated.
Support of the United Nations, reconversion of industry, disarmament and other
methods to lessen tension—all far is of the President's overall program have
not met opposition from the military.
Two Kir.ds of Capitalism
"Corporate executives seem increasingly possessed by the idea that they
roust define and formulate their responsibilities to their publics, both inside
162
and outside the firm." 1 According to Paul A. Samuelson there are two categories
.'
-..,'. ...'. „_...:
Old fashioned profit iraximizing mar'-ats that are perfectly or imperfectly
' 60Lt. Gen. Leonard 0. Heat;n„ "Ambassadors in White," Army Information Pi qest.
Hay 19S5, pes. 32-37.
— —
'"'Richard W. Van Wagenen, "American Defeise Officials Views on the U. N„"
Western Political O i^rterly, Vol. 'A, 1961, p. 116.
ro^Earl F. Cheit, ed.. The 3u::iness Establishment, p. 159.
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competitive} and the new notion of 'managerial capitalist'—that the
corporation (and its officials) are responsive to the interests of all
parties—employees, customers., sharcwon«r.3, the public, the federal govern-
ment. 1^
The old fashioned kind of capitalism was .supposedly an American product
which made this country great. It consisted of minimum government control,
competition, a market mechanism that protected the public welfare automatically,
relieved industry of any social responsibility except for a good product
at a competitive price, the profit motive, and self-interest as a guiding
principle
.
Robert L. Heilbronner quotes William Feather, a publishing executive and
regular contributor to Nation's n;.- -jness, 33 faying in 1926t
The one-hundred per ccui American believes in the doctrin?. of selfish-
ness, although ha is often u;.c.T.ed to admit it. . «, . The Amirican idea is
that every man is out to promt* his own interest, end he has discovered
that the best way to do this 's to make ! imself useful to others. ... It
is inconceivable to a one-.1 an red per cert American that anyone except a
nut should give something for nothing.'
The naw fashioned kind of tcrJtalism is the Gospel of Social Responsibility
and is typified by Thomas J. WaiKo.i, Jr., President of IBM (International Business
Kachir.cs }, Mho says,
Only with the past few years have Icrge number of business leaders
publicly esknevj] edged and j;ctively preact.ed the doctrine that they are
servants of society and th£;t rnanagorasnt rrerely in the interest (narrowly
defined) of stockholders is not the sole end of their duties. Indeed,
discussion of the 'social responsibilities of business' has becoroe.not
only acceptable in leading business circles, but even fashionable.' *
l^lbid., pps. 203-2CA.
fflfd.. p. 13.
-- '- ^^.:-r.j S-—'.:.: '. : - :\b. :•;<:•:: _ cv i±.:. Si:;ir.ssr.-::n, p„ kk*
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The Constitution was adopted according to the preamble in order to form
a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide
for the comnron defense, promote tha general welfare, and secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our pofteri-ty. To Shis list of objective; could be
added one proposed by Gunnar Myrdal who says, "The primary role of government in
the economy I conceive to be the one of creating conditions for business that
result in rapid and steady economic growth."* " Some may consider that Myrdal's
statement is included in promoting the general welfare, because the role of
government in economic problems has been radically altered since the Constitution
was adopted. The founders believed tn freedeu for man in all his rights (political,
religious, ethical or economic),, to firmer belief was prevalent: free enterprise
and the protection of individual property was meant to be protected at all costs.
By free enterprise, the founding fathers meant leaving business to control
its own affairs to the maximum octant. This concept changed through experience.
Free enterprise, left alone, wau found to be self«destructive, by the growth of
huge industries and monopolies. Arnold A. Rocow and Harold D. Lasswftll say
that even Adam Smith, the apostia of free enterprise, was aware that competition
left to itself becomes monopoly through conspiracy, and that monopolies conspire
to maintain themselves.' 67 This stabMMt, all ost buried in Smith's philosophy,
should not be given undue weight but it does indicate that the apostle of
American capitalism was aware of the dangers of monopoly which could prevent a
free market. In the initial period (approximately 100 years) in United States
history, of absence of government restrictions, the large enterprises gobbled up
] "Gunnar Myrdal, Challenges to Democracy, edited by Edward Reed, p. 11.
'°'Arnold A. Rogow & HaroUTb. Lasswell, Power Corruption and Rectitude,
p. 93.
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the small and merged with each ether so that the public had only one supply
channel and the monopolies prevented cempetiters from entering the r-arket by
price lsi.'3, or any other method they could devise.
Cyclical booms and depression; and the fc.ct that businessmen considered
that wages to be paid laborers mutt be determined by the market, placed a good
portion of citizens in economic peril. Depressions occurred 22 tlir.as from
1762 to 1938, with 6 of these listed as major depressions or panics^ and the
one from I837 to 1843 lasting 72 months.16*' To eliminate these evil.; and to
further protect the majority of the citizenry^ the United States decided upon
government control of industry. T;is control began moderately with the
Interstate CcEnarce Act of I887 wh ch was enacted to regulate railroads, in
which industry some of the larger.-.; fortunes were made and unscrupulous practices
.-- Kepiurn
Act in 1906 and Clayton Anti-tri'5» Act in 191':, increasing gradually until now
there are over 100 government agencies dealing with the regulation of business*
Government planning for business is anathema to businessmen* Business-
men praise Adem Smith's classic; ! economic theory, but behave contrary to its
rules. They point to agriculture as definite proof that government spending
prevents a solution and that government interference has made it so the market
system could not work. They firmly believe that too much planning Inhibits
innovation* Nevertheless, John E. Bunting, in his book, The Hidden Face of
Free Enterprise, brings out soma relevant facts* His thesis runs as follows:
Americans now want security. Scarcity for most has been overcome. World War
II proved beyond doubt that government spending can produce a boom. Business-
men do everything they can to thwart natural economic law—not because they
,6d
Ri chard A. Morris, Encyclopedia of American History, p. 508.
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don't believe in the market system—but because they believe in their own self-
interest. Businessmen do not want the market system to work in their own firm.
They want the market system for everyone but themselves. A businessman wants
to control the price of his own product and hrs continually sought to control
the market and not have the market control his business. Businessman want to
be free to make profits and, to do this, they .mist not expect to be insured
against loss, believing that prcfits are something they deserve rather than being
a reward for superior performance. During th& depression beginning in 1929,
businessman were the first to coma to the government for assistance.
As Frederick Allen says:
Host businessmen believe in corcpetition—theoretically but constantly
search for ways to prevent it, so that rival companies in an industry might
all jack up their profits end enlarge thtir profits. Again and again the
heads of various steel companies, let us say, would form a 'pool •make an
agreement not to sell below a certain price. But these often lasted only
long enough for sexsone to gal on the phcne.'7°
As classical an economist as William Ropke says that
to restrict competition, then, is tc jeopardize the principle of
economic reciprocity. If this much is clear, then the conclusion can no
longer be avoided that the grewth of monopoly represents an extremely
serious disfigurement of our economic system.'''
Any businessman holds that competition has macs Atari ca a great country and
is the essence of capitalism. This is the theory which businessmen adhere to
and will fight for politically, but actually they believe and at times
honestly say, "The only way to insure profits is to stick together, keep prices
high, and maybe push them higher. 1 "2
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'John E. Bunting, The Hidien Face of Fr^c Enterprise, pps. 2, 21, 36, 63,
74,120.324. C **
'/^Frederick Lewis Allen, Tte Big Change, p. 74.
'''William Ropke, trans1ateT"by Patrick M. Boarman, Economics of a Free
Society, p. 236.
"^Bunting, 0£. cit. . p. 17.
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Joseph Rosenfarb, in his bco!; Freedom and the Administrative State, gives
as his thesis
that an economy in which continuous planning is essential is inherent
in our economic system, and that a managed economy founded on private enter-
prise, and democratically controlled and oriented, should be America's
contribution to modern statecraft and social systems. '73
It appears that recommendations for increased national economic planning by the
federal government might be necessary if individual liberty for the greatest
number of citizens is to be attained. No one can deny that, as long as there
is a poverty level in the United States, the individuals on this level are
being denied freedom.
Full consumption has teen denied a vast segment, if not the majority,
of the nation's population. So long as the present income exists, a full
consumption and full production economy will be a pious but unrealizable
goal for those insisting or. the preservation of the fundamental economic
inequalities which have flourished under Republicans and Democrats alike,"*
Government control is no longer the question in the United States; the
question is whether regulation will bring both service and more enjoyment to
more Americans and will prohibit private monopoly, Leslie B. Worthirigton,
President of U. S. Steel Corporation, says that there are now four branches of
the U. S. Government: the executive, legislative, judicial, and regulatory; this
latter branch is composed of the 60 federal agencies that not only regulate but
also
investigate and sometimes castigate almost every action and activity
taken or planned by businesses big and small, successful and unsuccessful. .
. No businessman in America objects to regulatory procedures which are
173joseph Rosenfarb, Freedom and the Administrative State, p, X,
17^Gabriel Kolko, "The American Income Revolution" as quoted in America
As a Mass Society, Philip Olson, editor, p. II 1*,
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designed to stimulate and insure fair competitive practices. If this is
their true and only purpose, then such regulations will never bother him
at all. 1 '-'
It is important that even business now accepts regulation to insure fair compe-
tition, which was not the case at the turn of the century, but it is also true
that business and industry believe unccir.preai singly that there is too much regu-
lation and they bitterly contest additional regulations.
There appears to be a dichotomy in the beliefs of industry. Thomas J. Watson,
Jr., President of IBM (International Business Machines), says:
For centuries the businc. ;;;:an has hzzn a favorite whipping boy and the
reasons are plain to see. 3u:.iness acquired wealth. With weatth, they gained
power. And until this century, much of that power was employed almost
solely in their own interests^ 1 '
Or. Clare Eliasr Griffin say^s
Thore is evident among many ir.sra tho-jghtful business leaders a growing
sense of ethical obligation; to workers and an appreciation of the intangible
values of morale which have led th:se loaders to seek practical ways of
meeting this problem (individual econonic security), 177
Conservatives Donald Kesnasrer and C. Clyda. Jones conclude:
The new way of giving people the maximum of liberty is by protecting
them frera the selfish acts of others. Lotting everyone do pretty much as
he pleased was the old way, but that will no longer work in a country as
crowded and an economy as complex as ours. '78
Modern businessmen have social responsibi Sites. Business pays social
security taxes, provides recreational facilities, builds tru3t funds, manages
insurance policies, pays minimum wages decided by law or collective bargaining.
United Fruit, after many years o : exploiting to the hilt its holdings in Central
America, has adopted a system of sharing by emphasizing private initiative. A
change becesse necessary for them tc .emain in business in Central Air.arica.' 79
175
"'--
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l'~."thingt ... -. inesi Worry Too Much Regulation-' U. s. News
and World Report. March 9, 1964, p. 16.
-
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C,sre £1c2r Griffin» Ent(rc -isa in a Fi ee Society, p. 566.
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These and many more examples of social awareness and progress could be cited by
American industry. Still, the naro typical opinion of the majority of businessmen
is the attitude of Roger Blough, U% S. Steel executive! "For a co.-poratton to
attempt to exert any kind of cccnoiiic compulsion to achieve a particular end in
the social area seems to be quits beyond what a corporation should <Jo."'^°
Social iinprovemont for workers singly cannot replace the profit motive entirely
if corporations are to exist. Professor Hilton Friedman contends that the doctrine
of management's social responsibility is
fundamentally subversive, ... Few treads could so thoroughly
undermine the very foundations of our trt ; society as the acceptance by
corporate officials of a serfffl responsibility other than to make as much
money for their stockholders as possible.'8 '
Earl F. Chcit claims that
top management, in factj, is committed more strongly than over to
the corporations 's profit position as a result of the growth of stock
tft,
option plans, because without profits the options are largely worthless.
The gains of society in general appear to have come from public and
governmental pressure rather thsn from a fundrasntal change in business motives.
U. S. Steel conceded that its decision to open higher-paying jobs to Negroes in
its Fairfield, Alabama, plant was because of federal government pressure and the
leverage of government contracts.' 3 It is true that many American businessmen
take their responsibility to society seriously. The new managerial power system
predicted by James Burnham has not come to pa£3 but there is no proof that
managers reject the values of ownership or the goal of maximizing profit.' 8**
Of course managers act for other reasons, such as power, prestige, and job
security. Businessman also support the Coauuinity Chest, employment of the
% fifl
Andrew Hacker, "Do Corporations Have A Social Duty?", Hew York Times
Magazine, NovcxScr 17, 1963, p. 21.
]°«Cheit, oo,. cit., p. 163.
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handicapped, research in the social sciences, symphony orchestras, religious
tolerance, the United Nations, economic education of tho American people, liberal
foreign trade policy, intellectual refugess from China, freedom of the press,
conservation of forests, and maintenance of private colleges. 185 Titf3 new "Gospel
of Social Responsibility" stresses responsibility to shareholders, to customers,
to the industry, to the nation, to everyone.
Undoubtedly there are men like Watson who say, "Bigness is a relative new
phenomenon in our society. Even If nothing ol;e had changed the vast concentrations
of power in our society would u- i that busi.iassraen reconsider their responsi-
bilities for the broader public .et?are"'86 Thare seems little argument with
the fact that industry is search-tic: for a new ideology and taking a more tolerant
view both of lebor and of govorrE.;sut.
Heilbronner says,
There is no reason to doubt that the corporation manager today has
an increased concern for hunan welfare and a more sophisticated appreciation
of hissan wants than was the esse a few decades agoj times and ideas havo
changed. At tho sacs tlms—and this is helf explicit in the ideological
statements we have cxemincd—there are evident mixed motives in the wooing
of the man on the plant floor. Greater productive efficiency, the
discouragement of unionism, tha inculcation of pro-company sentiment, the
procursaant of labor peace~.thos« are clc.rly among the motives underlying
raanagcTant's concern for hisan.,vs1uas in eddition to its announced
solicitude for the individu:Vs'
Further Heilbronner says there "is the explicit admission that corporate
management can act in interests ©tfcsr than those of classical theory,, that is,
in at least partial disregard of tha traditional dictates of profit making."188
Ha also bolieves that the new literal business ideology will come to dominate
the older idcetogy and may prove to be the mae. is by which many necessary
ofchait, on. cit., p. 160.
!ft3B&» P" '59.
ISIBR., p. 26.233load., p. 33.
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adaptions are made In our social system,' 69 Or. the other hand there are
others who rerark, when the new hu.an relation 3 policies are put to any
specific business actions of decision, that the important question still 1st
Is it dons only where it pays? Even sympathetic critics have failed to
answer the question: "To whoa is the corporation responsible?"19 '
Ethos Compared
The optimistic view that the new ethic of business is that of social
responsibility has many supporters,, There is -onsidarabte evidence that it is
having effect but the opposite view 33 present: that the profit restive is the
only logical one and that social if iroViaent cist coara as a by-product to strict
adherence to the classical econo.it, views of competition, supremacy of the
market, and minimus government control. Busir.sss ideology apparently is in
a transitional state. The importer* point is Aat there are divergent viewpoints.
There is no accepted standard and the preponderance of evidence is that it is
a selfish ethic. Whether this is last for Arae/ica is not the point* but that
self-interest is still the control ting ethic for industry. The miiftary ethic,
on the other hand, provides a constant standard by which the miltey can be
judged, and it is essentially an id elfish ethic. The military believe in their
ethic as a protection for their professional^ i and for democratic institutions.
It cannot be realistically expected that ihe military man and businessman
would have the same code of ethics. In the first place the professional military
man belongs to a closely coordinated, compact fjroup and, while on active duty,
is under rigid organizational control. Violation of the military ethic brings
|
89Loc. cit.
II3S&7*. i6i.
' 91 Ibid., p. 25.
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almost automatic censure from within the group, which may include dismissal from
the service. Businessman belonc to a loosely connected group, with practically
no group control as far as ethics is concerned, They coma from every walk of
life, enter, leave, and reenter the business group at will, some arc educated
and some not, and they form a criS: -section of Americans in almost all particulars*
They are no moro idealistic or responsible than the average American. Obedience
is the highest virtue to the miliary, while freedom or liberty receive £he most
praise from industry and business.
The motives of the two groups are entirely different. The military man is
dedicated to preserving American desocratic traditions and Ms responsibility
is the security of the country. The success of a businessman is primarily
measured roono'carily. Without profit, there is no industry, and if business does
not prosper, neither do the people of the United States. Ar.ssrican businessmen
may have made America great by their strict ac/tarence to the profit and loss
system. It is no condemnation cf industry anc business to state that the primary
dedication of the average busin::a :an is to making money and not to preserving
American institutions. This is not to say that American businessmen and
industrialists are not patriots, b. cause they are. In times of peril to the
country they can be depended upen, but in day-to-day operations profit is their
motivating force* For the most part industrialists believe that what is good
for industry is good for America. This also rnmybe a true statement* "Manufac-
turers," Judge Elbert Gary, (U. S. Steel President) once stated, ".r. :st have
192
reasonable profits to do their cut/*" It is too strong to say, bit it is
implied that no profits result in no duty. But it can be said that, with profits,
192
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the businessman finds his duty to his country a stronger motivating force and
the danger can also be implied that, with greater profits, the duty to country
nay bacons a greater motivating force.
The recent anti-trust suits against steel ccxpany officials, jail sentences
for electrical industry executives.-, Security Exchange Commission (SEC)
investigation of the American Stock Exchange during which its president quickly
resigned, and conflict of interest controversies in the Chrysler Corporation
and Prudential Life Insurance Co.".<pcny, involving the presidents of both firras
r.aybe isolated incidents and it is not to cay that business in general accepts
these practices; it is only intended to say that there is no overall moral code
which sets the standard, as the military ethic does for the military. The lack
of simitar incidents eieang the ciMtary, rotimd as well as active, is a credit
to its ideals as well as to the control within the establishment.
It is true that business has accepted an ethic as represented by "Better
Business Bureaus" and it can be briefly but inadequately surasarized' 9^ as,
"Honesty is the best policy." Thane organizations provide protection for the
consider as well as for the good names of rop.:able firms. Their growth, in
many cases, was instigated and prorated by these businessmen who fo.red additional
governsent controls might be forthcoming, particularly in questionable advertising
practices, if business did not willingly polios its own actions. Their influence
is mostly local in nature, not national in scope, and it does not constitute a
creed applicable autcraati catty under alt conditions and uniform in its standard,
in any way comparable to the military ethic.
Milts has said that the hierarchies of corporation, state, and military are
interchangeable.'3 it has already been shown that military men are going to
Ml
"-'"Says Business Morality Reflects Basic Mores," Kansas City Star, January
7, 1965. p. 12.
,:wM1tlB, op. cit., p. 10.
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industry for a second career, upon retirement, in increasing number:. Is there
a conflict of interest in this ciavoloptsant? It could not be expected that
industry would take thousands of military roan and give them important jobs for
altruistic reasons. Undoubtedly industry gets full reward for these services
and has found retired officers Jo be valuable employees. Business Weak says,
'The marriage of business and military is a happy one. Beyond all else, the
military can is loyal and his integrity is puncture-proof."!95 Furthermore,
the leaders of the military had to join hands to shape industry in 1J&1 and
the need of industry for experienced managers has not abated. Fotv.or Secretary
. / - .'.--.... . .; :2Ui Z--J2}
retired officers who era now onploycd in private enterprise are
making a significant and perhaps irreplaceable contribution to national
defense and the industrial capacity of this country.l9°
Aviation Weak reports that "retired officers have not only technical knowledge
but also a major as»unt of executive, administrative, and pure business ability.""?
Military man, with their ethic of absolute obedience and loyalty, their ded-
ication to their own service, their knowledge of Pentagon methods, and, above
all, their conviction that national security rests upon military strength, can
be strong advocates for defense industry by means of entering industry upon a
second career. And when industrialists talk of the absolute loyalty and integrity
of military employees, they are speaking of loyalty to business executives or
to the corporation which has hired them. Congressman Hebert says, "The question
of defense industry hiring of fomtsr military men is a delicate one. The cases
are not all black and they are not all white. That's why we have to be careful.""^
"'"Generals Make Good in Business," Businass Meek, October 27, 1956, pps.7W6
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The logical conclusion is that the military ethic is a strong safeguard for
the country while the military man is tn uniform, but it may work against
national interests when he is a civilian member of the industrial portion of
the complex*
Congress
As stated previously, Congress is so actively engaged in all aspects of
the military-industrial complex, from budgetary appropriations to procurement
contracts, that the complex is wore accurately named the Congressional-industrial-
military complex* No atic.-r.pt will be made to define an ethic for Congressmen,
the third component of the complex, as has been done for the other two units*
This is a job Congress should do for itself but has refused so far to do.
Reelection cones most generally to those who can prove they have done most for
their constituents. This naturally leads some Congressmen to an overriding interest
"... defe : eta for their dt* rict», but ipparcrliy to .-.} r.-.3ra or less
interest than that in other federal money spent in their districts* The size
of the defense budget is the only reason for its preeminent importance.
If, as President Eisenhower says, "We must never lot tha weight of this
combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes," then it appears
that Congress, with its legislative: and investigative powers, has the major
responsibility for determining the rules and exposing the dangers, if they are
present, connected with tha growth of the complex* In fact, it also appears
that there should be no insurmountable difficulty in controlling such a complex*
Congress has passed innumerable lav.s to control industry* Senator Clifford P.
Case, Republican of New Jersey, made a very sensible proposal. He recommended
that a joint Senate-House Coamittee be constituted to review space and defense
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contracts and that all records and communications leading to the award of a
defense contract be made public. He also suggested that this committee be
headed by a member of the opposition party—in this case by a Republican. The
difficulty with this latter suggestion, although it is admittedly feasible, is
immediately apparent. No Democratic Congress would allow a Republican to get
the publicity and credit for such a potentially explosive national issue, or vice
versa. However, if the opposition could find no instance of unwarranted in-
fluence, then the public could iz .'airly well assured that there was none.
Further Case said,
One immediate benefit would be that members of Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch would be in a totier position to resist pressures from contrac-
tors who seek political help in obtaining contract awards.
. . The knowledge
that any outside intercession would become publicly known would serve as a
warning and, I believe, the. strongest possible deterrent to those who would
seek improper intervention."199
Secretary McNamara said he was in complete agreement with the objectives
of maintaining public confidence in the defence procurement process.
Although this proposal is over a year old, neither the Defense Department, the
White House, nor Congress has irxde any effort to put any portion of It into
effect.
Furthermore, Congress has required appointees to the executive branch to
get rid of their holdings which might cause conflict of Interest. Charles E.
Wilson was required to sell all hi* General Motors holdings before the Senate
would confirm him as Secretary cf Defense in 1953. McNamara relinquished
options on Ford Motor Company stock and thereby lost $400,000 in profits.2 *
No such rules apply to Congressmen* This dual standard prompted the late
Senator Richard L. Neuberger of Oregon to say.
'99julius Duscha, "The Disarmament Blues," Harper's Magazine, May 1964, p. 61,
2S?LpCo cit.
''"'Irwin Ross, "Congressmen and Their Conflicting Interests," The Reader's
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I fear that It has a corroding effect on government generally when
a men&er of the President's Cabinet can ba ordered to jettison his cor-
porate portfolio by Senators who themselves may be dabbling in oil,
futures, television, hotel chains or urar.iuau202
cotton
President Kennedy in his message to Congress concerning the prevent-ion of con-
flicts of interest on the part of Special Government Employees gives a defini-
tion of ethical standards of conduct. One of the roost important facets of this
definition is the prohibition of use of inside information for private gain.20^
If this is wrong for special enf-loyaes who work for the government only inter-
mittently, how much more wrong is t for Senators or Congressmen who have access
to this type of information on e d y-to~day btsis and whose influence can affect
the decisions of government on ; $ inttnent b3ris?
The Defense Department has s.;.d that the surest way for a company to lose
a contract is for a retired office- to start lobbying for it.20'* Defense offi-
cials resent such pressures but also resent pressures from Congressmen. In the
halls of Congress, by comparison w;th the Pentagon, vested interest lobbies run
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riot and conflict of interest rides unchecked. " The recent Baker investigation
has pointed up this problem dramatically* The Senate Committee has turned
in its report, but even its innocuous recommendations have not been accepted.20^
Many Congressmen have made public iheir financial holdings and have recommended
that this practice be made mandatory or, at least, that a yearly statement be sent
to the General Accounting Office for its records. While Senator Mansfield and
Senator Humphrey both favored seme such disclosure, Senator Oirksen said It would
202Raymond, op_. cit., p. 218.
2°3special Message on ConfSicts of Interests to the Congress of the United
States, supplied to author by Senator Henry Jcckson, Democrat of Washington.
204Katherine Johnsen, "Gates Defends Officers in Industry Against Congres-
sional Attacks," Aviation Week, July 13, 1959, p. 35.20J"JFK Speech in New Hampshire," New York Times, November 23, 1958, p. **.
''"""Congress j Fighting To Finish," Newsweek, August 10, 19°^, p. 29.
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ir.ake "Class S citizens out of Sectors."207 Doos this imply that Cabinet Offi-
cers and other high officials in the Executive Branch are "Class B citizens?"
This is not a new matter. 0;i id Lawrence,, in a reprint of an erticle he
wrote during the New Deal, says,
We favor legislation which will make it a penal offense for any mem-
ber of Congress to approach e::y person ir. the executive establishment with
respect to the disbursement ov any public money, or to appear before any
executive department or conraission on behilf of any constituents or any-
body else to obtain contracts or agreements for said constituents, or to
influence the award of any orojects involving the expenditure of public
funds.208
Robert Moses, New York City Park Ccmtiissioner, says that what is needed is
mental honesty, and his creed Iss
I shall accept no fevers which will influence my official actions.
I shall steadfastly avoid cenvusion and conflict of public and private
business. I shall look to no reward that will reflect upon my conduct
in office.
He further states that conspiracy among supposed competitors is more serious
than conflict of interest between sovernment and business. 2°9 Of course, Mr.
Moses is supposedly speaking frca his home state of New York but it appears
that the same would bo true on e national level—that competing businesses
probably conspire more than govern..-.snt and business. If this is true, 1* it
not the responsibility of Congress to adopt proper rules, laws, or regulations
to prohibit such conduct within the military-industrial complex, if President
Eisenhower's thesis is accepted that its very weight is endangering the
individual liberties and democratic processes of the country? That Congress
has dona nothing to curb the growing influenco of either the military or
industry in government affairs should be proof that the majority does not agree
that the problem exists. As far as Congress itself is concerned, it should be
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"Ethics in Congress," editorial, New York Times, May 24, 1964, p. 2E.
208David Lawrence, "Do Fundamental Principles Really Change?", U. S. News
and V.'arld Report, January 6, 1964, p. 79.
^W'Mr. Moses Examines Conflict of Interest," New York Times Magazine, July
23, 1961, p. 12.
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stressed that just because a conflict of interest exists does not mean that it is
exploited. Temptation and suspicion remain ar. long as Congressmen refuse to
apply to themselves that which ihcy apply to the members of the executive branch,
a power which they jealously guird and implenant.
Laws and rules are not made for the ethically sensitive person, but for
thosa less perceptive individuals to whom unethical conduct is pursued until
restrained by legal or other standards. Could it possibly be that obvious
measures for control of the Congrcsslonal-military-tndustrial complex, which
will be enumerated in a later chapter, are proposed because they might hamper
the operations or influence of a majority of Congressmen?
The final report of the Twenty-Sixth American Assembly states:
The vigor of the Cong-ess as a legislative body and the effectiveness
of our constitutional arra nge r.ents require that the Congress warrant and
command the confidence and rs ;pect of tha electorate. A Congress able and
equipped to discharge its central functions rationally, expeditiously, and
with integrity is essentia, to the survival of representative government
in this country.2 '
One way for Congress to warrant and cotsr ind the confidence and respect of
the electorate would be to adopt a code of etiiics for its own actions as un-
compromising and exacting as it e?:pects of tha top appointive eche'ion in the
executive branch. Being elected to Congress Joes not automatically and
perpetually clothe a person with the distinction of probity. Democratic govern-
ment, it is often forgotten, is founded upon the doctrine of responsibility thru
popular elections.
.
The elected official shou'id be held responsive to the voters
if democratic theory is to have practical application. Among other things it
would be well if Congress exercised a beneficial influence on the iroral tone of
the country. If the military-industrial complex is endangering the democratic
210Report of the Twenty-Sixth American Assembly, Congress and America's
Future, p. 5.
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processes of our country. Congress shares the blame. No one doubts that
controls are needed In the Industrial -military complex, and that Congress has
the ability to provide such controls. The main concern at present Is that
the impartiality and objectivity of Congressional legislation and investigation
may become clouded by self-interest. Adopting internal rules that would make
this possible or unlikely would certainly create confidence In its subsequent
actions.
A Safeguard In Separation of Powers
Edward S. Corwin, a great authority on the Constitution, says that one
of the two great structural principles of the American Constitutional system
211
is the doctrine of "Separation of Powers." This principle is held in great
esteem among scholars of government and cntong our Congressional law makers.
Separation vis-a-vis concentration Is the theory behind the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act—keeping one Industry from totting too large or too powerful or opposing
monopolies in industry and preferring several smaller companies. Separation
of powers i3 applicable to other areas of government as well, but its effect in
the CongressionaJ-iiiilitary-indujtfial complex Is of paramount importance. In
fact, the separation that exists Within Congress, within the three military
services, and within industry la the most effective present safeguard against
militarism. This may seem a contradiction because the reader should now be
convinced that the potential danger of the Congressional -military-.' ndustrial complex
lies In the inextricability of its components, as Walter Lippmann and Senator
2
"Edward S. Corwin, The President; Offic.3 and Powers, p. 9.
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ht claim, or, as Sc.-.;_tcr Thurmond saycs
military considerations and economic, political, ar.d
.
.._.- lions are interrelated to such a degree as to make an
..•>:_-:-
-
.
line between the military and nonmiliiary increasingly
lisfrtc.
—
It als -r-c- that Congress, rather than controlling the military in
al Cor^rcssional role of chief antagonist to military budget
s the chief protagonist for increased military budgets and actively
-!.~ — .-...ration and approval of the military in advocating these increases.
.
respite th c ;od conditions resulting in closer associations
>oth national and political self-interests, a few examples should
that tho oS - -•- of Congressmen by states or districts separates their
..-
. i. u..,v i.-Justry is also widely diversified and separated throughout
vhj Cvur.iry, anJ t:.e cos-ration of tha military into three services rathw than
... .. fnto a single service is an indispensable safeguard in preventing
the .;se of the sisplaced power that President Eisenhower warned the nation about.
i
Thi . -- ...^.. 'S.tz military is service-oriented rather than unified as to
ttafy hardware is not hard to show. Under Trisian, the Air
was ... ascendancy as air power was considered our most valuable military
. .- . In <:cct the Air Force's position was that Navy carriers were obsolete
1 that pro* ; liouid go into the Air Force's B-36. This resulted
-...
... v 1 of t 'all . • 3 The military argument was purely a service
an tho Air Force and Navy, but the result was that both the car-
'.--. and 'J:.~ /- i<e?t in the military arsenal and Admiral Lo^is Confield
to resign by President Trisan. "Hassive retaliation" was the national
. Military Cote '.tor Education Report, p. 51.
-
--- ~5 _.„ .~__.j ?» 199.
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strategy under President Eisenhower. This resulted in the downgrading of the
Army mission and the upgrading of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) mission under
the Air Force. Two Army Chiefs of Staff, Ridgway and Taylor, were not reap-
pointed for a second normal two-year term, but were allowed to retire. Again,
this was strictly a service argunant. Under President Kennedy, "flexible
response" became the national strategy, with the result that the Air Force's
strategic mission has had to give way to the Army's answer to peripheral wars.
General LeMay has bean disturbed with this result and, at the present time,
Air Force general officers are the most outspoken against administration
policy, but it is a service argument on a military question. Air Force generals
are ably abetted by Senator Gol<?water, a World War II bomber pilot who holds
a Reserve Major General's co-nmission in SAC. With the Polaris missile and
nuclear sufcssarinss, the Navy has won back much of its influence in the strategic
field that was lost to the Air Force immediately after World War II. So we
find the budget arguments concerned with the number of nuclear submarines, as
compared to Air Force ICBH's ant! IRBM's and manned bombers, and the Army
requircT.arts for limited war.
After national strategy is decided, supposedly by NSC, it is implemented by
the services. At this time the interests of industry and Congress become appar-
ent. The recent TFX controversy, which the McClellan Committee has been inves-
tigating, is the largest defense contract ever let. A bevy of Congressman be-
ca.r.3 vitally concerned because cf the huge amount of subcontracting to be done.
Finally all companies were eliminated for the prima contract except Boeing and
General Dynamics. The JCS recoir-jsr-.ded Boeing but KcNamara, representing the
administration, changed the decision to Generc.1 Dynamics. His given reason was
that the General Dynamics plane had more "comrr.anality" as he called it. The
plane was to be used by both the Navy and the Air Force. The contract award to
Iks
General Dynamics was not only a victory for them and a defeat for Boeing, but
a victory also for the Congressmen of the states of New York and Texas, where
the largest portion of the work wjis to be dona and a defeat for the Congressmen
of the states of Washington and Kcnsas, where Boeing's principal plants are
21 if
located. The importance of military approval to Congressmen was also highlighted
in this case. As soon as the JCS stated befo.-e the McClellan Committee that
either plane was acceptable and that the decision was a difficult one to make,
the McClellan investigation disappeared from the front page. There seemed to be
no more argument.
The air defense mission of the United States is divided between all three
services. Each service reccmersded its own weapons system for priority
development and procurensant--thi Navy's Talcs, the Array's Nike Hercules, and
t he Air Force's Ben-arc. Finally the race narrowed to Bomarc against Nike Her-
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cules. A decision for Nike Hercules would liave been a victory for the Army
and Western Electric and a decision for Bomarc would have been a victory for
the Air Force and Douglas. In this case no decision was made for several
years, with both systems becoming operational, which shows the costliness of plural-
ism.
There are many more examples that could be given but in all of them the
services contended for a mission or a weapons system for their service, the
Congressmen for work to be done in their district, and, of course, industry
for the contracts. Contractors are scattered all over the United States, but
the largest are in California, New York, Michigan, Texas, and Washington; how-
ever, subcontractors are even more widely dispersed. Congressmen represent every
state in the union and the military is service-oriented. The Congressional
-
military-industrial complex, viewed as a whole, may appear to be a monolithic
Julius Duscha, "Arras and the Big Money Men," Harper's Magazine, March
1961*, p. M.
215Raymond, o£. cit. « p. 33o.
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giant, but viewed from inside, it is widely diffused and separated. However,
there are dangers. Congressmen can combine to get contracts and industry can
allocate sub-contracts to tha districts of influential Congressmen. The size
of defense contracts allows for unlimited possibilities. Again this diversification
promotes pluralism, which is costly. Judge Brandeis, talking about the Consti-
tutional separation of powers, mada a statement which is equally applicable to
the separation of defense industry among our Congressmen and within the services.
"The separation of powers was not devised to promote efficiency in government.
In fact, it was devised to prevent one form of deficiency—absolutism or
dictatorship."216
Joan Coyne McLean, Pros-; ds.it and Congress, p. 46.
CHAPTER V
EISENHOWER'S UNSOLVED PROBLEM
The most influential political position in the world is that of the Presi-
dent of the United States, The position alone, regardless of the man holding
this office, brings immense resfec; and prestige. When a sincere and dedi-
cated man who has given his life to the servici of his country uses this forum
for a farewell address, it is certain that his words have been chosen with
utmost care in order to bring tc ; ;e people he has served the distilled wisdom
of his experience as well as guidance snd hope for the future. In Eisenhower's
farewell address the President had compelling reasons for what he said.
Admittedly the speech is general, lacks specifics, and is vague. These quali-
ties can be considered normal for a speech severly limited in time. However,
the President's past actions and policies should provide clues and guides for
the underlying meaning of his words, and clarification and amplification of
his thoughts and ideas can reasonably be expected to result from the questioning
of an alert press in interviews.
Eisenhower Explains—Commentators Evaluate
The only direct reference Eisenhower has made of the military-industrial
complex since his farewell address was in writing to the Stennis Subcommittee
in 1962. He said:
Moreover, as mentioned in my final aJdress as President, we must
watchfully mind the military-Industrial complex, for it tends to generate
powerful economic and political pressures beyond the anticipations even
of the participants themselves. But thesj are matters of proportion and
sensible national leadership, requiring tha same kind of continuing over-
sight and perspective that other major power groupings in our society,
1i*8
including business, labor, and governmeni itself reauire in tha interest
of keeping our system flexible, balanced, and free.
Tha significance of the speech seems to have changed considerably. From an
influence that is felt economi cal 5 y, politically, and even spiritually in every
city, State house, and every office of the Federal Government, he r.ow refers to
it as a matter of proportion requiring the same oversight as all "major power
groupings in our society." Perhaps he felt ha had spoken too strongly initially.
Or perhaps he thought that mention of the dangers in his speech would start
a dialogue which would be a sufficient response to the problem. If this were
his motive then he was successfjl. But it is doubtful if Eisenhower expected
his theory of a military-industrial complex to be exploited by Fulbright,
Douglas, and writers like Sworaley, Coffin, and Cook, who use his speech as evidence
of a warfare state, and are generally conceded to be in opposition to his
political beliefs. His reticence to enlighten the public further could be con-
sidered political. This is only speculation, but as his remarks are still
being used by those who would ba expected to quote him in negation rather than
affirmation, this may have some validity.
Commentators, analysts, ani ciners have interpreted the speech mostly
according to their own particular bias. Thoso who believe the military
establishment is too large and creates an atmosphere conducive to war have used
the speech as evidence of militarism, or at least of a preoccupation with military
solutions when others are available. Of course the President didn't indicate
this. He said the military-ind-istrial compter, was an imperative need and
represented only a potential danger, not an (actually) present danger. Business
and industry have generally regarded the speech as unfortunate, and even as an
^Senate Cold War education He arings , p. 7.2The publications and articles of these writers are all entered in the
bibliography.
"undeserving and evil legacy,"^ pointing out that these partners are doing
a conscientious job of keeping United States military strength at a level
second to none, which is what America wants and expects* Typical of the
reasoning of usually knowledgeable political experts in the field is the report
of the Congressional Quarterly ;
Revered by the nation as its chief military hero, and respected as its
Commander-in-Chief, the President was confident of his ability to 'put
need above pressure-group inducement, before local argument, before every
kind of any pressure except tlnat that America needs,' as he put it on
February 11, I960. The st;r : tudced brars of the Pentagon awed him not
a bitj 'there are too many ge -rals who lave all sorts of ideas, ' he said
on February 3» I960. Knowing how i;hey 'coerated, ' however, he feared
that his successor—whether Nixon or Ken: 2dy—would be unable to understand
their pressures.**
Undoubtedly the President was cone .-r.ee about pressure from the military-indus-
trial complex. Certainly he realized that by the time these pressures reached
the Presidency they had been apj lied in the echelons of government subservient
to him and in Congress, as well, rle must also have realized that, if the
pressures were applied to the Presidency which had been unsuccessfully resisted
in the Defense Department, civilian control was not as effective as it should
be. But the lack of civilian control is not what concerned Eisenhower. In 1962
before the Stennis Committee on Military Cold War Education, he reiterated
strongly that there is no danger of the military usurping unwarranted control.
It is rather odd for Elsenhower to give a warning regarding a military-
industrial complex. Whatever success or fame he has achieved is di.-ectly the
result of his military career. He has always professed a deep respect and trust
in the military and its leaders. Likewise, he has demonstrated a predilection.
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^Williera J. Coughlin, "Hogvash in Harper's," H- ssiles and Rockits, March
16, 1964, p. 46.
4
"The Military Lobby—Its Inpact on Congress, Nation," Congressional
quarterly, Harch 24, 1961, p. 463.
'Senate Cold War Education He".rings, p. 7»
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almost an awe, for the advice ar.d association of business leaders. In the
selection of his cabinet he shc*od this preference for business roan. With
Wilson in Defense, Humphreys in Treasury, and Weeks in Commerce, the cabinet
became known as the "millionaire's club." He appointed innumerable industrial
leaders to assistant and under-Sccretary positions and even complained that he
could not entice enough businessmen to enter government. Businessman definitely
had priority in the Eisenhower administration and he seemed to have complete
faith in them.' As an example of their early influence, Eisenhower met 30
times with different business groups during his first eighty days, while Kennedy
Q
mot with them only twice during a similar period. Richard Neustadt says, "Moreover
both (Eisenhower and Trcman) hava iended to put special credence in successful
products of an idealized career other than their own: military men in Truman's
case} businessmen in Eisenhower's.'& So for fifteen years, one or the other
partner in the military-industrial complex had preferential treatment from the
Chief Executive. Could it be possible that Eisenhower's lifetime association
with the military and his eight years of close association with business leaders
gave him an insight into their respective operations that forced him, as a matter
of conscience perhaps, to warn this country against such a combination?
During 1959 President Eisenhower had already encouraged national suspicion
of the military-industrial complex. When asked if he had expressed concern over
the influence of the "munitions lobby" in the debate over the Army's Nike Hercules
anti-aircraft missile and the Air Force's Bomarc, Eisenhower appeared annoyed
that someone had made "those remarks public property" and said he did not recall
using the term 'Hnunitions makers," but that "obviously political and financial
^New York Times , December 9, 1952, p. 36.
JrI chard Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 176.
°U. S. News and World Repor t, Hay 1, 1961, p. 68.
^Ri chard Neustadt, "The Presidency at Mid-Century," law and Contemporary
Problems, Autumn 1956, p. 634.
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considerations" rather than "strictly military needs" were influencing the
debate over military weapons.'" At another tirs ho said, "if such forces were
allowed to prevail, everybody with any sense knows that we are finally going
to a garrison state."''
Huntington says:
The economic interests o? the industrial concerns—potentially
the most powerful of the outside groups-«usua11y did not extend to
major strategic issues. The companies tended to accept the decisions
on basic strategy and then, w.'thin that framework, compete for contracts
for their products and servient. It is c'oubtful, for instance, that the
aircraft industry—more involved with military policy than any other
industrial complex—influer.ee! the decision on massive retaliation or even
that it played an important role in determining the size of the Air Force.! 2
The truth of this statement is rot doubced, but the fact that a reputable polit-
ical scientist could even consicci- the possibility of industrial influence
upon strategic political decisis ;.;. is a seriocs indication of incalculable danger
to the country. The next senter ce by Huntington is the most important one.
"In the future, the influence oi j;me outside interests in the formulation of
strategy probably will increase. Between 19^5 and I960, however, their role was
distinctly peripheral."' 3
President Eisenhower was deeply committed to peace and disarmament. These
were his chief goals as President, as they were President Kennedy's and are
President Johnson's. Eisenhower was disappointed that he was not more successful
during his two terms in office. Ha was sensitive to what he felt at times were
counter pressures by the military-industrial complex.'^ Sherman Adams relates
the following story.
Eisenhower asked Humphreys if it were not possible for American busi-
nessmen to make some sacrifices in the interests of world peace. 'No,'
Humphreys said candidly, 'The American businessman believes in getting as
Jjack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, p. 192.
| * Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. i;63 #
| ^Samuel P. Huntington, the Cornnon Defence, p. 176.
' 3Loc. cit.
'
^Sherman Adams, First Hand Rooort. p. 458.
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much as he can while the getting is good.' 'Mayberthat's the trouble with
businessmen, George,' Eisenhower said seriously.
"Newness" and "Bigness"
Incidents such as these prcbaoly altered Eisenhower's complete enchantment
with business leaders. But these incidents are not quoted as factors by Eisen-
hower. He gives no hint that the military-industrial complex was affecting
disarmament proposals or strategic decisions, except in offhand re-narks which
cannot be treated as his considered judgaent. Instead his reasons are that
the complex is "new" and "big." G.-anted that the military-industrial complex
is both "nat'and "big," but "newness," and "bigness" of themselves are not
qualities inimi cable to the demccrccic processes and liberties of the United
States. "Newness" and changes ire present in every sector of American life-
even revolutionary changes. In co.raninicatior.s, space, and medicine, science is
daily changing our lives. The "mass society" is changing traditional social
and political concepts. "One iaan-one vote" ar.d civil rights legislation are
having or going to have profound political, social, and economic effects
nationally and locally. Emerging and underdeveloped nations are changing inter-
national relationships and affecting foreign policy. One of the character-
istics most highly prized of our Constitution and democratic government is the
flexibility with which it enables our government to meet the crises of a
changing world. It is the constituent parts of the "newness" and "bigness" that
must be examined.
President Eisenhower is correct in statir.g that the military-industrial
;ex is new and has brought changes politically, socially, and economically
in the United States. Again, these changes m:y or may not be detrimental to
15
Loc. cit.
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democratic processes and liberties* Each one must be examined on its own merits.
No general statement can be made. The "cold war" itself is new and responsible
for some of these changes. The different ideologies of Russia and the United
States would produce changes even if war were not an ever-present danger, because
of the resulting political incompatibility of the United States and the U.S.S.R.
Many think that co-existence has eliminated war as an instrument of national
policy. At least the possibility of war is still the accepted national policy
and peace through military strength is the dominant theory in our international -
relations. This has brought the most profound changes in the military, but
immediately after World War II, it was apparer.t that the military would never
again be asked to relinquish th(- responsibility that Franklin 0. Roosevelt had
given them and drop into apparent oblivion. Reorganization of the government,
resulting in creation of the NSC, provided thct the military would always be
represented at the highest level cr government policy-making. During wars
America has turned to the military for leadership but after they were finished,
as Hills points out, the military has returned to the background in a position
that was the target of general distrust and ingrained suspicion. 1 ^ This concept
has radically changed. To return to pro-World War II conditions, in which
military influence was practically disregarded, is as hopeless and undesirable
as stopping the new trends of science, industry, and education. Tho military
now appears to bo in the mainstream of American life. At least the officers'
corps is no longer drawn mainly from the service schools but predominantly from
civilian institutions and about 50 percent of regular military officers return
to civilian universities for advanced degrees, many in the social sciences. The
16C. Weight Hills, The PoK:r Elite, p, 7.
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prestige of the military has grown tremendously, until now when it speaks, even
on subjects considered politics;, it has the ability to raise the subjects
above the political level* The military would dispute the fact that it was
being partisan; and they clothe thoir thoughts in an aura of patriotism and
impartiality difficult to counteract by those who disagree. Also, they have
abundant opportunities to speak, not only as witnesses at Congressional hearings
where what they say is fully reported and often makes headlines, but also, if
they desire, news reporters wil: attend military press conferences. Retired
military officers are commentators for national magazines and daily newspapers.
Here they, for the cost part, loyally support their own service. Military
speakers are also featured for rationally knc.n professional organizations, at
fund drives of a patriotic or public spirited nature, as well as at educational
institutions and many other types of meetings. Their presence is sought after.
No longer are their public appearances before audiences limited to Independence
or Memorial Oay. Many would consider this cultural militarism but the consensus
is that the military represent a broad approach to accepted American ideals.
Urcnentioned by President Eisenhower, the biggest change in the military-
industrial complex is political. Security of the United States was undoubtedly
the major issue of the 196l» campaign. Senator Goldwater employed a task force
whose membership included two former Chairmen of the JCS, Admiral Arthur Radford
and General Nathan Twining, and a former Secretary of Defense, Neil McElroy, to
support, among other issues, his main contention that the President should dele-
gate the use of nuclear weapons, in certain emergencies, to NATO caamanders.
'A few of the better knowr retired military commentators are: General Thomas
D. White, former Chief of Staff, USAF, Newsweek, Major General Max Johnson,
U. S. News and WorTd Report, Major George Fielding, New York Times, Brig. Gen.
Thomas Phillips, St. Louis Post Dispatch
. There are many other lesser lights.
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President Johnson did not use the military conraanders, but he and Vice-President
Humphrey exploited to the maximum the weaknesses of Goldwater's position and
they did freely use Secretary McNarsara. Employment of even the civilian chiefs
in American politics never had occurred before to such an extent. President
Eisenhower, commenting on such employment said, "I think that to take the de-
tails of how you're going to defend the United States and make it a campaign
issue is quite reprehensible."15 His remarks could be applied equally to Senator
Goldwater, Secretary McNamara, cr 'resident Johnson, But the important point
is that no evidence was produced during the c: r.paign that the military chiefs
19
had even given behind-the-scenes support for Goldwater, ' in this or in any
other of his contentions, except io they had already gone on record before
Congress.
But the change in the American political campaign practices is not the
principal change, as far as the military is concerned. The primary alteration
is in its relationship with Congress. Congrecs, the former "watchdog" of the
Treasury as far as military expend ; tures was concerned, has turned its job, in
the main, over to the executive branch* The President is supposed to control
the economy and one of the most Important way;, he controls the economy is
through his annual budget message. Any limitation of military spending must
come through this document and cannot be left to Congress to reduce it as once
was possible. Congress, once parsimonious and even antagonistic toward military
spending, now seeks military assistance to increase such spending. Congressmen
have always had a close relationship with ind:istry, at least that industry in
their own states or districts. Likewise, ind;;stry has always worked harmoniously
^Newsweek, October 19, 1964, pps. 32 and 33.
'9"The Nuclear Issue," Nemwcak, September 21, 1964, p. 34.
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with the military. In these areas it is not change or "newness" which is impor-
tant but the second factor mentioned in Eisenhower's criticism—that of "bigness."
It is true that the military-industrial complex would not present a problem
if it were not for its size. The interest of Congress can probably be measured
by the size of military contracts, although Congressmen are interested in
anything that effects their constituents monetarily. It appears safe to say
that the bigger a contract is—the more Congressional interest there will be.
If it means a job to a constituent which produces 100% of his income, or if a
town is totally dependent upon a defense contract—then size means little; it
is the percentage of the income for the constituent or locality that is the
determining factor. Nevertheless^ size or "bigness" is probably the most
important ingredient of the miHtery-industrial complex. President Eisenhower
has remarked on this size several times since leaving the government. He
places emphasis on the deleterious effects of big government, but not similarly
20
on those of big business* The Defense Department is by far the largest agency
in the federal bureaucracy, so Ms statements must apply to it. Still, to
criticize "bigness" of itself ii r.ot a conclusive argument. Burns and Peltason
contend that, "bigness" is now a \.ay of life in the United States. "Ours is
a civilization of big cities, big machines, big labor, big bombs, big government."2'
A huge Defense Department is necessary because the Communist threat to our
security is a huge one; it is necessary because U. S. military forces are
scattered over the entire globe and because the U. S. is a member of defensive
alliances encircling the iron curtain countries. The job of defense in the United
Dirlght D. Eisenhower, "Let's Be Honest With Oursolves," Saturday Evening
Post, October 19, 1963, pps. 23-25, October 26, 1963, pps. 26 and 27.
^Ijames MacGregor Burns and Jade Walter Peltason, Government by the People ,
p. 8.
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States cannot be done by a small o.-gani zation.
Walter Lippmann challenges Eisenhower's theory of big government by asserting
that federal civilian employment, has not grown as fast as the population; that
state and local employment has doubled since 1947, while nondefense employ-
ment in federal government is the same percentage; that the share of state and
local government in the GNP has doubled since 19^8—from 5 to 10%~federal
revenue as a percentage of GNP has increased only slightly—from 12 to 1<*%;
that using debt as the measure, local and state debt has increased 382 percent
while the federal debt has increased only 26%—all this despite the continuation
of the cold war.22 These statitti'js show that there is not the steady drift
toward centralization so feared <nc, if these facts are sufficient, they augment
the claim that the United State: is not in danger of becoming a militaristic
state, for one of the tendencies of militarism is centralization.
Convincing as these figures are, a more important aspect of the problem of
centralization is the decisionmaking process and the promulgation of regulations.
Numbers of personnel may decrease, but if the required decisions must go to the
top for an answer or if all actions are governed by time-consuming regulations,
then centralization of authority has taken place regardless of the mere number
of personnel, with a resulting loss of initiative, time, sympathetic consideration,
as well as awareness of actual details. The more decisions a top-level person
has to'make, the less he will know about each one. This law, of course, is part
23
of Hills' theory—that a few people are making all the important decisions.
3ut this contention has never been proved because Mills fails to name names and,
if he could, he probably would have done so. It is impossible in our present
government to determine who is raking the decision. There is no doubt that
22Wa1ter Lippmann, "Ike's Picture of Nation Challenged," Kansas City Times,
April 15, 1964, p. 22.
23Mills, op. cit., pps. 8, 11.
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goverraient should be kept as small as possible to do the job. "Bigness," regard-
less of whether it is in government, which includes the military establishment,
in industry, in unions, or in other institutions, is prone to rigidity and
complacency, and once a government agency is created, it becomes self-perpetuating.
On the other hand, the United States has long accepted the theory that business
must be controlled. As industry grows and becomes more diversified, the more
government it will take to control it. Government, in, all its functions, must
increase if its power is to provide the services the people are demanding
as the United States grows economically and its international interests increase.
The concentration of power in business monopolies, trade associations, farm
blocs, or trade unions, to such an extent that any of them can challenge the
authority of the state is hostile not only to a democracy but also to any form
of organized society.
Freedom Lost
The military-industrial ccmplex does not work as a uniform conscious entityj
such as unions, farm blocs, AW. Conerican Medical Association). Nevertheless,
it has unquestioned national influence. There is no doubt that its immense
power can be used in an unwarranted as well cs a warranted manner. It is also
evident that the power of the complex is enhcnced greatly by the inclusion of
political power. Relegation of the complex to the same category as other power
blocs is debatable, for it seens to have at least one characteristic not common
to other power blocs. The bases for farm blocs are farmers and politicians from
rural areas. The same is true for unions and the same can be said for any
other bloc, but the Congressional-military-industrial complex cuts across all
power blocs. Its power is felt in the unions, in small cities as well as large,
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in educational institutions, in the economy of the entire nation, and it reaches
Into practically every home in the country.
Eisenhower says that this si 1 -pervasive pjwer of the military-industrial
complex has the potential to encancer our liberties and democratic processes
and, at other times, he speaks of the erosion of liberties. He has failed to
mention what liberties are beinr reduced. Individual liberty and freedom, in
theory at least, are the characteristics of the government of the United States
most prized by its citizens. Pcli.icians and other orators speak ov these
liberties and freedoms in a genera" way, but vary rarely become spacific. But
the fact is that certain of our fr edot.u have disappeared; although they are
not mentioned in the first ten erne dmertts* or the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth amendments of the Constitution, which are usually considered its most
important portions guaranteeing individual liberties and freedoms. Nor can
these lost freedoms be attributable to the irtcustrial-military-complex per se
but they hav3 been lost, totally in some cases and partially in others, because
of the seme factors which perpetuaie and enlarge the military-industrial complex.
The draft (officially called by several other names) has been in effect
since 1940, with the exception of 17 months in 1947 and 1948. Carried on the
rolls in 1964 were 9% million young men. Of the 1.1 million men reaching age
26 annually, only 58% have fulfilled or are in the process of fulfilling their
military obligation. If a young man doesn't enlist after high school, he is
usual. y not drafted until age 22 or 23 and by then he has usually started a
civilian career. The services claim inability to fill their officer and
enlisted requirements of 2% million men without the draft. At present there
are at least 50 possible variations a young man must consider as he becomes age
18. The system, as it operates, is not universal nor is it fair. The six-year
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committment in the ready and stcnd:>y reserve is not producing the type of
units best suited for the theracnuclear age. ' Extensions of the draft at first
were thoroughly debated in congress and contested, but in 1963 it was extended
until 1967 by a vote 387 to 3 in the House. No one can contest thai young men
have lost considerable personal freedom and liberty through the draft. President
Johnson announced in April 1964, that ha had epproved Department of Defense
plans for conducting a "very comprehensive study of the draft system and related
manpower problems."2^ Senator GoldVjater made the draft a campaign issue in 196V
as Adlai Stevenson did in 1956.''
(Jo authentic information has jsen released on the DOD (Department of Defense)
study, but the rumors to date are that there will be no extensive changes.2 '
Affecting the draft is HcNamara'-s recent annov.ncosant about incorporating the
Army Reserve units into the National Guard. This action reduces the combined
Army reserves by 150,000, which should reduce somewhat the Army's need for the
draft. The big saving, however; v.ill ba in equipment. The Army has long
contended that it was uneconomical to have two reserve forces—the National
Guard and the Army Reserve. As they had direct control over the Reserves, the
Army has several times tried to reduce the National Guard, but the politically
powerful National Guard has always prevented this action. Secretary HcNamara's
plan has taken the other alternative and combined the Reserves with the National
28
Guard. The Army, the National Guard, and the Defense Department have hailed
24
Charles J. Hitch, Econom ics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p. 316.
25"Rundcv;n on Draft Versus AH-Voluntccr Military Force," Amy, September
1964, pps. 18-21. All facts fo;* this paragraph, except as otherwise noted, are
taken from this article.
26,°New York Tfes , September 17, 1964, p„ 28, and September 24, 1964, p. 30.
2£Kansas City Star, February 10, 1965, p» 14A.
28New York Times, January 17, 1965, p. 12F
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this as a constructive step forward; while the ROA (Reserve Officers' Association)
has been rather quiet, evidently not being able to find substantive arguments
to combat the move, but it is expected that this organization will find means
to alleviate some of the more drastic measures in the directive.2? The only dis-
senting views have been from Congress:
Congressman throughout the Nation are seething, mainly, it appears,
because the Defense Secretary also directed that men in important Govern-
ment posts such as Congressman (who were not consulted) should not be kept
in the Ready Reserve.3u
The position of the Defense Deperteant is that Secretary McNamara has the
authority, without going to Congress, to make the reorganization but it can
almost be guaranteed, whether HcNamtfa is right or wrong on this latter assumption,
that Congress will find a way to influence this decision before the reorganization
is complete, particularly as funds to enlarge the National Guard must be
appropriated, even though the decrease in Reserve forces and their equipment
will provide an overall saving. Similar reorganizations can be expected in the
Navy and Air Force reserve structures if the Army reorganization proves
satisfactory.
It is a truism that a democratic society, by its very nature, requires an
informed electorate. Governman: by the people presupposes that the electorate
has the freedom, if it so desires to use it, to obtain the knowledge to know
how its government and society operates. All agencies of government are
responsible to see that the public is kept informed but all three r.embers of the
Congressional-military-industrial are instrumental in restricting this freedom.
However, Congressmen have particular responsibility for this freedom as elected
"ROA has requested former Ohio Governor M. V. DiSalle to release correspon-
dence between him and President Kennedy in which the latter opposes any National
Guard-Reserve merger. Journal Memo, The Journal of the Armed Forces, February
6, 1965, p. 4.
30The Conreon Defense; A Monthly ticttslott;r on our National Security and Peace ,
January 1565.
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officials with broad investigative powers. The press, with its freedom
guaranteed under the first amendment, is considered by Americans as the agency
most responsible for keeping the public informed. An 18th century historian
William Lecky, said;
Next to the existence of open constituencies, and a fair mode of elec-
tion, the best security a ration can possess for the fidelity of its repre-
sentatives is to be found in the system of parliamentary reporting.''
Thomas Jefferson said.
The way to prevent these irregular interpositions of the people is to
"
give them full information of their affairs through the channel of the
public papers, and to contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole
mass of the people. The b;si:'. of our government being the opinion of the
people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it
left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers,
or newspapers without government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer
the latter.32
The press cannot perform Its /unction of adequately informing the public
if its members cannot get acces: to information. James Wiggins, in his book
Freedom or Security, 33 has listed rany of the difficulties the press is having
in maintaing this freedom. In this discussion it is assumed that the press
would perform its function if it ciuld. The problems of a responsible press are
outside the purview of this thesis,, Classification of material for security
reasons prohibits the press from presenting many facts to the people. Responsible
civilian and military officials feel it important to inform the public in broad
outline and this they do. And often the administration finds it politically
wise to release material which would otherwise be considered classified. The
debates in the 196** Presidential campaign between Secretary McNamara and Senator
Goldwater are a fine example. However, Secretary McNamara would never have
released much of this material unless he had considered it politically prudent
31 William Hartpole Lecky, A K i story of England in the Eighteenth Century
,
Vol. 1. p. kk2* '
'
.^Julian Boyd, editor, The ?e->ers of Thor as Jefferson, Vol. XI
, p. *»9.
33 James Russell Wiggins, Freedom or Secu.ity, passim. Unless otherwise
noted, this book provides theTKfK.'laS" USed'i'fnriscussion of the press.
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to counteract Senator Goldwater's charges. There is also a feeling among many
people that the results of decisions are offered and not the reasons or the
data behind them. Even in the Goldwater-McNamara debate the decisions had
already been made and had to be accepted. It would take years for Goldwater to
reverse the trend toward fewer bombers even if he had been elected President
in 19&4 and had still decided it mm necessary.
Undoubtedly many military secrets must be classified. But it Is also true
that material once shielded recuins so longer than any need for it to be held
confidential. Any officer or civil servant, except minor clerks, is allowed
to classify material, to Individ.:;! is reprimanded for too high a classification
or for classifying material which -hould be ur classified, but he can get into
serious difficulty for failure to classify. The entire system works toward
more classification Instead of frear information. Upon retirement, General
Ridgway submitted his final report as a matter of courtesy to Secretary Wilson,
Secretary Wilson returned It with the request that it be classified. General
Ridgway refused to do so, stating that it was all taken from unclassified sources.
When the tow York Times questioned Wilson on the report, his comment was that
3*»
the report wasn't important anyway. Without doubt, the only reason for Wilson's
request was that the report was critical of the administration and would be
embarrassing. No one knows how much more of the same type of information is being
withheld. It is certain that the press would never have ferreted out this
information if General Ridgway had remained in office and had not been interested
in presenting his views for conridaration to the public. The material In
Ridgway's report should have am could have h an debated in the press among the
informed public for months, CI salification of material is a loss of freedom,
which although necessary at timt:s, is easily and continually abused.
3 Matthew Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B, Ridgway, pps. 317-321,
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Industry has the same problems. Its work on classified projects must
be protected. Before personnel can work on these projects, a thorough investi-
gation, similar to a government security chec:, is made. Anything in an
employee's past that indicates disloyalty or instability is grounds for loss of
or failure to get the proper security clearance. This type of security check
for millions of government employees is accepted, as to work for the government
is a privilege and not a right. For industrial employees it may mean loss of
a job and certainly restricts the freedom of many individuals who may have been"
unwise once. Also this security restricts the free flow of scientific information,
which may have overall serious rej ^rcussions. Limiting scientific information
to a restricted circle puts fewer rinds to work on various problems and can easily
have the effect of slowing the entire scientific output of the nation. An even
more limiting effect of this system ha:; been > sal i zed. Industry has found a
serious problem in restricting classified, information to people who have the
required security clearance. To
. ;ke r.atters easier, they have found it neces-
sary to classify at least 25,000 entire plants or enclaves and to have security
clearance for all individuals working in thes- plants, including the lowliest
janitor. Whether necessary or unnecessary, freedom of many Americans has been
reduced.
Secrecy breeds secrecy. It has long been a growing problem for the press
to get proper access to Congressional operations. Congressional Quarterly ran
a survey in 1954 of committee sessions, excluding meetings held during recess,
meetings held outside Washington, meetings of conference committees, meetings
of the House Rules Committee called to grant rules for consideration of bills,
and meetings of the House Appropriations Committee and subcommittees of which
no record is kept. Of the 1,413 Senate coaraittee meetings, 546 or 39% were
^Raymond, ep_. cit., p. 154.
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secret and 867 were open. Of tiie 121 joint ca-mrittee meetings, 70, or 58
percent were dosed and 51 were open. Of l,4i8 House committee meetings, 627,
or 43% were closed and 841 were open. It Is interesting that the House Armed
Services Committee, which might be expected to meet most often behind closed
doors for security reasons, was y-% secret cc spared to House Education and Labor,
which was 92% secret. Many comnitteos held a greater percentage of secret
meetings than the Armed Services Committee. This raises the quest-ion as to
whether security or convenience c members it more important as far as secret
committee meetings is concerned;, Regardless, secret committee meetings restrict
the right of the public to know how the government operates. In many states
this penchant for legislative secret meetings is on a par with that found in the
national government and has even ieen adapted by city and county commissioners
in some cases.3°
For a country that wishes to protect itself, the knowledge of potential or
actual enemies is as indispensibla as the presence of armed forces. In fact,
current End reliable intelligence is a vital ingredient to adequate military
planning. One of the objectives of the United States is world peace and, to
further this objective, governr.ienis among the emergent and backward nations must
not be inimicable to our ideas,, intelligence about the operation of these gov-
ernments can be gathered only by a secret intelligence force. While not an
immediate part of the military-industrial complex, the CIA (Central Intelligence
Agency) is also partially a result of world conditions and is closely knit to
the military as far as intelligence estimate.; are concerned. In the book,
"ha Invisible Government, by Duvid Wise and Thomas B. Ross, the activities of
the CIA are outlined. Whether this book is vactual in all details is not known,
nor is it important to this discussion. What is important is that CIA controls
36wiggins, op_. cit. , pps. 12-15.
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a whole area of government policy that is never discussed until long after that
policy has taken effect. This secrecy has been accepted as necessary in the
world today, but it is also an area in which unwarranted influence and misplaced
power can surely arise. The bock begins:
There are two governments in the United States today. Ona is visible.
The other is invisible. The first is the government that citizens read
about in their civics books. The second is the interlocking, hidden mach-
inery that carries out the policies of the United States in the Cold War.
This second invisible government gathers intelligence, conducts espion-
age, and plans and executes secret operations all over the globe.
The Invisible Government is not a formal body. It is a loose, amor-
phous grouping of individuals and agencies drawn from many parts of the
visible government. It is not limited to the Central Intelligence Agency,
although the CIA is at its heart. Nor is it confined to the nine other
agencies which comprise what It known as the intelligence community:
The National Security Council, the Defense Intelligence Agency, The
National Security Agency, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force
Intelligence, The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, The Atomic Energy Commission and The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The Invisible Government includes, also, many other units and agencies,
as well as individuals, that appear outwardly to be a normal part of the
conventional government. It even encompasses business firms and institu-
tions seemingly private.
To an extent that is only beginning to be perceived, this shadow
goverrarant is shaping the lives of 190,000,000 Americans. Major decisions
involving peace or war are ta.'dng place cut of public view. An informed
citizen might come to susptct that the foreign policy of the United
States often works publicly in one direction and secretly through the
Invisible Government in just -he opposite direction.37
The most important areas in which individual freedom has been iost has been
clsc^sed by Walter Millis, in his book Indivir ial Freedom and the Canyon Defense.
in which he says there are "three areas of concern": (1) obligatory military
service and other features of the present system of military manpower utilizations
(2) the many recent measures directed toward the control or extirpation of
''David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government, pps. 3 and 4.
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sedition and subversive belief; (3) the increasingly stringent measures directed
toward the control of espionage^, the protection of government secrets, the
gathering of intelligence* and the development of counter-intelligence operations.
Spending
The obvious way to reduce the influence of the military-industrial complex
would seen to be to reduce the military budget. President Johnson has made it
clear that he believes it possible to hold down these expenditures and thereby
make more money available for the socio-economic benefits of a "Great Society."
He said:
As I have stated—and as our enemies well know—this country now pos-
sesses a range of credible, usable military power enabling us to deal with
every form of military challenge from guerrilla terrorism to thermonuclear
... \
Barring a significant shift in the international situation, we are
not likely to require further increments on so large a scale during the
next several years.
Expenditures for defense will thus constitute a declining portion of
our expanding annua! Gross National Product, which is now growing at the
rate of five per cent each year.
If, over the next sevaral years, we continue to spend approximately
the sania amount of dollars annually for our national defense that we are
spending today, an ever-larger share of our expanding national wealth will
be free to meet other vital needs, both public and private.-1?
There is no doubt that any cut in the defense budget must come from
Secretary McNamara through the leadership of President Johnson. Congress will
investigate for waste and poor management, particularly from evidence supplied
by GAO {General Accounting Office) but real economies must derive from the
executive branch. During Eisenhower's 8 year; in office, the defease budget was
38
Walter Millis, Individual Freedom and the Conmon Defense, p., 12.
39nSvid Lawrence, "Can We fake Chances On Survival?", U. S. »cws and World
Report, February 1, 1965, p. 104.
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always over half the national budget and around IK of the GNP. During the
Kennedy administration it remair.ed about the eame as far as percentage of the
national budget and GNP are concerned. As the GNP increased, so did the national
budget and the defense budget, resulting in a! out $6 billion raore for defense
under Kennedy. The defense budget has had it::, ups and downs since World War II,
but generally the trend has been upward. Even under a rising defense budget,
industrialists have criticized cancellation of any defense project. McNamara
has cancelled several, but the post recent was Pluto (low-altitude supersonic
vehicle). Typical of industry 1 :- view iss
The cancellation, With its undertones of unilateral non-armament,
is of a broader significance than the program itself. If we continue to
appease the Soviet Union b/ vailing to carry out research and development
in promising areas, than 1 : Bust be asked whether there is, in fact, a
bright future for defense Firms'* • • •
Industries have concentrated on military research and development which,
they claim, is strangled by the concept which dsmands fulfillment of requirements
and missions as grounds for substantial expenditures. Hanson Baldwin points
out that invention has never followed this path and the machine gun and tank
would still remain blueprint dream* had their development awaited the specifications
of a clear-cut military requirement.**2 It is known that the JCS voted unani-
mously to include production money in the FY (fiscal year) 66 budget for Nike
X, the anti-missile missile.'*3 Tha country that makes a breakthrough in this
field will have a clear-cut superiority for a while, but Secretary McNamara has
insisted that systems tests be performed before any production decision is made.
Most of the criticism of the defense budget has come from the civilian
sector. But General Thomas S. Power! USAF, former Chief of SAC, who recently
^tlHaM J. Coughlln, "Two Minds," Missiles and Rockets, July 20, 1964, p. 46,
^'uilHam J. Coughlin, "The Price of the Future," Missiles and Rockets,
November 16, 1964, p. 46.
^Hanson W. Baldwin, "Slow Down In The Pentagon," Foreign Affairs, January
1965, p. 264.
^"The Countdown," Missiles and Rockets, January 25, 1965, p. 7.
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retired and wrote a book which was suppressed by the Pentagon, while he was
on active duty gave an interview in which he discussed the dangers of disarmament^
U. S. Hews and World Report said that military men, (it did not narae them), were
worried about cutbacks and listed the following actions as leading toward
disarmament when other countries were not disarming: (I) scrapping the last
225 B-47 nuclear bombers, (2) d activating 3 squadrons of B-52 long-range bombers,
(3) curtailing or closing 95 military bases, (4) reducing Army and Air Force by
58,000 men, (5) considering end;.-.;, the military draft, (6) cancelling plans for'
200 more Minuteman missiles, (7) vetoing Army plans for Nike X missile, and (8)
refusing to authorize any new major surface warships. Of course, defense and
space industry is fearful of improvement in relations with Russia, as it removes
the urgency from their program.^6 Industrialists cite arguments as "even more
dangerous" that match the position taken by Stewart Alsop, who stated that the
revolution in weaponry is now almost ccrcpleteo'*7 They also misuse the arguments
of economists like J. R. Livingston, who firmly believes that military programs
should not be kept in operation just for the cake of the economy and who says:
All of these things (closing of military bases, cutbacks In military
programs) will create pockets of unemployment. If the administration
doesn't modulate this program it ould result in a flattening out of the
rate of growth, and if handled badly it could even cause a recission~
but I don't think this is going to happen.**
This is a reasonable statement but industrialists and politicians point to
California, which has 23% of the offense business and 50% of the space business
but also has San Diego, which is hard hit by unemployment due to a falling level
44
"A 'Sure Way" To Prevent Nuclear War" - Interview with Gen. Thomas S.
Power, USAF (Ret.) - U. S. News and World Rsp.-rt. January 25, 1965, p. 72.
**?"Why Military Men Worry About Cutbacks " U. S. News and World Report,
January 25, I965, p* 73.
~
*
/^William J. Coughlin, "The Bear Trap," M' ssiles and Rockets. Kay 18, 1964, p. '(6.
^'William J. Coughlin, "Withdrawal FronTi;eallty," Missiles and Rockets,
June 15, 1964, p. 46.
'""Sees Peril In Military Cuts," Kansas City Times, December 7, 1964, p. 3.
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of new government business.**5 Ttey expect the government to correct this but
not by reconversion or by movin-j business from a locality that does not have unem-
ployment to one that has unemployment. As far as industry is concerned, the
Economic Conversion Commission proposed by Senator McGovern is totally
unnecessary.
This would result in further government interference in privateindustry. The widespread talk about the necessity of converting thisindustry to commercial business is just so much pap* There will, of
course, be shifts in the space and defence markets. But federal spending
with this industry will reisain high, regcrdless of the outcome of the -November election, Those firms competent enough to keep up with chancesin the market will have no trouble surviving.*"
n g
The FY 1966 budget, with $i>9 billion for defense and $24 billion for new
contracts seemed to allay the fears of industrialists. Nevertheless, they gave
warning that this budget was "seen as a floor from which defense spending
inevitably must rise to some degree—not as a ceiling from which it will decline."5 '
And William C. El let, Director of Market Analysis for Northrop Corporations,
said: "I concur the defense budgets of the future may decline, but there is a
finite point below which they will not fall.''52 The conclusion to be drawn from
these illustrations is that defense industry will apply every pressure possible
to maintain the present level of defense spending. A decrease in defense spending
will not decrease the influence of the Congressional
-mi litary-industrial complex.
It will increase it because more Congressman and industrialists will be struggling
for what they think is their rightful slice of a smaller pie. The military will
i»» iWi i'alr °* ,Cou9hHn' "Survival Of The Fittest,'' Missiles and Rockets.June 29, 1964, p. 46. *|°Loc. cit.
8, 1965 "65
J
*
C0U£,h,fn* "0nW3rd and Upward," Missiles and Rocke ::s
f February
52Loc. cit.
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probably not outwardly support the industrialists except in official Congressional
testimony, but it will, from dedicated intere. t in its concept of national
security, provide the facts and basis for industry and Congress in their
attempts to influence and perhaps change decisions. A declining defense budget
will be more serious from the viewpoint of mi.placed power and unwarranted
influence than will an increasing defense budret unless defense industry has
already been absorbed into other
,
irsuits. Increased defense spending is
reinforced by thoughtful scholars juch as Herman Kahn who thinks the present
defense budget is far too small, He claims that World War III is well on the
way and we should be expending rior.^y for civilian defense structures, anti-
missile defense, mere ballistic Missiles, and a larger strategic air command.
Further he thinks that the defense budget of the past few years has been below
the minimum required for security and has only been kept alive by the Korean
War, Hungarian insurrection, Suez and Berlin crises. Without these stimulants
the United States would in all probability already have become a secondary
53power. Specifically Kahn is of the school that rejects a single, simple
strategy which is the most econraii ca 1 . He says:
No satisfactory solution to all the problems can be found by relying
on a single simple strategy; the richness and variety of the possible
challenges create a requirement for multiple and flexible capabilities.
One hopes the acquisition of adequate limited war capabilities and pre-
attack mobilization bases will mitigate the conflicting demands to a point
where whatever problems regain can be handled by some combination of general
war capabilities, unilateral and multilateral arms control measures, and
various regional and international arrangements.^
The two solutions of limited war and preattack mobilization bases that he en-
visions would greatly increase the defense budget, which increase he claims
^Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 536.
Stjbid., p. 53U
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America can and must accept if it wishes to survive.
Another point of view is being presented by columnists and trade magazines
on the civilian portion of the defense establishment. This takes multiple forms
but mainly exploits the differences existing between the military and civilian
sectors of the Defense Department and between the civilians in the Defense
Department and in Congress. Both these groups are naturally antagonistic.
Congress is always looking for msans to increase its prestige and authority
vis-a-vis the executive branch. Relations between the legislative and executive'
branches vary from active to reluctant cooperation to outright and direct
opposition. The diverse interests of Congress make it impossible for a Defense
Secretary to please the entire Congress. The best he can hope for is a
consensus to support him. McNassara initially enjoyed approval of a high percentage
of Congressmen, but this approval has decreased with the length of time he has
been in office and this is nonr.sl. As far as the military and civilian sectors
of the defense establishment arc concerned, the degree to which both see "eye
to eye" on all key issues can be used as a measurement of how well the civilians
are performing their job. If ail three services, with their separate interests,
support the civilian hierarchy v.ithout question, then the civilian organization
is undoubtedly not fulfilling ii:s mission. Conversely if all .three services are
at odds with the civilian heads
;
. then there ii something wrong also. Controversy
is essential to successful control » In no other way can Army, Navy, and Air
Force dereands be arbitrated.
Korris Janowicz in his revealing and persuasive book, The Professional Soldier^
says that, continuously since the end of World War II, both the legislative and
executive branches have sought to strengthen the political control of the armed
"a11 factual material for this paragraph, except as otherwise noted, is
taken from Morris Janowicz, The Professional Soldier, pps. 3^7-3^9.
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forces. This has been accomplished in the executive branch by the .hsc and by
enlargement of the President's personal staff and in Congress by increasing the
number of committees and, particularly, by increasing the number of committees
dealing with defense. Janowicz a1..o points out that civilian control has been
oriented toward administration rather than toward policy. But this is a field
in which the military are recogivz^d experts. Also the military itaelf has
been more interested in management than in po'.itics and, as a pressure group, it
"is not a voluntary organizatic. ctfng on ti 3 organs of government; on the
contrary, it is an organ of govern lent, seekir.g to develop new techniques for
intervening in domestic politic:." 56 The military approaches Congress as an
object of public relations, except for a few key individual Congressmen. This
description of the military is apt. Tha reorganization of the Department of
Defense in 1958—59 had the cumulative effect of producing greater organizational
balance between military and civilian administrators.^? However, commentators
looking for areas of disagreement between Congress and the military and between
the civilian defense officials snd the men in uniform highlight any frictions that
appear which are apparent and give (as to the individuals concerned) the press
considerable room for personal interpretation.
Secretary McNaaara was hailed by industry as a fine choice when he was
selected by President Kennedy but greeted with less enthusiasm by the military,
who were less sure of his management techniques, cost effectiveness programs,
unified procurement in selected aroas, and other financial reforms. 3 McNamara's
success within these areas, his forceful presentation of ideas to Congress and
his support by President Kennedy increased military concern and, when he moved
5°Janowicz, od_. cit., p. 369.
57Lawrence Radway, "Uniforms and Muftis What Place In Policy?", Public
Administration Review, I958, p. 182.
5°wflliam J. Coughlin, "The Revolution: Part II," Missi les and Rockets,
April 6, 1964, p. 54.
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into technical areas, even cancelling some "pet" military projects, the industri-
alists started to explit what they called "military dissatisfaction" to attack
McNair.ara, without quoting or naming military r..an but using the indefinite term
of "sc.T.e military man" (or a similar expression). One of the less subtle, but
typical, consents is:
Defer.se Secretary McN:nara was a good man in his time and place* He
has now outlived his usefulness. He can't project himself and the Depart-
ment of Defense into the future. He has no vision. Unless thare is a
change, the country will be in trouble in a few years.59
John J. McCloy says that usurpation of authority by civilians is much
more dangerous than usurpation by ;he military. John C. Ries has written an
entire book the thesis of which is that the Secretary of Defense has built up
an all-powerful apes 'of civilians who have ci plicated and supplanted the men
in uniform which has all the devecis of the Army system discarded by Secretary
Root 60 years ago. Hanson W. Bsi'id ;in, who is often critical of the man in uniform, •.
criticizes McNaraara for consolidation at the Lefense level in creeling new agencies
such as the Defense Supply Agency, Defense Cor;mini cations Agency, Defense Intel-
ligence Agency and Defense Atonic Support Ager.cy, He points out that the 15
Presidential appointees in rank of Assistant Secretary of Defense In 1961 have
been increased to 16 and the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defer.3 j have been
62
increased from 11 to 30. Anoti er article st> tes that Secretary Kc.iamara has
asked Congress to increase the Joint Staff which ha controls from 00 to 800 and,
now that he has military chiefs whom ho has appointed and who are his type of men,
that he is trying to increase their tour from 2 to 4 years. * Janowicz quotes
5
°Wi!licTi J. Coughlin, "Alice in McNamarcland," Missiles and Rockets. August
3, 1964, p. 46.
°°Su;-ns and Peltacon, og. eft., p. 606.
"'John C. Ries, The Hanacser-.ani of Defense, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1964.
°2Hanson W. Baldwin, "Slow Down in the Pentagon," Foreign Affairs , January,
1965, P. 271.
oj'Tour Year Tour For Service Chiefs?", The Journal of the Armed Forces,
January 23, 1965, pps. 1 and 5.
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General Taylor saying that as Army Chief of Staff, he had 19 layers between him
and the President. In another field McWamara is accused of classifying reports
that he does not want publicized, such as "The Howze Report on Army Mobility,"
"Disoway Report on the Air Force," and "Project Forecast," which looks to changes
in the 1970's, as security material, and he is charged with the "muzzling" of
other subjects such as the Naval problem of nuclear propulsion and future ship
construction.? Time summarize:: both sides of the question as follows:
To some outsiders, particularly on Capitol Hill, McNamara's dominance
over the JCS seems a cans ; for concern,. Where once they worried that the
JCS might become so powerful to be a sort of 'Prussian General Staff, 1
they now fret lest the Chiefs become too subservient to the civilians.
But the fact remains that ur.der McNamara the nations military power has
grown as never before—wvih less waste of money and with less energy
expended in futile interservice and military-civilian fights. McNamara's
new team of military managers seem likeiy to flourish in that fashion.^o
Summary
Eisenhower's recommendationi for control of the military-industrial complex
were principally: (1) that "in the councils of government, we (supposedly
includes the citizenry of the nation) must guard against the acquisition of
unwarranted influence" and (2) "only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can
compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defensej
Certainly it can be agreed that the President presented a timely warning. But
he did not give a hint as to how the citizenry must guard against the acquisition
of unwarranted influence nor did he tell how the citizenry could become
knowledgeable so that they could compel the proper meshing of industry and the
military. A few of the subjects that would have to be understood to make one
^Janovjicz, op. cit. , p. 3^7.
°5>'Congress Can Remove Th2 Muzzle," The Journal of the Armed Forces.
January 2, 19°5, pps. 1 and 8.
65Time, February 5, 1965, P- 23A.
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knowledgeable on the military po.-tion of the complex are the training, armament,
status of alert forces, gaps in the warning networks, range of bombers, reliability
of missiles, atomic stockpiles, hardening of sites, dispersal and concealment
of military facilities of United States forces, as well as those of our allies.
Experts of all countries are continually evaluating and reevaluating their
own strengths as well as those of their allies, and for that matter, those of
all other countries. These complex interpretations require highly skilled
personnel, computers and, after the estimates are made, there is rarely real
agreement. In the United States t:>.e Army, Navy, and Air Force, Defense
Intelligence Agency and CIA all ma :e separate evaluations and never accept each
other's estimates. Tne estirv atn controversial and disparate. These
separate estimates not only support the viewpoint of the service, but are
among the most carefully guarded sacrets of this country as well as our allies.
Decisions on weapons systeris raade today, taking into consideration lead
time for equipment such as submari nes, planes and missiles, will affect the
military establishment for at least a decade. A scientific breakthrough,
such as the atomic bomb, gives a country whicii has the production capacity,
wealth, and determination to react to such a breakthrough, a decided advantage.
The country that first possesse: cri anti -ballistic missile capable of defending
its cities will have a military superiority that could be decisive for years.
The fate of our nation rests on these decisions, but the decisions can be made
only by the President and his appointed officials. Even Congressmen, with
their undoubted knowledga, skill, and experts to advise them, can only insist
that America remain superior in all fields. Despite Eisenhower's admonition,
these decisions are taken for granted by the citizenry of the United States.
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Ernest A. Englebert says:
For political scientists it raises the broad question of the possible
alternatives to open and uninhibited public decision-making when the issues
are so complex and clothed in security that intelligent and public debate
is not possible. °7
The principal alternative presented is for political scientists to gain
a sufficient knowledge of science :o be able to understand the positions taken
by scientists in national politics.:, If it is necessary for political scientists
to become scientists in order to intelligently debate questions of national
importance, it is also important to recognize that the general public must
have the same ability if they are to understand the issues at stake.
The fact that the American puolic demands the security of absolute superior-
ity in all weapons systems and in any type of war (land, sea, or air) in this
thermonuclear age, and the fact that politicians know their statements cannot
be disputed without the release of classified material, makes defense a subject
that can be exploited. The Republicans tried to do this in 1964, and Eisenhower
did it in 1952. Kennedy did it in I960 and a recent article called this a
military myth which sparked a costly arms race.68 All these statements were
partisan and overdrawn and while there is no statistical proof, the American
citizens seem to accept the Statements of our defense posture according to their
individual political beliefs. A R .publican naturally has faith in what the
Republican national leaders are saying and, likewise, a Democrat believes his
party's national leaders. If this were not so, there seems no logical explanation
for the fact that the Democrats in I960 were saying that the Eisenhower
administration had produced the "missile gap"^9 anc| had not prepared the United
States for limited wars, and four years later Senator Goldwater claimed that
^Robert Gilpen, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, as reviewed
by Ernest A. Englebert, American Political Science Review, Vol. 57, June 1963,
°°"The 'Missile Gap' - 1 - Military Myth Sparked Costly Arms Race," Kansas
City Star, Associated Press Dispatch, January 26, 1965, pps. 1 and 6.
°9Senator Stuart Symington, (3-Ho.) popularized the term "missile gap" during
Eisenhower's second administration but it was used by Democrats, including President
Kennedy, during the I960 Presidential Campaign.
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the Kennedy administration had allowed American defense to deteriorate from its
strong position under Eisenhower. Defense decisions, as far as they affect
complex, are aired politically end not factually. This does not main that the
actions in Vietnam or the Congo may not get factual interpretation in the press,
but the portion of the military involved in t'r.e complex is more oft^n shrouded
in secrecy as far as the public It concerned.
Still there is a wide area in the classified, definitive decisions on the
details of the defense posture end in t;vo rr.ati rial released occasionally by
the administration to reassure the American j. blic, from which the American
citizen can beccv-se batter infer. . Tlii Army has proposed a new Air Assault
Division in which halicopters replace a great many vehicles; some of these
helicopters cost: as much as a B-k'/, or $3 million each. Should the Army procure,
maintain,, and operate the incre..-e.j airplanes and helicopters or should this
mission be given to the Air Force? General LcMay claims that the Army proposed
a duplication of the research and development and the supply installations
necessary to maintain and operate these aircraft and that this task could be
ccce^pliched more cheaply by existing Air Force installations.' But does a
democratic government want this unification of responsibilities or does it need
existing pluralism in order to fester competition and separation? Or will the
Air Force give the priority to this job that the Army desi res—there is proof,
according to the Army, that the Air Force has always given development and
procurement of planes for Army use last priority. Examples such as this could
be duplicated many times. Also thare are problems of maintenance costs, modern-
ization, as well as operations, and may others which Charles J. Hitch discusses
^ Air Force Information Policy Letter for Commanders , Number 130, United
States Air Force, April 196^, p. 2^T,
179
in his book, Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age . The subject is exceptionally
complicated, but there is no doubt the public <ou1d become more knowledgeable about
the defense budget. Probably the area which shows the most promise for public
enlightenment would be a law which would open all negotiations on difense
contracts to the public.
Although the President has railed to propose a remedy for a changing
condition (cold war and resultir j uilitary-inc.'ustrial complex) in American society,
he has also failed to show areas o," personal freedom already eroded by this changing
condition, as indicated by Walter Hillis. The most important omission by the
President is that any increased involvement in defense matters by the citizenry
is contingent upon more information from a reliable source which will tend
to remove defense questions from partisan politics. This not only increases
the part to be played by a responsible press end educational institutions but
changes must be made in Congressional operations. In both his farewell address
and his letter to Senator Stennii Eisenhower stressed another idea. In the
former he warned against unwarranted influenct, sought or unsought, and in the
latter he said the complex generated polities', and economic pressures beyond the
anticipations of the participant;* The problem remains: how to guard against
an unsought, unwarranted influerce that is serf-generating.
CHAPTER VI
A PROPOSAL
A synopsis of the problem follows: (1) the prolonged existence of
the cold war, which shows no signs of abatement (coexistance with Russia
intensifies conflict with Red CI ina), presents the United States and her
allies with the continued thr of instant, thermonuclear war from the
U.S.S.R.j (2) unsettled condi ;icns throughout the world require the U. S.
to be prepared for any type o i _r practically any place on the globe;
(3) to maintain a certain degree of readineas to oppose these multiple threats,
the United States retains a huge military establishment including armed forces,
conscription to provide personnel, a sizable arsenal, stockpiling of critical
materials, and expanding research and development in all types of military
equipment and in all areas of military endeavor; (k) the American people
believe that world security is the overriding single problem in the world
today and accept and support the theory of "peace through strength" in all
areas of research and development and in all types of possible warfare on land,
sea, or fn the air; (5) this huge military establishment requires an industrial
base to support it and creates the danger of misplaced power and unwarranted
influence particularly because Congress has a vested interest in the continuance
of the military-industrial complex, (6) misplaced power and unwarranted influence
increase due to the motivation of industry for profits and Congressmen for
re-election; (7) the military's dedication to civilian control and democratic
institutions protect the national interests while military men are in uniform;
however, there is no proof that this dedication will operate when the military
man enters industry for a second career; (8) geographical dispersal of
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Congressional districts, as well es the diversification and distribution of
industry, provides safeguards aiainst misplaced power and unwarranted influence
by offsetting concentration to a degree; (9) there has been erosion of liberties
and freedoms due to the cold wa •; (10) unwarranted influence and misplaced
power may increase or the national economy ma/ be adversely affected under a
declining military budget (unless adequate prior plans for reconversion of
defense industry or other public spending are introduced; (11) the major
difficulty to be solved is that the Congressional-military-industrial generates
unanticipated pressures inimical to the best interests of the country; (12)
the ultimate solution to this problem must be a more informed electorate, but
the press is handicapped in providing continuity and completeness of
information because of security c .ssi.;ic^tio i, other inherent complexities in
bureaucratic government, and a tral tendency for both Congress and the
executive establishment- to avo: jrspnally embarrassing or politically
detrimental facts from reaching ere public; (13) only Congress and the executive
branch Ci.n provide the solution to the problem.
Individual Liberty
There are many reasons why the national government does not keep the
electorate completely informed. These reasons intertwine but can be generally
grouped under two headings. First, all three of the coordinate breaches of the
national government feel that tUey have a paramount interest in protecting
individual liberties and freedca;; each branch is jealous of its own prerogatives,
particularly Congress snd the executive branc; the result, at best, is a lack
of cohesion. Each branch can point to the other as the negligent agency with
its own actions being accepted as best for the country. Second, there is no
general consensus as to exactly what freedom and liberty mean. Above all
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freedom or liberty is a personal matter; loss of liberty for one person or
agency may be a gain for another individual or group of individuals. Freedom
must be constantly reevaluated in its overall effects and, as the United States
is changing politically, socially and economically, the concepts of freedom and
liberty need redefining. At best it is a nebulous subject not to be controlled
by a single Act of Congress; instead its loss is by creeping erosion, and it
must be considered in every Act o," Congress, as well as in executive: directives
and the daily actions within th cut've branch.
Without giving reasons,, Americans speak cf freedom and liberty as sacred
concepts and political virtues jociliarly American. The Revolutionary War was
fought for freedom. The debate which started on these subjects before 1776 is
still going on. Thomas Jefferson accused the Federalists of despotic behavior
and a desire to destroy the newly-won liberties. It wss the theme of William
Jennings Bryan at the turn of the century and of Barry Goldwater in the 19b4
Presidential campaign. To document politicians, use of this theme would be
almost endless. But always the party out of power accuses the party in power
of destroying individual freedom and liberty. The Constitution, the guardian
Of these liberties, also is sacred. Although it has been interpreted and rein-
terpreted, any politician can bring cheers frc.-n his cohorts by saying it is
being misinterpreted. Actual amendments are remarkably few but, nonetheless,
the Constitution has undergone ; radical chanre in meaning. Madison, the
first great interpreter of the Constitution, cid not believe in an interpersonal
relationship; his theory was ba: ad on achieving group equilibriums. The modern
theory of liberty, evolving gradually over many years, differs greatly. It is
concerned with the status of the individual, an individual who is part of a
great society which is being changed by bureaucracy, urbanization, industriali-
zation, technology, and the cold war.
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John P. Roche, in his essays "The Sources of American Liberty," in which
his thesis is that more Americans have more liberty and freedom today than ever
before, says:
The great power for gcod of the national government has as an inevi-
table concomitant a great pow^r for evil. From my point of view there are
no inexorable forces at work roving the United States towards authoritar-
ianism, but the liberal corrmunity must realize that the instruments of
national power it so casually bestowed upon the national government in the
period 1935-1952 are capable of employment against its interests. 'The
sword cares not who wields ft nor whose blood it sheds.' It is perhaps
at this point that an imps: ti 1 sociological observer might regret the
domestication of American roi onfe.-mists.- alluded to above: so large a
proportion of the American re orm elite was taken into the firm in the
1930's and 19^0's that few voces but these of the crackpot Right are
disposed to criticize and tttack.
And in further elaboration, he soy.;:
No sane man will deny that the potential threats to American freedom
from possible state action aro far greater in I963 than they were in I833
or 1913. The great apparatus of federal power could be employed for evil
ends as wail as for good ori^ ana the real possibility of resistance to
centrali iad power has vanished. I would submit that any sober evaluation
of the contribution of the national government to the improvement or the
decline of civil liberty mist conclude on the basis of the evidence to
date with a decision in favor of federal intervention.
Anyone who cherishes the ideals of individual freedom and justice
can never relax his efforts to push forward the frontiers of liberty. ...
despite the existence of a huge centralized state, he is today free to enjoy
a range of personal liberty unknown to his ancestors. 2
The main political problem in the United States is to use the immense power
of the national government to foster freedom and liberty. Great strides have
been made, as indicated by Roche, particularly in civil rights, competitive
bargaining, development projects similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority,
and Supreme Court rulings to equalize voting, but nothing is more true than
Uoche's other point which stresses that every great power for good entails a
'.John P. Roche, Shadow and Substance
, p. 56.
2 Ibid
., pps. 7^-77.
mconcomitant power of perversion. A complex, as potentially powerful as the
military-industrial one is, becomes more capable of perversion when it includes
Congress.
Control by Congress
Admiral Rickover told Congress that it had the ability to control the
industrial
-political complex. By .implication he assumed that, if Congress
through its investigative power:. Ajuld controi the industrial portion of the
complex, then the military portion would also be controlled. * Undoubtedly this
idea has considerable merit. S :ato and local governments are engaged actively
in securing defense industry, but the focal point still remains in Congress.
Here is where money is appropriated and undoubtedly a Congressman's influence
in Washington is not only desirable, but could be indispensable, since this is
where final decisions are made. Congressmen i.ave the authority and ability
to control Congress as they make their own rules. But the incontrovertible fact
is that Congress, throughout the history of the country, has shown little
inclination to control "pork barrel" legislation and, while individual Congress-
men occasionally recommend controls, there has been no concerted drive toward
achieving any meaningful results in this field, and to expect Congress to do so
in the future seems futile. Congress has a vested interest in fostering the
growth of the railitary-industri.J complex, because it means business for
Congressional constituents and reelection for Congressmen.
Congress, by itself, will not provide the means to control the military-
industrial complex and the paradox remains that, without the assistance of Con-
gress, no action will probably be taken.
^Hearings Before a Subconm- i ttae of the Committee on Appropriations,
af Representatives, Sdth Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), pps. <W>7, W, 512-516.
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esidency
As Richard E„ Neustadt say:
., ,'n his valuable book on Presidential Power,
ybsdy row expects the mar. o'e'the White House to do something about every-
kthing." The President has en a powar and can galvanize action for a
:ific goal in many ways but his greatest power, according to President
nah, is persuasion. 5 For the President to persuade Congressmen to act,
according to Neustadt, "is to induce them to believe that what he wants them
to do is what their own appraisnl of their own responsibilities requires them
to do in their interest, not hiiV'S
Under the stress of a national emergency, the President could doubtlessly
persuade Congress, as he often has, to act according to his wishes. But the
military-industrial complex presents no sudden or urgent national emergency; its
effect has exerted a growing influence in an area in which Congress, as a whole,
has vital interests of its own. The President speaks for "all the people" while
Congressmen speak for their individual constituencies and, as Burns and Peltason
say, "are elected by different alignments of voters and hence have differing
loyalties and respond to different pressures." 7 Outside of President Jefferson,
I to a lesser degree President Washington, never has a President been able to
speak with positive assurance (except during "honeymoon" periods or national
emergency) that Congress would follow his lead. Even a strong President like
Theodore Roosevelt complained that his strongest opposition was among his own
party. On a subject so general as the protection of the liberty and freedom
of the individual and the safety of democratic processes, Congress would never
^Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 6.
?Ibid», p. 32.
^Ibid
., p. 46.
/James KacGregor Burns and Jack Walter Peltason, Government By The People,
P. HHO. r
8Joan Coyne HacLean, President and Congress, p. 61
.
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speak with unanimity. It is a group of autonomous, conflicting, irreconciliable
committees, tieustadt is correc; in saying,
Until there is a marriac s be^.ieen presidential and congressional
:es, particularly at :he stage nomination, there will be no
mar*. be seen President arc! Congress.^
[s another rr.ore basic reason why the President is unable to act
with the needed continuity under the present organization of our executive
branch and cannot provide the needed organization for discussion and action
regarding the military-industrinl complex. If Congress is fragmented, so is
the executive branch. Neustadt's study shows that the Cabinet represents
its own Department more than overall national interest and the oft quoted
remark of President Truman is considered representative. "I sit here all day
trying to persuade people to do the things they ought to have sense to do
without my persuading them.
. . . That's all the powers of the President amount
to."' The Presidency is a many-faceted position. The President is Chief of
State, Chief Executive, Chief Diplomat, Commander-in-Chief, Chief Legislator,
Chief of Party and Chief of the Economy. If the assertion of this thesis is
accepted, it will be necessary to cdd to all these positions another one—Chief
Protector of Individual Liberties ».nd Freedom . As may have been reiterated
innumerable times, the President must consider all of his positions in making
a decision.
The present problem is to make certain that he considers the latter
job when making decisions. In ell his different positions he has assistance
throughout the executive branch and, in many of these duties, Congress and the
Judiciary have responsibilities also. While the Cabinet doesn't
^Neustadt, op., eft., p. 19':
'
"Ibid
., pps. 9-10.
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represent all, or at present even the most important assistance the President
receives, it is usually considered the body that provides his principal advi-
sors. Eisenhower spoke for himself, in his farewell address, in warning the
nation about the industrial-military complex. It is unknown whether the Eisen-
hower cabinet of businessmen would have wholeheartedly supported his thesis
on the military-industrial complex. It might have accepted the lofty and
general terms of the address but it appears reasonable that when it came to
positive action as to limitation or control of the military-industrial complex,'
a consensus would have been very £"fficult to obtain. Eisenhower tried hard
to make his cabinet a unified v< Ic :, but as F: chard J. Fenno points out, the
cabinet at best is only a sound::-.; board for the President." The normal cabinet
follows the description of Rexforc G. Tugwell:
A new President sits clown at the table facing a Cabinet, not of
friends or even of prospective loyal associates, but of representatives
he has felt compelled to accept by political arrangement. They have in
cc.-..v,on only membership in a party recent'iy victorious in an election.
Individuals among them may not agree with the plans made by the President,
and they may regard themse'.ves as political rivals—an impulse likely to
grow stronger as they are encouraged by the interests that gather behind
them.' 2
Cabinet officers all have their own administrations with built-in pressures and
loyalties to their respective departments. These duties are extensive and
time-consuming. Even if the President could count on the entire executive
branch supporting him, there appears to be no department of the present Cabinet
capable of logically assuming the mission for drafting legislation, and making
recommendations pertaining to the erosion of personal liberties. The departments
of Commerce and Defense both have vested interests and would be suspect from the
Richard J. Fenno, "Now I;; The Time For Cabinet Makers," New York Times
Magazine, November 20, I960, p. 12.
,2Rexford G. Tugwell, The Enlargement of the Presidency, pps. 1 73-17'*.
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start. While there are aspects of the military-industrial complex as
evidenced by GAO reports to Congress that should be handled by the Department
of Justice and there maybe other legal infractions but the primary purpose,
as will be seen later, is to advise the President and Congress and to provide
a forum that may produce a consensus requiring legislative action first. And
if there is a problem existing at present, there is also sufficient reason to
accept Eisenhower's contention that it will persist. It seems apparent that
the fragmentation within Congress by party, committee, and district, the
failure of the problem to fit into any single department within the executive
branch, and the continuing historic conflict between Congress and the executive
branch would alt combine to prevc.-,: any meaningful results on such a general
subject as the loss of individujl rreedom and liberty caused by the military-
industrial complex. If the national government is to become effective in this
area, a new commission is needec.
A New Commission
In 1950, Cr. H. D. Lasswell, Professor of Law at Yale, in his book
National Security and Individual Freedom, was one of the first to draw atten-
tion to the fact that freedom wes diminishing because the separation of the
military and civilian spheres was breaking down, defense expenditures were
rising, and the government was not only expanding but becoming more centralized.
Other changes, he noted, with attendant loss of freedom were the weakening of
political parties; decline in the influence of Congress, civilian administrators,
and the courts; withholding of information; increased police investigation; and
a decline in the relevancy and influence of the press and public opinion.
'^Harold Dwight Lasswell, national Security and Individual Freadom , New
York, McGraw-Hill Book Company," Inc., 1950.
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Not all these subjects are considered pertinent to this thesis nor is it
agreed that Lasswell proves Ms position in ail of them but it is important
to note that even a recognized scholar such as Dr. Lasswell believes that one <i
cannot isolate the military-industrial compler. without considering the Congress,
courts, press, and public opinion. This fact becomes self-evident to any
student studying the subject. Dr. Lasswell also held that national security
demands all the sacrifices necessary to preserve American independence but,
as he says,
If the crisis continues for years, es seems probable, and rises to
even higher levels of interuiiy, as seems likely, effective freedom of
choice will be restricted t-y :;he necessities of defense. One urgent
problem is how to keep there acrifices of freedom at the lowest point
; with national security, since an unnecessary loss of freedom
is an unnecessary blow to :ecurity.1^
Dr. Lasswell 's solution war to expand the NSC (National Security Council)
to three additional permanent members who wouid have no other government res-
ponsibilities except to review all security policies and advise the President
as to their effect on individuei liberties. Ke would assign to t'r.a NSRB
(National Security Resources Board), now replaced by OEP (Office of Emergency
Planning), the responsibility to assess the impact of security upon the free
15
economy. * In Congress he would establish comprehensive national security com-
mittees representing all committees with jurisdiction in the field in order to
give Congress an overall view of security which he claims is lacking at present.
j-flbid. , p. k$
10., p. 80, 81. Actually an eight-point program is recomnvanded: (1)
.-tiraa civilian member:; to be added to the NSC with no othar government
than to formulate and review security poHciej, (2) one full-time member to
/ security measures on individ al liberties, (3) one full-time
member responsible for effecting flow of info. nation to the public on national
security, ('-:) clarify and develop ;he function of NSRB (now replaced by 0PM),
(5) establish within the Department; of Defense a strong civilian staff indepen-
dent of control by military ser'icas to aid in developing and evaluating security
policy, (6) eliminate extraneous, functions fna the control of the armed forces,
(7) develop a program of advanced training wi :hin the government under civilian
auspices to provide a comprehensive grasp of security policies within the frame-::iva
Hon, (8)work of our objectives as a nation President to devote a portion of his
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Also recommended is that ths Pre si dent devote a part of his annual State of the
Union message to a discussion of tr<e problems involved in the relationship of
the national security problem tc t>.e problems of civilian supremacy freedom
of information, civil liberty, snd a free ecoromy.
Lasswell's solution is the only concrete proposal dealing with the entire
subject I have found, and it wa; r iccmr.snded fifteen years ago; the problem has
noi diminished since then. Lasswell's plan hes advantages in that it recog-
nizes the military-industrial ccmplex is not an isolated problem and also
recognizes the first requirement, in protecting individual freedom and liberty
in a democracy is an informed public. This plan also recognizes that
individual freedom and liberty is -he most priceless ingredient in American
democracy and the plan has placed ;he responsibility for maintaining it in the
NSC, the principal advisory body .^ the President. It would also outline specific
duties for the President. It would require him to review decisions concerning
freedom and liberty in his annual message to Congress and the people.
Lassv»U'S plan has certain drawbacks that would reduce its effectiveness.
Chiefly, it fails to recognize that the complex is Congressional -military-
industrial and that any improvement over present conditions must consider the
role of Congress. While he has furnished the President with an expert adviser
on liberty and freedom, any recarcr.sndations for legislative correction must go
annual message to discussing national security program in relation to civilian
supremacy, freedom of information, civil liberty, and a free economy.
^ 7lbid a , p<, 104. Program for Congress consists of six points: (1) estab-
lish comprehensive national security committees, representing all committees
with any jurisdiction in the field, (2) increase the amount of technical infor-
lable to Congress by additional steffs in the Legislative Reference
.ibrary of Congress, (3) members of Congress provide their con-
stituents with more comprehensive information about the security position and
problems of the nations, (4) Congress to safeguard individual freedom by pro-
viding a model of fair play in its own hearings, (5) all lobbying and pro-
paganda activities, concerning national security made a matter of public record,
(6) establish a Commission on National Security and Individual Freedom if the
abova recciroendati ons do not work.
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to Congress for implementation end as Congress is not being a party to
formulating the recommendations, it would be apt to ignore them. Administratively
Lasswell has separated duties between NSC and OEP which would only divide the
job, giving two heads for one job. Further, addition of three members to the
NSC with no other responsibilities ^ut protection of liberty and freedom would
make the plan unacceptable to ttu present NSC, which has only five members
(President, Vice-President, Secrctiry of Statt, Secretary of Defense, and
Director of OEP), in addition to :ne permanent administrative secretariat con- -
sisting of the Special Assistar.1: ;sr Ni-.c.ial Security and the Executive Secre-
tary. Further, these three men ..o'-ld have to .iave organizational support.
They could never perform their joo adequately without a well-trained staff.
Lasswell 's concluding reccr.-.-.i.idation is that, if his previous recommendations
as already outlined did not prove .'orkable, a "Civilian Commission on National
Security and individual Freedom'' (hereafter called the Commission) be established
along with a Joint Committee of Congress on ;. dividual Freedom (hereafter called
the Joint Committee). The Commiss on would h ve responsibilities to both President
end the Joint Committee similar to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy. Th'"s action el im. nates the main objection to
Lasswell 's first proposal.
The main purpose for such ;. Commission is increased public information,
the law establishing such an agency would under my concept state that all written
reports to the President as well as to the Joint Committee would be made public,
except in specific cases to be covered later. Included in this concept would be
that only the head of the Commission would be a member of NSC. The practice of
privileged advice to the President must not be abrogated, as far as the head of
the Commission is concerned. I it it should be his prime duty to point out to
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the President the probable adverse consequences to individual freedom or to
the traditional processes of government that any NSC decision might have.
e President should inform the people of any NSC decision that he supports
in contradiction to these recommendations. He could do this periodically but,
in accordance with Lasswell's recommendation, a portion of the State of the
Union message devoted to the recoraendations of the Commission would enable
the public to assess the thinking of the President as well as his actions on
this all-important subject. Similarly, it should be required that the senior
House and Senate merobers of the Joint Committee report to the Senate and the
House respectively, outlining t
-econ nendations of the Joint Committee with
legislation concerning the rcpo ts of the Co; ,ission. In this manner the public
would be informed by an organization v.l'.oso so e job would be the protection of
individual liberties, and which hed access to the information upon which
"&cc « wer« made and, above all, had loyalties to both Congress and the
President. The President would present his views to the people, at least in the
State of the Union message, and Congress would have the benefit of its own
members reviewing all recommendations. The press would be fully informed and
other organizations interested 'n government, as well as individual scholars,
would also be able to assess the recommendations from the Commission, the
executive branch, and the Congress. These organizations would also have a
responsible government agency that would be concerned with their recommendations.
The solution will seem overly simplified to some and impossible of
attainment to others. Undoubtedly the main obstacle would be getting Congress
to approve a Commission that would be critica'i of Congress. This is a formidable
obstacle, but there are advantages for Congressmen that might make it acceptable
to them. One of these is in tha trea of CIA. Congress does not have the control
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over this organization that man/ Congressmen I elieve desirable. As a member
of the NSC, the head of the Commission would be privy to the counsels and
assignments given to CIA. This would not satisfy Wise and Ross who, in The
InvisiMe Government
,
say that the present Congressional subcommittees should
be replaced with a Joint Committee similar to the Joint Corvnittee on Atomic
J Q
Energy. m the Atomic Energy Committee there has never been a leak of
classified data and there is no reason to believe that another Congressional
Committee would be any less responsive to its responsibilities. But, lacking .
a special Joint Committee on C! - he presenc of an agency outside CIA respon-
sible for reviewing its actions re| , tine to Congress should go a long way
to satisfying the demands and r: . of ;cngr« 3.
Another area which should
...: .al to Congress is in the matter of classifi-
cation of
-"on. This Commission's main purpose would be to increase the,
flow of information. At presenl there is no government agency responsible for/
determining whether material should be released to the public or remain secret.
Each agency is responsible unto itself. By broad category this Commission would
have the responsibility to recommend declassification. The press has little
confidence in the present system The existence of an outside agency to whom
the press could appeal when it felt that classification was being ma 1 administered
in the interests of an agency would certainly restore, in a great measure,
confidence to the public that needed knowledge is available. The classification
function of the Commission would be the only one in which it would have
responsibilities directive in nature. As the Commission would be privy to the
decisions of NSC, which would include those of Defense as well as those of CIA
and The State Department, the Commission should not be given judicial responsi-
bility to declassify, but each agency should be required to justify actions
which disagreed with the Commission's recommendations. The Commission, as the
18 David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government
, p. 35k.
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representative of the people and Congress in these matters, would have a salu-
tary effect. At least it should tend to stop the withholding of information
which would be only embarrassing to the administration or certain highly
placed individuals. Classification of information would be based solely on
national interest and infomaticn :ould become available as soon as possible
in the public interest.
Effeci of Corr,iission
The total effect of the Commission on the military-industrial complex
cannot be foreseen, but it should be considerable in many areas of government.
First it would have to determine what present practices and trends are
inimical to the democratic proct.^-s of government and individual liberty. It
would probabjy decide that many present practices are satisfactory and need no
change. But let us consider scr.e of the recommendations that might be made.
None of these ideas are new, and some have been offered many times. Above
all, they are not all-inclusive, Out the Commission would develop data and
reasons which would make some of them politic* lly expedient.
The considerable empire of the armad forces to indoctrinate the general
public in all phases of military a .deavor wou':d undoubtedly be an area that
the Commission would scrutinize cai-efully. The military tie-in with indus-
try in this vast public relations effort might result in censure or closer
budgetary control. Undoubtedly thj type of position retired officers could
accept in industry would be scrutinized. For instance, the Commission might
decide that a retired officer could accept a position as a technician or re-
ch specialist but could not accept a position in industry as a board member
or a sales representative—or that retired officers could not work for a certain
period of time after retirement with companis > doing defense business. There
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might be a limitation on the nur.iber of retired officers any company could hire
depending upon the amount of government busin.ss the company did annually.
Full disclosure of the duties o"' the retired officer in industry might be
required. Retired officers cou.d be limited to government employment in
certain definite areas. Congressmen in reserve units might be asked to resign
their military commissions or, at least, not to serve on any Congressional
Committee dealing with defense.
As for businessmen entering government, there would be rules as to the
type of government job they could accept, depending upon their former
employment. The Commission night decide that to force businessmen entering
government to dispose of their business holdings was desirable but that it
was just as desirable for Congrti3£-aan to do the same thing. They are both public
officials. At least rules would be established for the conduct of businessmen
entering government and for Con;.-e -smen dealing with the Defense Department on
contracts. Lobbying for defense contracts wo Id be closely regulated and all
negotiations for defense contracir would be public.
There are regulatory agencies for power, communications, railroads, etc.,
so the Conraisaion might recommend ihat all defense contracts be removed from
the Defense Department and placed under a new regulatory agency. Kilitary
requirements, specifications, and areas for research and development would still
have to be controlled by the Defense Department, but under the new system, all
purchasing and contracting would be done by the regulatory agency. Rules and
methods for negotiating defense contracts, to include accounting procedures,
would be uniform. Undoubtedly :.uch an innovc ion would be resisted by the mili-
tary services and by industry and, if accepte. , would initially caise duplication
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and might be more costly. But such a regulation would also certainly make
conflict of interest more difficult, and democracy is not essentially interested
in cost when perpetuation of democratic processes are at stake. Before such
a recommendation would be made there would have to be evidence, which is lacking
now that the present system has weaknesses.
Changes in the ways industry executes defense business and the necessary
adjustments in the political sphere, mainly in Congress, will be much more
difficult to attain than change;, in the military side of the complex. After
all, the military is a compact, closely supervised group, and it takes orders.
As Hanson Baldwin says, in commenting on the liebert Committee investigating
conflict of interest,
It should recognize that the retired officer is only a very small
part of a much bigger prob'.eir:; that the retired officer's services are
needed bosh by industry and Government; that very few, if any, are guilty
of improper acts, and that a clarification, modernization, and codifica-
tion of the conflict-of-interest laws and regulations--with discrimina-
tion el".Tr;r,2ted~is in the public interest.
And Mr. Stanley Hiller, Jr., in reviewing the Array-industry relationship, said
that a "closer union is needed not only in the planning stages of the specialized,
complex programs, but literally throughout the product's life from the cradle
to the grave."20 Both of these views would have to be considered but it
appears that legislation is all that would be required to control the military
side of the complex. Congress i iwilo! ba different, as it makes its own rules,
freedom of action is a fetish with American businessmen.
°U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee fo;- Special Investigations of the
itee on Armed Services, HstrinjjS, Employ—ant of Retired and Civilian Per-
sonnel by Defense Industries,"¥bth Cong., 1st Sess., l"9o2, p. 136.
'"'Stan'iey Hiller, Jr., "Technical Competence—Basis For Change," Army,
May 1964, p. 31.
197
Another area in which the (.emission might be influential is in the field
of vertical mergers. Horizontal mergers have been illegal under the Sherman and
Clayton Acts but the new type of vertical merger is driving out small businesses
that cannot compete.21 If there is any truth to Mills' theory that a small
group of men is making all the important decisions in industry and government,
22
the evidence should be found in interlocking directorates. A law that would
limit the number of corporationr. in which a person could be an active director
should be investigated. The Department of Justice would still have the job of
enforcing the lav;. The Coramiss- -..sitility would be to indicate areas
where individual liberty is threat red and to suggest to the President and
Congress nev laws for the Depi ov JuGti:e to enforce.
Unions should come under t. 3 .:,« Consuls ion scrutiny as industry. There
is sufficient evidence that e s grown they have, in soma cases,
become more Interested in their own power tht: in forwarding the interests of
their members. Certainly recommendations might be made which would alleviate
the spiraling of wages and prices which are restricting liberties of many who
are victims of the process.
Lennox McLendon, top investigator in the Baker case, says that, in his
opinion, Bobby Baker was at one tirae more powerful in the Senate than any of the
23
100 elected members. His influence: extended to both Republicans and Democrats.
The Senate reluctantly investigated Baker in regard to relations with civilians
end government employees, but s:ae Jfastly revised to reveal his dealings with
^Richard J. Barber, 'fHergers" Threat to Free Enterprise," Challenge,
rtarch 1963s. p. 7.
22PhiHp Olson, ed„ America As A Mass Society, as quoted frets: the National
Resources Committee. 'The Structure of Contro.s," ops. 72-75.
23james McCartney, "Sobby Baker's Power Appraised," Kansas City Star, March
A, 1965, p. 20. This was not at the time President Johnson was majority leader,
but during the period when Senator Mansfield took over after Johnson was elected
Vice-President.
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other Senators. The view of Senators and Representatives that because they
are elected by the people and their record is reviewed by the people at election
time they should have special status and be able to operate more or less
secretly and with immunity is preposterous, even though it is traditional.
Election does not insure probity fn a public official any more than appointment
does. The same rules should apply to both. If Secretary McNamara should
divest himself of all stock in Ford Motor Conv-any, the public should know which
Senators and Congressmen have personal interests in which corporations. The
right of the people to know how legislators eern income in addition to their
government salary should not be c^^stioned in a democracy. The Report of the
Twenty-Sixth American Assembly says:
Respect for the goverr.s^nt requires respect for its indicidual offi-
cials. Each Senator and Representative and all Presidential appointees
should be required to reoprt annually their financial interests and the
sources of their income.
Income tax reports of all Senators, Congressmen, Presidential appointees,
military officers of general or admiral rank, businessman and corporations
doing public business should be available to the public. Maybe this should
extend to all corporations for, as Gabriel Kolko aptly points out, "A corpora-
tion is now, essentially a non-statute political institution, and its directors
are in the same boat with public office holders." ' The public has a right
to know how public officials and businessmen doing public business invest
their money and increase their cea'ith. It would appear that individuals who do
not wish to make this type of infer-nation available should not run for public
office, engage in business with the government, or accept positions in the
executive branch. That corporations claim that making these reports available
would give valuable information to competitors should not be allowed to stand
2 Report of the 26th Assembly, op_. cit
., p. 8.
25oison, op_. cit., p. 109.
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in the way of the greater public interest. Profits made by corporations
doing government business is a part of the information a democratic society is
entitled to have, and it entails a loss of individual liberties when such
information is kept secret for individual or corporate gain. There would
be no law that would reduce conflict of interest quite so readily as one that
would make income tax reports available for public scrutiny. There is no
expectation that Congress would consider such a law on its own initiative.
However, if the Commission recommended such a law and each Congressman and
Senator was required to take a stand before the electorate on such an issue,
undoubtedly an aroused public would see the advantages and changes might occur.
There is little disagreement by Congressmen or leading political scientists
with the conclusion that Congress needs reorganization and more explicit
rules, but to accomplish these changes Congress needs the assistance of public
opinion and recorsnandations frori the Commission could obtain the necessary
public interest. At the present time a Congressman can campaign for a bill,
introduce it into Congress, have, it assigned to a Committee, and this can easily
be the last the public will hee;- cjout it until the next election. The public
is entitled to know why and hew .: -e bills a-e killed in committee. Secretary
Ickes recorded in his diary that the opinion of Vice-President Garner was that
there ought not to be any execu:iv2 session of any congressional cenmittees.
He made the point that it was all public business and that reporters should
be permitted to attend any committee meeting. Still, in 1953, 39% of Senate
Committee meeting- and 38% of House Committee meetings were secret. Probably
the worst effect of the present system is that secrecy really does not exist.
Each legislator leaks to the public his version of what happened in a committee
°Wiggins, op. cit., ppc. i2«13.
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meeting and what he wants his public to know. The public in many cases is not
27
only informed, it is misinformeco
The Commission might also have recommendations for protecting indivi-
dual liberties before Congressional committees. While the excesses of McCarthyism
have not reached the same heights again, many individuals are still tried legis-
latively who could not be tried legally. Lascvell claims it is necessary for
Congress to provide the example of fair play in its own hearings in order to
safeguard individual liberty, 2 a.i-J one of the recommendations of the 26th
Assembly is: "Each chamber should -dopi and er.force effective procedures to pro-
tect the constitutional and otht:- Taditional rights of citizens called before
its committees."
°
Many states have given the governor the right to veto individual items in
appropriation bills. Practically all student- of government, except Congressmen,
agree that, if the President coild veto specific items of appropriation bills,
economies could be made in goverr<.r..;nt and this would be most applicable and
27lbi.d>, pps. 19-20. James Russell Wiggins gives seven reascru why legis-
lative DOdfes in a democracy shcu't :i meet in the open: (1) public business and
not private business is the obj<c; of their deliberations, (2) 1ig-i:;lative power,
in a democracy, remains with the w ole people, and is only yielded in part, and
for stated intervals, to indivi. cting for the whole people, (3)
open proceedings enlist the ii ice of the whole community in ;he lawmaking
process, (4) public proceedings broaden participation in goveraxent by citizens
as a whole and make citizens to a certain extent participants in th^ government,
(5) public proceedings protect the comrv-mity, the state, or the nation against
the possibility of wrongdoing, eft ier by individual lawmakers who may mislead
or deceive a majority or by a whole legislative body, (6) at the saas time, they
protect the honest and conscientious legislator from successful imputation of
wrong conduct by false accuserSj (7) public proceedings protect a legislative
body against being made the vie* 1m of fraud or misrepresentation by witnesses
appearing at legislative heari.
2 Lasswell, op. cit
., p. 1C
29Report of the 2oth American Assembly, c£. cit., p. 7.
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probably most effective in regard to defense appropriations. Congress still
would have the considerable power of overriding the veto. If Congress could
muster this type of support, it would be an extreme case in which the President
would fail to follow the direction of Congress. The present arrangement of not
spending money for particular weapons satisfies neither Congress nor the public
but increases tension between Congress and the President.
The regulatory agencies also need examination from the viewpoint of the
public. Walter Adams and Horace H« Gray have written a book entitled Monopoly
In America, in which their thes'j .'s that government, mainly in these regulatory
agencies, fosters monopoly, qui nopoly, a.,d imperfect competition by its
policies.3° Just because these leguiatory agencies have been found necessary
does not mean that they have not c 'crstepped aeir original purpose and have
not increased their power in ways ot intended. This is a natural tendency of
government. Perhaps the Commit ton would find means to eliminate some government
controls that would restore los'.: competition. There could be some consolidation
in government by transferring duties from precent agencies to the Commission.
Cne obvious addition to the Cordis si on would be the Civil Rights Commission
whose duties are to investigate deprivation of voting rights due to color,
race, religion, or national orinir. and to report its findings and recommendations
to Congress and the President. Only very peripherally is the Civil Rights
Commission related to the milit; .-y-industria? complex but it is intimately
related to individual liberties and freedoms egarding the denial of equal
protection of the laws under the Constitution 31
3 "Walter M. Adams and Haro'. d M. Gray, Monopoly In America, p. XIV.
3'General Service Administration, Office of The Federal Register, National
Archives and Record Office, United States Government Organizational Manual
,
pps.
535-536.
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Every government has different methods of economic control. When dealing
with totalitarian governments or datnocracies, business has found out that the
goverrjnent is a required partner in overseas markets . Tariffs which once
were necessary to protect infant industries are now used for many different
purposes. These commitments, both internal and external, should be reviewed
from the standpoint of individual iiberty and democratic processes as well as
that of the image the United Stetes desires to portray to other countries. The
United States is using all Its rces to convince other nations lhat its
type of democracy is best for t! i =st coplt This Includes free enterprise.
The American image in these c:. ant. Not only official
declarations, but the actions c .'seals, CIA, and the military should
be reviewed from the standpoint c sratic freedom and liberty is
the ultimate result obtained frca ::his great increase of official Americans in
foreign countries. In over b0 countries, the United States has MAAG's (Military
Assistance Advisory Groups)." Our troops are deployed all over the world.
Their military job, for the most part, is unquestioned but a review by a disinter-
ested government agency with particular attention to methods used is warranted.
In addition, the militarymen stationed in foreign countries reach down into
many of the constiunities of the underdeveloped nations to develop plans and train
indigenous troops to do civilian jobs such as building roads, schools, churches,
sanitary facilities, etc.
Army technicians—engineers, food handlers, automotive mechanics,
communicators, medics, and others—are daily training Asian military per-
sonnel in skills important to civilian as well as military life. Ulti-
mately this trained manpower joins the civilian economy and becomes the
nucleus of a slowly growing and badly needed force of indigenous skilled
labor.33
32The Department of the Aruy, United States Army and World Security
, p. 70.
33General James F. Collins, "The Array in Pacific Area," Army, December,
1963, p. 62.
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The civilian work done by the military Is undoubtedly worthwhile, necessary,
and a job that both the Army and foreign governments recognize with pride.
There are convincing arguments for increasing it rather than decreasing it.
The Array has traditionally engaceo in civil wcrks in the United States and this
may be one of the best ways to sell freedom ar.d liberty, but this job and all
other missions being performed eve -seas should be evaluated by some agency other
than those performing them. If the co'.d war is an ideological battle and the
result hoped for by the United Jta es is the practice of United States democracy,
the democratic traditions of th< U rcec! State! must be practiced by our official
representatives throughout the »: . : 'cc-Icn could bring unbiased
opinion to the President, to Co: 3S, il a te the public in regard to the entire
field of our growing relations. k;1t!i otl ;.-ss.
Oemocrc ti c Instituti ens
The United States is proud of its fras institutions of press, pulpit, and
education. Unhampered for the n.ost part by federal control, all have a proud
heritage of independence and responsibility for informing and educating the
public. The proposed Comraissior. iiould have a profound effect on all three
if for no other reason than that more factual information would be available.
Beginning with Thomas Paine during the Revolution for Independence and
followed by Harriet Beecher Stove and the "Abolitionists" during the Civil War
period, the Hearst Press in the War of 1812, the fight for democracy in World
War I, and even now President Johnson's progre-a for "medicare" and assistance
to education the press keeps the public infonr.ed and is a powerful instrument to
instigate action. There is no e'ea.-th of information on the Congressional-
military-industrial complex as a distinct entity. There is also considerable
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information connecting its constituent groups and showing the interrelationship
between them. Faithfully reported by the press are cancellations of defense
projects such as Skybolt, RS-70, HMR3M and, with each cancellation, attacks
follow in the trade journals, until now skepticism of McNamara's decisions
in military development of weapons systems is being questioned by seme.34
On the other hand there is little said after such a cancellation as to
the aspects of individual liberty end freedom or an evaluation of unwarranted
influence by the Political-mi1it,;ry~industrial complex except by the partisans
who lost contracts. It is mainly an economic debate. The 1964 Presidential
campaign, with the opposing yf«ws of Qoldwater recommending more manned
ibers end the administration recommending primary reliance on ICMB's, is
an example.3* tothing is being seid about evaluating the costs of the two
concepts nor about the influence of the Congressional-military-industrial complex
in this debate. Maximum defense, regardless of cost, is still the persuasive
political view. The political ques< ions Americans are interested in are
security and economy: how much <poc can a Representative or Senator do for
his district or state? The press, when considered as a whole, faithfully
presents all the angles of this side of the controversy particularly as it
affects the area it serves. Lttt . or no evaluation is made as to individual
liberty or increased influence of the Congressicnal-military-industrial complex,
nor is the general public interested. Economic and military security are more
important than individual liberty and freedom as far as news is concerned.
34u
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Americans willingly give u.5 their liberties and freedom in order to advance
their economic status by joining i.nior.s or associations which police their
activities such as the Stock E: ige, American Medical Association or the
American Bar Association, or by contracts sucli as athletes make in baseball,
football, and other sports. The press faithf illy reports the existence, methods
and aims of these organizations* They deprive individuals of freedom and
liberty but are not considered a threat to a "ree nation. But when it comes
to individual liberty and freed:.ii connected with the Congressionai-military-
industrial complex, a complex s; I ;ge that it reaches into every Congressional
district in the nation, the . k with unanimity no.- continuity
nor is it expected to. Editor-; _'.. , magazine articles, and scholastic journals
present a voluminous amount of material, gooo and bad, thoughtful end superficial,
and of every shade of political belief and self-interest. There is no agency
to digest this material factually and to present a program of action when
necessary. What material is available comas from Congress, industry, or the
Pentagon--all of which are members of the con ilex. The material needs to be
reevaluated objectively from t'm public point of view. Arthur Barber says,
"I can think of no major problem, of national security or disarmament in which
the basic information is not available from unclassified sources." This is
certainly a minority point of view and is suspect, as Mr. Barber is a Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense. 3ut his other charge is more substantial,
as he says the material is scattered in the Congressional Record and Committee
reports, executive reports, newspapers, and public statements which are not
being adequately researched, correlated, synthesized and presented in a manner
3°Kansas City Star, October 15, 196**, p. 1.
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from which the interested public c^n draw adecjate solutions.
Fulsome praise can be given the press for its ability to recognize a timely
news issue and to ferret out the details. Only on rare occasions does the
daily press perform this detailed type of research suggested by Mr. Barber.
As has been noted, the press has little confidence at present in governmental
classification procedure. Operating on the democratic theory that the people
can decide if they have the information, the Commission would have as its main -
purpose to increase the flow of t\ aly inform; :ion to the public. The press
undoubtedly would welcome an inc. . ndent agency that would be sympathetic
to its charges- of suppression c . had sufficient influence to cause
changes. There is no doubt th g - sss and the line agencies (StJte Department,
Defense Department, Atomic Enerty ;omnrission, CIA and so on)
tend to exaggerate the import nee nnd secrecy of their activities and to
apply higher security standards than an informed outsider would consider
justified by the facts. ... In addition, the line agencies, knowing that
their decisions will be subject to review, would exercise considerably
more care and discriminatic • r.ct usej on the opposite side of the
fence, journalistic playinc off of one arency against another would be
discourac;£d. 37
There is another possible effect that could result. I have accepted that
the press of the United States is •^sponsible,. That this conclusion is not
fully true is hardly arguable. " : press coi d do much to increase its
objectivity and quality. By bringing facts of irresponsibility to the attention
of the public the Commission woi:ld create a healthful atmosphere of discussion
within the press and might even bring some self-policing that would be bene-
ficial. An example is the recer.t discussion over the actions of the press in
37john P. Roche, Shadows ar.d Substance
, p. 368.
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trying criminal cases by the public before a jury has acted. } There are
many other areas of sensational! ;rn and bias which could be corrected by free
discussion and make our free pre;... which is undoubtedly one of the bulwarks of
a free country, more responsive to our best ic'^als. Douglass Cater, a
newspaperman, now a member of President Johnson's staff, makes a pica for
political scientists to assess the responsibility of the press. He claims that
39
we have government by the newspapers consisting of trial balloons and leaks.
The press is the first to declaim when it believes information it is entitled
to is withheld. Still it continually withholds information the public is
entitled to. By refusing to noire :he contact from which information is received,
the press refuses the concerned citizen a vital element in assessing the
reliability of the information. T-.e Commission might be influential in these
areas in assisting our free p. more . ^sponsible.
Next to be considered are i ional institutions. W. W. Rostow, in
"United States in the World Are:;:,' 1 says:
It is clear that the universities--; s a byproduct of their normal
business are a major source of the fundamental ideas on which our military
hardware, our foreign policy, large segments of our domestic policy, and
our living concepts of the law ar;; based. Universities create ideas; and
ideas are what we live by; what we build our machines out of; jnd in
the end determine how we alert our basic institutions in the face of a
changing reality.^'
The above statement is ful y corroborate.: by the arms debate now in progress.
This debate is covering every pi -: i of arms, ; isarmament, war, peace, military
strategy of all types, as well as Foreign policy in a thermonuclear age.
38james J. Kilpatrick, "Fa r Trial - Fre ; Press Conflict Can't Be Fully
Solved," Kansas City Star, February 25, 1965.
39oouglass Cater, The Four h 3ranch of Government, passim.
^°W. W. Rostow, United Sta:e: : in the worfd Arena, p. iii.
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Probably no subject has so enga3e( such a large percentage of the scholarly
minds of the country since the adoption of tho Constitution was debated and
every man who could read or wrr
. to understand and have an opinion on
Locke- Montesquieu, and Black!
_ ^ to be expected that this debate
should engage so many authors, i jhe survival of western
civilization as we know it. ' Many foundations such as RAND, Rockefeller,
Carnegie, Ford, and others ai rfng these projects. In this connection
Arthur Herzog cc.T.raents,
« °u
S
f, .*,
he r" : :as 3boul American intenectual life
since World War II is , i its institutionalization intothought centers of one kirn a, ther, and nowhere is this more dearlytrue than in the kind of thinking that has been applied to the cold war.No less than three hundred study centers of all sorts now consult for theDepartment of Defense, T,c a .cunt of brain-power such places can aqqlomer-
tlt I
S IT*8"** RAND| for Stance, has a staff of 1,100, of whom 600are professionals, and 2S0 of their. Ph.D.s, enough to staff a university.**2
Scholarly publication and research is also being accomplished in the graduate
programs of universities, particularly at Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, Pennsylvania State University, Johns Hopkins,
Chicago, Ohio State, and Stanford.
The production and advice of these scholars have affected national policy.
Several of the authors have been brought into responsible government positions, 43
and two of these books, Henry Kissinger's The Necessity for Choice** and Robert
Osgood's Limited Warfare,4? are credited with influencing the change in national
4, Robert A. Levine, The Ansa Debate
. This book and its bibliography presenta salary of current opinion on
-.he entTre subject without providing personal
wO f (ibid ... |
2Arthur Herzog, The War-Pence Establishment, p. 54.
** * „
0f the P^ncipal contributors are w. W. Rostow, who is presently on the
^JSEf"""*W ?,""*."* 3oard and Heraan «*** wh° »»« "eld severe? govern-ment positions, principally with the Air Force. s»
^K55!^ I|!|iSiif£Lite "aw York, Harper 6 Brothers, I960.Robert E. Osgood, Limited Warfare, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, I9J2
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policy under President Kennedy of "flexible response" from that of President
Eisenhower's and Dulles' poticy of "massive retaliation." Military men are
even co.-r.plaining that the sacred prerogative of the military to determine
strategy has bsen preempted by scholars.
While it is true that scholars deserve the major credit for bringing new
ideas, theories, and many facets of war and peace in a thermonuclear age into
sharp focus: it is also true that curriculums in the universities have not in
the same degree kept pace with changing conditions. The military budget is
50 to 60 percent of the national budget. At a time when military influence is
having a profound effect upon the ation, few colleges are giving courses
specifically in military history, military poHcy, military security, or
foundations of national pc
In a study completed in 1955 enly seven percent of the universities and
colleges answering the questionnaire were giving courses purely in military
47
mstory or policy. On the other hand as the interrelationship of foreign policy
and national security is inextricable it is true that the problems of security
are being given more and more attention in allied courses. The same is true
of the scientific revolution. Scientific history is quite new in our society.**8
Undergraduate courses in new field, must usually wait for professors to be
trained in sufficient numbers for r..ajor curriculum changes to be made. If
universities follow the normal path, it will be years before undergraduates are
offered specific courses in military history, security and policy in a majority
of our universities. Dr. Richard C. Brown co.-.jludes,
fcart H. Gin "The Challenges to Military Professionalism,"
fli£_f°rce and S-::.^ Pigest. Hare-, \9ok, pps. 50-56.
'Richard C. Srcvin, Thajfca-.^nq of Military History in Colleges and
University, of tne United t: F Historical Studies: No. l^tToTTk.
Loren Eisley, "Che Genesis of Genius," review of Arthur Koestler's,
The Art of Creation," The New York Times Book Review, October 18, 1964, p. 3.
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A knowledge of military history is useful, even necessary, if our
citizens are to be able to it decisions on the problems
facing our country now and in the future,, For young men who are to spend
even part of their adult lives in military service, the study of military
history can be a profitable experience. At the graduate level, for the
historian-in-training a study of military history is almost imperative if
he is to be able to interpret twentieth century history in a meaningful
fashion. There are job opportunities for historians with an interest
in military history and training in the field. Military histo.-y is
interesting; it can contribute color and drama to any course in history.
And, finally, military history can be of service throughout an individual's
life, as a hobby or avocation.
°
The problems of war and peace in a thermonuclear age are being considered by
the intelligentsia but the dialect: to a gree extent is written by the
intelligentsia for the intelligt.v: fa and for those like J. F. Kennedy.
It is expected that the C ion will -ntract with educational
institutions for studies evu. id performing the necessary
detailed research on various pr;.;: :- s » If successful this would create a
better understanding by scholar: of problems ct the national level. This
would appear to be a healthy development.
Arthur Berber says:
I can remember a time when facts and closely worded argument and con-
troversial thought were the hallmark of the university scholar. Indeed,
I believe I can recall a day when scholars would debate and write without
a government contract or a foundation grant. 5°
This implied condemnation is a most serious one for our universities.
However, there are many scholar. y agencies in the United States not tied to
government. They are usually or" two types: discussion groups which present
differing opinions with no conclusions and groups, presenting conclusions and
usually a plan of action. Of the first type, probably the most p.-estigous is
the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions whose chairman is Robert
H, Hutchins." There are many scholarly and ;ublicly-inspired groups sponsoring
cf^E* cit ., p. 12.
'Arthur Barber, "The Citizen, The Scholar, and The Policy Maker," Back-
ground, August 1964, p. 84.
5l Edward Reed, ed«. Challennes to Democracy; The Next Ten Years , New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, 19637
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.s second type, similar to the "American Assembly of
. 2?ort, the 26th has been previously quoted,
and America's Future." Both these organizations attract
. niug and the foremost American leaders in all fields.
-heir recommendations end thoughts are not discussed
the press and scholarly publications. But again, it is like the intelligentsia
-'ligentsia, for the irast part. The results of these discus-
:._', e 1 miniltal to date. Probably the most important reason for this
that there is no requiraner.t for government action. If any
.-de in correcting or controlling the Congressional -ail itary-
' industrial complex through a more informed public, the organization must exert
with Congr i and the executive establishment to take
ndations. It must be an organization that cannot be
red. An organization simiKr to the Hoover Commission to improve government
-ion could be the answer but it must have the continuity which the
.
-
of the great democratic educational institutions
to be cor... It is difficult to assess the effect of this independent
and diffusa group of thinkers. Churchmen were leaders in defeating UMT by
. _s with such organizations as the National Council Against
an* Fellowship of Reconciliation, Friends Coraaittee on National
-ional Council for Prevention of War.^2 Many leaders of the
church ere active ih peace movenentj almost too numerous to mention like SANE
,. for a San Policy), which advocate a variety of
-ions including unilateral disarmament, nn-resi stance, and non-violent
52John M. Swoir.. -,-y Establishment
, p. X.
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resistance. But there are also realists like Seinhold Niebuhr who contend
that there is no one solution to world tensions but the problem of peace and
war must be attacked on a broad front involving increased world trade, progress
in education, economic development, better communication, and so on.^ At the
turn of the century Right Reverend William Lawrence was not alone nor considered
radical when he preached that "in the long run, it is only to the man of morality
that wealth comes.
"
5^ The church aa a whole has never conducted a vendetta
against industry. A good portion of the church in America has always been able '
to make accomodation with the consensus on practically any subject. As
James E. Dougherty, Catholic theologian and a member of forward strategists
like Strausz-Hupe, se
Generally speaking, the Church has always approached the problem of
military power with circumspection. Secognizing that nowhere in the Gospel
is military life censured, the Church is not at all sure that the meanings
of the Scriptural passage on which the pacifists rely so heavily (e.g. 'they
who live by the sword shall perish by it') are incontestably conclusive.55
Churches have their own racicals and reactionaries. While undoubtedly
churches as a whole are influential, they are not unified, and their leaders are
as diverse in their teachings as there are political beliefs in the country.
Churches are generally against vhe use of military power except as a last resort.
The same is true of our government as well as the military within car government.
ver, churches should benefit as well as the press and educational institu-
:n a freer flow of factual i ,iforraation. Undoubtedly they would support
the Commission in its overall efforts toward personal liberty and greater
individual freedom.
o. cit
., pps. 229-251 and 88-91.
5;Earl F. Cheii, The Business Establishment ^ p. 53.
55herzog, op_. cit
., p. 230*.
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Conclusion
A huge military establishment., larger corporations growing bigger all
the tins, cold war showing no sign of abatement, emerging nations enibued with
nationalism and creating world tensions, industrialization, scientific revolution,
bureaucratization, automation, urbanization—all are making our pluralistic
society more complex. Senator Fulbright says, "Foreign policy in our time
is inseparable from domestic policy. It is more accurate to think of every
aspect of public activity as pal national oolicy."56 President Eisenhower's
contention that the military-i.ic
. unknowingly and undaliberately
generates pressure and influor.c- wot s i. .-oved.
Under these conditions i . ava already been iost. It is
an accepted theory c hat he public is entitled to be informed
about its gi ;. An agenc) ... the .o? Kvel of government whose mission
is to protect individual liberty and freedom by investigating and reviewing
government policies and increasir., the flow c. information is a worthwhile
concept.
Still this Commission woulc b no panacee, It would not immediately correct
all the misconceptions or areas no ding atte.-v ion which have been brought out
in this thesis, soma of which hsve been in 01. government for years.. Still if
the Commission operated as envisaged it would create an atmosphere of trust and
confidence among the citizenry c:: _he country and within our democratic
institutions of education, press, ^.nd pulpit. This appears desirable.
No other agancy of the government could ake on this added job with the
necessary degree of detachment end impartiality in addition to its present duties.
The Commission would not enforce laws. As has been stated, its only directive
power would be in establishing uniform classification standards. The
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Commission would undoubtedly recommend laws for Congress to consider. If the
laws were enacted, their enforcement would be a matter for Department of
Justice and the courts. The mi would get assistance from and might
-Tiend changes in the operation/, of the Bureau of the Budget, wruch
oversees Presidential policies, puts a price t3g on them, and reviews their
success each year as a new budg;'; s prepared* GAO, which authenticates
defense contracts and decider .. has received full value, would
be a source of material and stetis :ics Dmnrfssfon would not take over
{ts job. . iion by recc ,.,. ndir.g chan. ;s 'would be influential in
providing - us which vie. -.,-. which has been lacking in the
past becc „ Likewise conditions
requiring loss of freedom would be fully explained due to the review of the
Commission,
The success of the Ccnroission would depend a great deal upon the enabling
legislation and the biggest hurtle would be getting Congress to recognize the
need for such an agency. Place; c-j of the Cc Tiission in the hierarchy of the
government would be as imports-; as the duties assigned. The head must be a
.
iC in order to c; a competent job, and similarly, as has been
stated, it m^st report to both the Congress ar.d the President. It could not be
expected that the President would have a member of the NSC who was not only
his adviser but also whom he had not appointed. Therefore the head should be
a political appointee, serving at the pleasure of the President and he should
ba of the stature of a Supreme Court Ju3ticec The other members of the
Ccranission should be appointed for staggering terms so that appointments would
not all become vace.-..; "nistratior.. This would tend to create the
necessary confidence by assuring the citizenry that the Commission was not a
political instrument. This is of primary importance.
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The Commission, if established, would be the means by which the nation
becomes aware of the pressures generated by the Congressional-military-industrial
complex so that the American goal of peace with justice could be more adequately
served. The Convnission could be the forum which would assist the citizenry in
President Eisenhower's words to is "unswerving in devotion to principle, con-
fident but humble with power, di licent in pursuit of the Nation's great goals."57
In short the Commission would to realize America's continuing aspiration,
"that all who yearn for free. BXf it's spiritual blessings; that
those who have freedom will unde. s- _nd, also, -:ts heavy responsibilities. "58
57president Eisenhower':: II Address.
S^Loc. cit.
APPENDIX
Farewell Radio and Television Address to
the American People. January 17, 1961
(Delivered from the President's Office at 8:30 p.m.)
Hy fellow Americans:
Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country,
I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn
ceremony, the authority of the Presidency is vested in my successor.
This evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell,
and to share a few final thouoh : jith you, my countrymen.
Like every other citizen, ' v .sh the new President, and all who will
';abor with him, Godspeed. I pi ;h3t the coming years will be blessed
with peace and prosperity for
Our people expect thai.- -dent and the Congress to find essential
seroent on issues of great .... the wise resolution of which will
better shape the future of th-
My own relations with the ;or jress, which began on a remote and
tenuous basis when, long ago, o .-... ..jer of the Senate appointed me to
V/est Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and imme-
diate post-war period, and, finally, to the mutually interdependent during
these past eight years.
In this final relationship ; ne Congress and the Administration have,
on most vital issues, cooperate; well, to ser 'e the national good rather than
mere partisanship, and so hav a business of the Nation
should go forward. So, my offi :ial relationship with the Congress ends
in a feeling, on my part, of gr Iti :ude that \. . have been able to dc so
much together.
II.
-an years y of a century that has wit-
nessed four major wars among it nations. "hree of these involved
our own country. Despite these idocausts America is today the strongest,
the most influential and most productive nation in the world. Under-
standably proud of this pre-cmi.ierce, we yet .ealize that America's leader-
hd, not merely upon our unmatched material progress,
riches and military strength, but on how we u-e our power in the interests
-,-ld peace and human betten.ient.
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Throughout: America's ad. (n ."res government, our basic pur-
poses have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achieve-
ments and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people ar.d
Ions. To strive for U:;s would be unworthy of a free and re-
ligious peopie. Any failure traceable to arrcgance, or our lack of cora-
urehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt
both at home and abroad.
Progress toward these nob ts persistently threatened by the
fifing the worl< „ It coranandi our whole attention, ab-
sorbs our vary beings. We face a hostile ider logy—global in scope,
atheistic in character, rut;., ;e, . nd insidious in method. Un-
happily the danger it poses
.
-.inite duration. To
meet it successfully,
... r .U;Ch the emotiorel and
itory sacrii:-:cce of - ose which enable us to carry
forward steadily, surely, ar..: : ihe burdens of a pro-
longed and e ko. Only thus shall we
.
on
. .id course toward perma-
nent peace and heman betterr.-.-
w<11 conti ;;r.g them, whether foreign or
tic, great or small, there is a recurrirv temptation to feel that some
spectacu;. stty action c< ths miraculous solution to
i in newer elements of our de-
;• to the road we .:o travel.
;ach proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader considera-
tion: the need to maintain balei.es in and among national programs-
balance between the private end the public economy, balance between
sst and hoped for advantage—brie nee between the clearly necessary and
the comfortably desirable} balai.ca between our essential requirements as
a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; bal-
ance between actions of the moiiKjit and the national welfare of the
future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually
finds imbalance and frustration,.
The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their
gover: e, in the main, understood these truths and have re-
sponded to them well, in the face of stress ar.d threat. But threats, new
in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention too only.
IV.
A '•
-it in keeping the peace is cur military establishment.
Our arras must be mighty, ready -. :or instant action, so that no potential
aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.
Our military organization today bears little relation to that known
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by any of my predecessors in pei.ceiime, or indeed by the fighting men
o.' World War II or Korea.
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no arma-
rr.ents industry,, American makers of plowshares could, with time and
as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emer-
gency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create
a per., aments industry of vast proportions. Added to this,
three and a he>1f million men and women are directly engaged in the de-
. establishment. We annuaKy spend on military security more than
the net income of all United States corporations.
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large
arms industry is new in the American-experience. The total influence—
economic, political, even spiritual--is felt in every city, every State house,
every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative
need for this development. Yet Me must not fail to comprehend its grave
implications. Our toil, rescur:et and livelihood are all involved; so is the
very structure of our society.
In the councils of gove ist g ard against the acquisition
of unwarranted influence c-rgiit, by the military-
industrial complex. The po. astrous rise of misplaced
rfli persist.
Hon endanger our liberties
Cake nothing for granted. Only an
e proper meshing of the
military machinery of defense with our peaceful
.
so that sc and liberty may prosper together.
and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our indus-
trial
-nil i tary posture, has L le technological revolution during recent
decades.
In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more
sx, and costly, A steadily increasing share is con-
.
by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.
-
solitary inventor, tinkering :n his shop, has been over-
bed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing rields. In
t|» sara i, the free university, historically the fountainhced of free
sas and scientific discover da revolution in the conduct
if research. Partly because or involved, a government con-
virtualty a substiti
.
se for Intel lectual curiosity. For every
old blackboard theru are now hundreds of new electronic computers.
ati<
.
the natioe s scholars by Federal employ-
;'Ior>s, and the powsr of ir. jney is ever present— and
ravel y to be . egarded.
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Yet, in holding scientific research and oiscovery in respect, as we should,
we must also be alert to the eqial and opposit:: dancer that public policy
could itself become the captive of a scientific-tecriological elite.
is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate
these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic
system—ever aiming toward the . ems goals of our free society.
V.
Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time.
i we peer into society's future., we—you and I, and our government-
must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own
ind convenience, the precicus resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage
the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss
also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to
survive for all generations to c , not to become the insolvent phantom
of tCT.orrow.
VI.
Down the long lar.a of the history yet to be written America knows that
this world of ours, ever grow .ler, must avoid becoming a com-
munity of dreadful fear and ha be, instead, a proud confederation
of mutual
Sue; deration M .The weakest must come
t0 th
-
-ile with tl j ao do we, protected as
we are by our ;r.orat» economic , : rail' ength. That table,
many past . Ions, canrot be abandoned for the
of the battlefield
and confidence) is a continuing
imperatives, Together we must lear .-, how to cor nose differences, not
v
"" £n
-• 'ith intellect ; «ent purpose. Because this need
and apparent I confers that I lay down my official responsi-
in this field with a s sense of disappointment. As one who
id the horror and the "lingering sadness of war—as one who
>ther war could utterly destroy this civilization which has
been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years— I wish I
could say tonight that a lasting paace is in sight.
ily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward
our ultimate goal has been made. But, so much remains to be done.
a private citizen, I shall neve/ cease to do what little I can to help the
world advance along that road.
'II.
lis my last good night to you as your President— I thank you
i many opportunities you have given me far public service in war
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and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy;
r the rest of it, I know ycu will find wcys to improve performance
in the future.
You and I--my fellow citiz: jo be strong in our faith that all
ns, under God, will reach , of pe.-ce with justice. Hay
we be ever unswerving in devoticr, to principle, confident but humble
.
power, diligent iti pursuit of the Nation's great goals.
To all the peoples of the vci^d, I once r: are give expression to
ca's prayerful and continuing aspirations
Public Papers c- the :: ts; Cwicht 3. Eisenhower 1960-61
, pps. 1035-
1 Qi;0.
We pray that peoples of ali faiths, all races, all nations, may have
their great human needs satisfi<d; that those now denied opportunity shall
come to enjoy it to the fullj that sll who ye. Ml for freedom may ex-
perience iis spiritual blessinc; ;hat ;ho;e I ho have freedom will under-
.
also, its heavy respor.. . . , that all who are insensitive to the
needs of others will learn chc. : the r courges of poverty, disease
and ignorance will be made to c tjpear from \ he earth, and that, in the
goodness of time, all peoples v.j . coma _o live together in a peace guaran-
teed by the binding force ^. J a respect ai d love.
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Reminiscent of George Washington, President Elsenhower chose to ask* a
farewell address. No platform Is more prestigious nor more Influential than
that of the President of the United States. Ho words should or do receive
more analysis. A farewell address only increased the natural Interest in the
President's words, because of the added hope that his eight years' experience
would bring forth the distilled wisdom he had obtained, to chart a course for
the future of the nation he had led with such dedication.
In one portion of this speech the President coined a new phrase—'Military-
Industrial complex". Ho made four points about this complex! (1) It was Inmense,
and it was imperative for the security of the free world) (2) its Influence was
being folt In every structure of our society—economic, political, and even spiri-
tual) (3) It has a potential for misplaced power that exists and will persist)
CO and only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing
of the complex so that security and liberty may prosper together* The President's
words added up to a warning against potential militarism. The subject was not new.
Several prominent man and scholars had written about the effects of the cold wsr,
with emphasis placed on the combined effect of increased military Influence in
all phases of American life and of the industrial base which supported this
new military power* The report of the Nye Committee, which was partially respon-
sible for the neutrality of the United States In the late thirties prior to
World War II, had not been entirely forgotten. The President's words only
emphasized a condition suspected by many but they were particularly important
because, he, of all men, had shown particular trust, respect, and understanding
to the American military and industrial leaders* He owed his success to these
two spheres of American life*
The purpose of this thesis Is to discuss the reasons behind the President's
charge, to determine whether his statement was justified, and to ascertain to
what degree thl* complex repre»ents a threat to Individual liberties and free-
dom and to the democratic processes of the United States.
The thesis attempts to analyze the President's words and actions whit* In
office and, simultaneously, Ms words regarding the complex since his retire-
ment. The Congressional Record and Congressional Quarterly have been used to
find out what Congress has said on this and related subjects. The words of
military scholars and industrial economists and other social scientists have
also been studied. As the subject Is a current one and the president had
specifically said the danger was potential* the New York Times. Kansas City Star
and Times. Heiawook. U. S. News and World Report and Time Magazine have bean read
dally or weekly during 1964, as the case may be, and the material evaluated. To
get the viewpoint of the military and industry, each Issue of The Journal of the
Armed Forces, Army. Alrpower, Aviation Week, Business week, and Missiles and Rockets
have been reviewed for the same period. Additional trade and scholarly magazines
have also been consulted.
The findings agree with those of President Eisenhower, but not with his
recommendation. The thesis concludes that the military-Industrial complex Is not
consciously operational, and that its power lies In public apathy, In lack of
public information, and in the creeping erosion of its appearance. However,
there are Inherent safeguards against this phenomenon. On the other hand, the
potential danger is greatly Increased by its alliance with Congress. And, most
important, some liberties and freedoms have already been lost due to Its existence.
The Eisenhower recommendation of an alert and knowledgeable citizenry is
unobtainable under our present political system and methods of government operation.
The needed information prior to the decision Is not available for the public to
become knowledgeable. Decisions on defense must be taken for the most part on
faith and trust. The executive branch, which includes the military, plus the
legislative branch, and industry combine to increase secrecy, and information
from all throe is given to the public only from the viewpoint of their self-
interest.
A countervailing power Is needed that will work toward Informing the elec-
torate and promote public and national debate. This countervailing power must
have the support of Congress, the executive branch, and the press. A solution
with modifications as first outlined by Or. H. 0. Lssswatl In his book.
National Security and Individual Freedom, is recommended.
